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Financial Crises and Central Bank Independence

Financial Crises and Central Bank Independence Abstract Although cooperation between central banks and treasuries is controversial, this paper contends that in a crisis it is inevitable and desirable. Six reasons for cooperation in a crisis are advanced. Disengagement in the aftermath and restoring central bank independence is tricky, however. The paper concludes with comments on what is necessary to maintain central bank credibility. http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png Business Economics Springer Journals

Financial Crises and Central Bank Independence

Blinder, Alan S
Business Economics , Volume 48 (3): 3 – Jul 1, 2013
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Publisher
Springer Journals
Copyright
2013 National Association for Business Economics
ISSN
0007-666X
eISSN
1554-432X
DOI
10.1057/be.2013.12
Publisher site
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Abstract

Abstract Although cooperation between central banks and treasuries is controversial, this paper contends that in a crisis it is inevitable and desirable. Six reasons for cooperation in a crisis are advanced. Disengagement in the aftermath and restoring central bank independence is tricky, however. The paper concludes with comments on what is necessary to maintain central bank credibility.

Journal

Business Economics – Springer Journals

Published: Jul 1, 2013

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