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[The theory of rational choice (TRC) is a model of explanation used by social science theorists to interpret behavior. Initially, the theory was the dominant paradigm of economics. A fundamental postulate of neoclassical economics was that economic phenomena primarily resulted from the action of agents who were fully rational, equal and therefore indistinguishable from each other and all agents pursuing their own personal and individual gain.]
Published: Sep 11, 2012
Keywords: Utility Function; Nash Equilibrium; Game Theory; Rational Agent; Rational Choice
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