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Empirically Engaged Evolutionary EthicsDual-Process Theories, Cognitive Decoupling and the Outcome-to-Intent Shift: A Developmental Perspective on Evolutionary Ethics

Empirically Engaged Evolutionary Ethics: Dual-Process Theories, Cognitive Decoupling and the... [A central tenet of evolutionary ethics is that as a result of evolutionary processes, humans tend to respond in certain ways to particular moral problems. Various authors have posited “dual-process” conflicts between “fast”, automatic, evolved impulses, and “slower”, controlled, reasoned judgements. In this chapter we argue that the evolutionary sources of automatic moral judgements are diverse, and include some intuitive processes (especially, reading other people’s intentions) that are quite sophisticated in term of social cognition. In our view, controlled, reflective moral reasoning represents the activity of higher-level processes that arbitrate between conflicting inputs from diverse automatic heuristics, in response to normative concerns. The integration and subjugation of automatic responses to more reflective ones is a developmental process that takes place at varying rates in different people and in diverse cultural contexts. We consider how approaches that represent cognition in terms of dual processes can be rendered more sophisticated by a consideration of evolutionary developmental psychology. We then apply this more developmentally aware approach to an extended example of the phenomenon in children’s moral development known as the outcome-to-intent shift. We outline a model of how automatic and controlled processes may be integrated in children’s social learning in culturally variable ways.] http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png

Empirically Engaged Evolutionary EthicsDual-Process Theories, Cognitive Decoupling and the Outcome-to-Intent Shift: A Developmental Perspective on Evolutionary Ethics

Part of the Synthese Library Book Series (volume 437)
Editors: De Smedt, Johan; De Cruz, Helen

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Publisher
Springer International Publishing
Copyright
© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021
ISBN
978-3-030-68801-1
Pages
17 –40
DOI
10.1007/978-3-030-68802-8_2
Publisher site
See Chapter on Publisher Site

Abstract

[A central tenet of evolutionary ethics is that as a result of evolutionary processes, humans tend to respond in certain ways to particular moral problems. Various authors have posited “dual-process” conflicts between “fast”, automatic, evolved impulses, and “slower”, controlled, reasoned judgements. In this chapter we argue that the evolutionary sources of automatic moral judgements are diverse, and include some intuitive processes (especially, reading other people’s intentions) that are quite sophisticated in term of social cognition. In our view, controlled, reflective moral reasoning represents the activity of higher-level processes that arbitrate between conflicting inputs from diverse automatic heuristics, in response to normative concerns. The integration and subjugation of automatic responses to more reflective ones is a developmental process that takes place at varying rates in different people and in diverse cultural contexts. We consider how approaches that represent cognition in terms of dual processes can be rendered more sophisticated by a consideration of evolutionary developmental psychology. We then apply this more developmentally aware approach to an extended example of the phenomenon in children’s moral development known as the outcome-to-intent shift. We outline a model of how automatic and controlled processes may be integrated in children’s social learning in culturally variable ways.]

Published: May 5, 2021

Keywords: Child development Child development; Cognitive development Cognitive development; Cultural differences Cultural differences; Dual-process theories Dual-process theories; Evolutionary developmental psychology Evolutionary developmental psychology; Executive functioning Executive functioning (EF); Moral development Moral development; Moral reasoning; Outcome-to-intent shift Outcome-to-intent shift; Piaget; Theory of mind Theory of mind

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