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Divisional performance measurement and transfer pricing for intangible assets

Divisional performance measurement and transfer pricing for intangible assets This paper examines the effectiveness of three transfer pricing methodologies for an intangible asset that is developed through bilateral, sequential investment. In general, a royalty-based transfer price that can be renegotiated provides better investment incentives than either a non-negotiable royalty-based transfer price or a purely negotiated transfer price, and in some cases induces first-best investment. This result contrasts with previous research that finds that the inability to limit renegotiation of initial contracts reduces investment efficiency. Further, I examine how tax transfer pricing rules inform optimal internal transfer prices when the firm decouples internal and external transfer prices. http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png Review of Accounting Studies Springer Journals

Divisional performance measurement and transfer pricing for intangible assets

Review of Accounting Studies , Volume 11 (3) – May 17, 2006

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References (51)

Publisher
Springer Journals
Copyright
Copyright © 2006 by Springer Science+Business Media, LLC
Subject
Business and Management; Accounting/Auditing; Corporate Finance; Public Finance
ISSN
1380-6653
eISSN
1573-7136
DOI
10.1007/s11142-006-9006-z
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

This paper examines the effectiveness of three transfer pricing methodologies for an intangible asset that is developed through bilateral, sequential investment. In general, a royalty-based transfer price that can be renegotiated provides better investment incentives than either a non-negotiable royalty-based transfer price or a purely negotiated transfer price, and in some cases induces first-best investment. This result contrasts with previous research that finds that the inability to limit renegotiation of initial contracts reduces investment efficiency. Further, I examine how tax transfer pricing rules inform optimal internal transfer prices when the firm decouples internal and external transfer prices.

Journal

Review of Accounting StudiesSpringer Journals

Published: May 17, 2006

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