Access the full text.
Sign up today, get DeepDyve free for 14 days.
T Zandt, X Vives (2007)
Monotone equilibria in Bayesian games of strategic complementaritiesJournal of Economic Theory, 134
J. Jansen (2010)
Strategic Information Disclosure and Competition for an Imperfectly Protected InnovationCorporate Governance: Disclosure
M. Darrough, N. Stoughton (1990)
Financial disclosure policy in an entry gameJournal of Accounting and Economics, 12
(1981)
Good news and bad news: Representation theorems and applications
(1977)
Reliability models with positive memory derived from the mean residual life function
M. Bagnoli, Ted Bergstrom (2004)
Log-concave probability and its applicationsEconomic Theory, 26
Frank Gigler (1994)
Self-Enforcing Voluntary DisclosuresJournal of Accounting Research, 32
Gerald Feltham, J. Xie (1992)
Voluntary financial disclosure in an entry game with continua of typesContemporary Accounting Research, 9
R. Dye (1985)
DISCLOSURE OF NONPROPRIETARY INFORMATIONJournal of Accounting Research, 23
R Verrecchia (1983)
Discretionary disclosureJournal of Accounting and Economics, 5
R. Guo, B. Lev, Nan Zhou (2004)
Competitive Costs of Disclosure by Biotech IPOsJournal of Accounting Research, 42
G. Swartz (1973)
The Mean Residual Lifetime FunctionIEEE Transactions on Reliability, 2
D Harhoff, J Henkel, E Hippel (2003)
Profiting from voluntary information spill overs: How users benefit by freely revealing their innovationsResearch Policy, 32
J Jansen (2010)
Strategic information disclosure and competition for an imperfectly protected innovationJournal of Industrial Economics, 58
Jeremy Bulow, J. Geanakoplos, P. Klemperer (1985)
Multimarket Oligopoly: Strategic Substitutes and ComplementsJournal of Political Economy, 93
(1981)
The role of warranties and private disclosure about product quality
R. Levin, P. Reiss (1988)
Cost-Reducing and Demand-Creating R&D with SpilloversIO: Productivity
J. Jansen (2009)
On Competition and the Strategic Management of Intellectual Property in OligopolyMicroeconomics: Production
Woon‐Oh Jung, Y. Kwon (1988)
Disclosure When The Market Is Unsure Of Information Endowment Of ManagersJournal of Accounting Research, 26
M. Darrough (1993)
Disclosure policy and competition: Cournot vs. BertrandAccounting review: A quarterly journal of the American Accounting Association, 68
(2010)
More than numbers: R&D-related disclosures and firm performance. Working paper
W. Whitt (1980)
Uniform conditional stochastic orderJournal of Applied Probability, 17
Discretionary disclosure, spillovers, and competition 341
James Brander, Barbara Spencer (1983)
Strategic Commitment with R&D: The Symmetric CaseThe Bell Journal of Economics, 14
James Anton, D. Yao (2004)
Little patents and big secrets: managing intellectual propertyThe RAND Journal of Economics, 35
T. Zandt, X. Vives (2003)
Monotone Equilibria in Bayesian Games of Strategic ComplementaritiesCEPR Discussion Paper Series
Denise Jones (2007)
Voluntary Disclosure in R&D-Intensive Industries*Contemporary Accounting Research, 24
D. Harhoff, J. Henkel, Eric Hippel
Mit Sloan School of Management Mit Sloan School Working Paper 4749-09 Profiting from Voluntary Information Spillovers: How Users Benefit by Freely Revealing Their Innovations Profiting from Voluntary Information Spillovers: How Users Benefit by Freely Revealing Their Innovations *
Joseph Weber, Robert Verrecchia (2005)
Redacted DisclosureLSN: Corporate Governance U.S. (Topic)
Pająk (2009)
Do Firms Rely on Big Secrets ? An Analysis of IP Protection Strategies with the CIS 4 Survey
(1998)
The association between competition and managers ’ segment reporting decisions
X. Vives (2004)
Innovation and Competitive PressureEntrepreneurship
Alfred Wagenhofer (1990)
Voluntary disclosure with a strategic opponentJournal of Accounting and Economics, 12
D. Gill (2008)
Strategic Disclosure of Intermediate Research ResultsIRPN: Institutional
E Muth (1977)
Theory and Applications of Reliability
Feng Gu, John Li (2003)
Disclosure of innovation activities by high-technology firmsAsia-Pacific Journal of Accounting & Economics, 10
M. Okuno-Fujiwara, Andrew Postlewaite, K. Suzumura (1990)
Strategic Information RevelationThe Review of Economic Studies, 57
We present a differentiated duopoly model, in which an industry leader’s disclosure of innovations achieved through research and development (R&D) activities reveals efficiency gains and enables a rival to free ride. Competitive intensity is measured by the degree of product substitutability. A tension arises between the incentive to influence the rival’s pricing or output decision by sharing information on R&D innovations and the incentive to avoid knowledge spillovers that allow the rival to also benefit. We show that either no or partial disclosure equilibrium prevails. In contrast to a commonly held view of an inverse relation between competition and disclosure, we identify conditions on knowledge spillovers, under which more disclosure transpires in equilibrium as competition intensifies. This result holds, irrespective of whether firms engage in price or quantity competition. We also show that a more innovative technology leads to more (less) disclosure in the case of price (quantity) competition.
Review of Accounting Studies – Springer Journals
Published: Jun 17, 2014
Read and print from thousands of top scholarly journals.
Already have an account? Log in
Bookmark this article. You can see your Bookmarks on your DeepDyve Library.
To save an article, log in first, or sign up for a DeepDyve account if you don’t already have one.
Copy and paste the desired citation format or use the link below to download a file formatted for EndNote
Access the full text.
Sign up today, get DeepDyve free for 14 days.
All DeepDyve websites use cookies to improve your online experience. They were placed on your computer when you launched this website. You can change your cookie settings through your browser.