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Cost of equity capital, control divergence, and institutions: the international evidence

Cost of equity capital, control divergence, and institutions: the international evidence This study investigates the governance role of a country’s legal and extra-legal institutions in explaining the variations in firms’ cost of equity capital induced by concentrated ownership structures from 21 countries. Using four implied cost of equity proxies, the results show that the large ownership-control divergence of the ultimate owner has a positive and significant impact on the firm’s cost of equity capital. The finding lends support to the entrenchment effect in that the concentrated ownership structure increases the firm’s external financing cost. Further analyses demonstrate that the higher equity cost induced by the ultimate ownership structure is significantly reduced by a country’s stronger legal and extra-legal institutions, highlighting the governance role played by a country’s institutions in reducing the firm’s external financing cost. http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting Springer Journals

Cost of equity capital, control divergence, and institutions: the international evidence

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References (127)

Publisher
Springer Journals
Copyright
Copyright © 2013 by Springer Science+Business Media New York
Subject
Economics / Management Science; Finance/Investment/Banking; Accounting/Auditing; Econometrics; Operations Research/Decision Theory
ISSN
0924-865X
eISSN
1573-7179
DOI
10.1007/s11156-013-0383-7
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

This study investigates the governance role of a country’s legal and extra-legal institutions in explaining the variations in firms’ cost of equity capital induced by concentrated ownership structures from 21 countries. Using four implied cost of equity proxies, the results show that the large ownership-control divergence of the ultimate owner has a positive and significant impact on the firm’s cost of equity capital. The finding lends support to the entrenchment effect in that the concentrated ownership structure increases the firm’s external financing cost. Further analyses demonstrate that the higher equity cost induced by the ultimate ownership structure is significantly reduced by a country’s stronger legal and extra-legal institutions, highlighting the governance role played by a country’s institutions in reducing the firm’s external financing cost.

Journal

Review of Quantitative Finance and AccountingSpringer Journals

Published: Jun 14, 2013

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