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Avoiding a COP-Out: Moving Towards Systematic Decision-Making Under the Climate Convention

Avoiding a COP-Out: Moving Towards Systematic Decision-Making Under the Climate Convention iv EDITORIAL ESSAY and Ukraine are allowed to maintain their emissions over 2008–2012 equal to their BPEs, even though their current emissions are well below their 1990 levels. This odd mix of QELRCs was the outcome of political horse-trading, power asymmetries at the negotiating table, and the desire to obtain commitments from all Annex-I parties. There is no defensible basis for this differentiation in the QELRCs (or at least one that might conceivably assist in future negotiations) and no consis- tent set of rules were uniformly applied to all the Annex-I countries to determine their individual targets. In part, this arbitrariness is a consequence of the ‘convention-protocol’ approach to international negotiation (used in the UNFCCC), where Parties first agree on broad principles to arrive at a ‘framework’ convention and subsequently negotiate on protocols and amendments to better define the actions needed to move towards the eventual goal. This approach is suited to the climate change issue because it offers a mechanism for managing uncertainty and allows the agreement to evolve with the scientific understanding of the issue. However, the convention-protocol process necessarily leads to a high degree of ad hoc decision-making, which can lead to a number of problems http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png Climatic Change Springer Journals

Avoiding a COP-Out: Moving Towards Systematic Decision-Making Under the Climate Convention

Najam, Adil; Sagar, Ambuj
Climatic Change , Volume 39 (4) – Sep 29, 2004
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References (14)

Publisher
Springer Journals
Copyright
Copyright © 1998 by Kluwer Academic Publishers
Subject
Earth Sciences; Atmospheric Sciences; Climate Change/Climate Change Impacts
ISSN
0165-0009
eISSN
1573-1480
DOI
10.1023/A:1005418228960
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

iv EDITORIAL ESSAY and Ukraine are allowed to maintain their emissions over 2008–2012 equal to their BPEs, even though their current emissions are well below their 1990 levels. This odd mix of QELRCs was the outcome of political horse-trading, power asymmetries at the negotiating table, and the desire to obtain commitments from all Annex-I parties. There is no defensible basis for this differentiation in the QELRCs (or at least one that might conceivably assist in future negotiations) and no consis- tent set of rules were uniformly applied to all the Annex-I countries to determine their individual targets. In part, this arbitrariness is a consequence of the ‘convention-protocol’ approach to international negotiation (used in the UNFCCC), where Parties first agree on broad principles to arrive at a ‘framework’ convention and subsequently negotiate on protocols and amendments to better define the actions needed to move towards the eventual goal. This approach is suited to the climate change issue because it offers a mechanism for managing uncertainty and allows the agreement to evolve with the scientific understanding of the issue. However, the convention-protocol process necessarily leads to a high degree of ad hoc decision-making, which can lead to a number of problems

Journal

Climatic Change – Springer Journals

Published: Sep 29, 2004

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