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- Publisher
- Springer Journals
- Copyright
- Copyright © 2015 by Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht
- Subject
- Computer Science; Artificial Intelligence (incl. Robotics); International IT and Media Law, Intellectual Property Law; Philosophy of Law; Legal Aspects of Computing; Information Storage and Retrieval
- ISSN
- 0924-8463
- eISSN
- 1572-8382
- DOI
- 10.1007/s10506-015-9166-x
- Publisher site
- See Article on Publisher Site
Abstract
In this article I argue for rule-based, non-monotonic theories of common law judicial reasoning and improve upon one such theory offered by Horty and Bench-Capon. The improvements reveal some of the interconnections between formal theories of judicial reasoning and traditional issues within jurisprudence regarding the notions of the ratio decidendi and obiter dicta. Though I do not purport to resolve the long-standing jurisprudential issues here, it is beneficial for theorists both of legal philosophy and formalizing legal reasoning to see where the two projects interact.
Journal
Artificial Intelligence and Law – Springer Journals
Published: May 10, 2015