Get 20M+ Full-Text Papers For Less Than $1.50/day. Start a 14-Day Trial for You and Your Team.

Learn More →

Against Norström’s Argument for Technological Knowing How Not Being an Instance of Knowing That

Against Norström’s Argument for Technological Knowing How Not Being an Instance of Knowing That In this paper, I evaluate an argument offered by Per Norström in section 8 of his paper Knowing how, knowing that, knowing technology. The argument is for the proposition that some instance of knowing how is not an instance of knowing that; the instance in question being one of technological know-how. This conclusion contradicts Stanley and Williamson’s proposal that all instances of knowing how are instances of knowing that. I provide reason to think that there are problems with Norström’s argument. http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png Philosophy & Technology Springer Journals

Against Norström’s Argument for Technological Knowing How Not Being an Instance of Knowing That

Philosophy & Technology , Volume 28 (4) – Jan 11, 2015

Loading next page...
 
/lp/springer-journals/against-norstr-m-s-argument-for-technological-knowing-how-not-being-an-lJmR8TcGrw
Publisher
Springer Journals
Copyright
Copyright © 2015 by Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht
Subject
Philosophy; Philosophy of Technology
ISSN
2210-5433
eISSN
2210-5441
DOI
10.1007/s13347-014-0181-8
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

In this paper, I evaluate an argument offered by Per Norström in section 8 of his paper Knowing how, knowing that, knowing technology. The argument is for the proposition that some instance of knowing how is not an instance of knowing that; the instance in question being one of technological know-how. This conclusion contradicts Stanley and Williamson’s proposal that all instances of knowing how are instances of knowing that. I provide reason to think that there are problems with Norström’s argument.

Journal

Philosophy & TechnologySpringer Journals

Published: Jan 11, 2015

References