Access the full text.
Sign up today, get an introductory month for just $19.
Yutaka Nakamura (1990)
Subjective expected utility with non-additive probabilities on finite state spacesJournal of Economic Theory, 51
Colin Camerer (1989)
An experimental test of several generalized utility theoriesJournal of Risk and Uncertainty, 2
(1989)
Axiomatic Representation of Expected Utility with Rank-dependent
R. Hogarth, H. Einhorn (1990)
Venture Theory: A Model of Decision WeightsManagement Science, 36
A. Tversky, P. Slovic, D. Kahneman (1990)
The Causes of Preference ReversalThe American Economic Review, 80
Graham Loomes, Robert Sugden (1987)
Regret Theory: An Alternative Theory of Rational Choice Under UncertaintyThe Economic Journal, 92
(1991)
Nonlinear Weighting of Probabilities and Violations of the Betweenness Axiom.
R. Luce, P. Fishburn (1991)
Rank- and sign-dependent linear utility models for finite first-order gamblesJournal of Risk and Uncertainty, 4
Daniel Kahneman, Amos Tversky (1984)
Choices, Values and FramesAmerican Psychologist, 39
Peter P. Wakker (1991)
Mathematical Psychology: Current Developments
A. Tversky, D. Kahneman (1990)
Rational choice and the framing of decisionsThe Journal of Business, 59
(1974)
Heuristics and Biases
Colin F. Camerer (1992)
Utility: Theories, Measurement and Applications
P. Wakker, A. Tversky (1993)
An axiomatization of cumulative prospect theoryJournal of Risk and Uncertainty, 7
D. Wehrung (1989)
Risk taking over gains and losses: A study of oil executivesAnnals of Operations Research, 19
Colin Camerer (1992)
Recent Tests of Generalizations of Expected Utility Theory
A. Tversky (1969)
Intransitivity of preferences.Psychological Review, 76
P. Wakker (1993)
Additive representations on rank-ordered sets: II. The topological approachJournal of Mathematical Economics, 22
J. Weymark (1981)
Generalized gini inequality indicesMath. Soc. Sci., 1
(1990)
Separating Marginal Utility and Risk Aversion
Uzi Segal (1989)
Anticipated utility: A measure representation approachAnnals of Operations Research, 19
P. Wakker (1988)
Additive Representations of Preferences: A New Foundation of Decision Analysis
D. Lindley, L. Savage (1955)
The Foundations of StatisticsThe Mathematical Gazette, 57
G. Loomes, R. Sugden (1982)
Regret Theory: An alternative theory of rational choice under uncertainty Review of Economic Studies
(1984)
Choices, Values and Frames American Psychologist
J. Quiggin (1982)
A theory of anticipated utilityJournal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 3
H. Roberts (1963)
Risk, Ambiguity, and the Savage Axioms: CommentQuarterly Journal of Economics, 77
(1982)
Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases
D. Prelec (1990)
A “Pseudo-endowment” effect, and its implications for some recent nonexpected utility modelsJournal of Risk and Uncertainty, 3
V. Smith (1993)
Monetary Rewards and Decision Cost in Experimental Economics: An Extension
M. Allais (1953)
Le comportement de l'homme rationnel devant le risque : critique des postulats et axiomes de l'ecole americaineEconometrica, 21
I. Gilboa (1987)
Expected utility with purely subjective non-additive probabilitiesJournal of Mathematical Economics, 16
Steven Kachelmeier, Mohamed Shehata (1992)
Examining Risk Preferences under High Monetary Incentives: Experimental Evidence from the People's Republic of ChinaThe American Economic Review, 82
A. Tversky, Shmuel Sattath, P. Slovic (1988)
Contingent weighting in judgment and choicePsychological Review, 95
A. Tversky, D. Kahneman (1991)
Loss Aversion in Riskless Choice: A Reference-Dependent ModelQuarterly Journal of Economics, 106
P. Wakker (1989)
Additive Representations of Preferences
M. Yaari (1987)
The Dual Theory of Choice under RiskEconometrica, 55
(1989)
An Axiomatic Generalization of the Quasilinear Mean and the Gini Mean with Application to Decision Theory
D. Kahneman, A. Tversky (1979)
Prospect theory: An analysis of decision under risk Econometrica 47
M. Machina (1987)
Choice under Uncertainty: Problems Solved and UnsolvedJournal of Economic Perspectives, 1
Daniel Kahneman, Amos Tversky (1979)
Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under RiskEconometrica, 47
W. Viscusi (1989)
Prospective reference theory: Toward an explanation of the paradoxesJournal of Risk and Uncertainty, 2
(1989)
On the Shape of the Decision Weight Function." Unpublished manuscript, Harvard Graduate School of Business Administration
C. Starmer, R. Sugden (1989)
Violations of the independence axion in common ratio problems: An experimental test of some competing hypothesesAnnals of Operations Research, 19
K. Arrow (1982)
Risk Perception in Psychology and EconomicsEconomic Inquiry, 20
G. Choquet (1954)
Theory of capacitiesAnnales de l'Institut Fourier, 5
P. Wakker (1989)
Continuous subjective expected utility with non-additive probabilitiesJournal of Mathematical Economics, 18
C. Heath, A. Tversky (1991)
Preference and belief: Ambiguity and competence in choice under uncertaintyJournal of Risk and Uncertainty, 4
P. Fishburn (1988)
Nonlinear preference and utility theory
J. Marschak (1950)
Rational Behavior, Uncertain Prospects, and Measurable Utility (1950)Econometrica, 18
J. Hershey, P. Schoemaker (1980)
Prospect theory's reflection hypothesis: A critical examinationOrganizational Behavior and Human Performance, 25
E. Zemach (1969)
Reference and beliefAnalysis, 30
D. Schmeidler (1989)
Subjective Probability and Expected Utility without AdditivityEconometrica, 57
Uzi Segal (1989)
Axiomatic Representation of Expected Utility with Rank-dependent ProbabilitiesAnnals of Operations Research, 19
Preferences Scientific (1982)
Kahneman, Daniel, and Amos Tversky.Psychology, 246
Daniel Ellsberg (1961)
Risk, Ambiguity, and the Savage AxiomsQuarterly Journal of Economics, 75
(1982)
Economic lnqui~
G. Loomes, R. Sugden (1987)
Some implications of a more general form of regret theoryJournal of Economic Theory, 41
M. Cohen, J. Jaffray, T. Said (1987)
Experimental comparison of individual behavior under risk and under uncertainty for gains and for lossesOrganizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 39
We develop a new version of prospect theory that employs cumulative rather than separable decision weights and extends the theory in several respects. This version, called cumulative prospect theory, applies to uncertain as well as to risky prospects with any number of outcomes, and it allows different weighting functions for gains and for losses. Two principles, diminishing sensitivity and loss aversion, are invoked to explain the characteristic curvature of the value function and the weighting functions. A review of the experimental evidence and the results of a new experiment confirm a distinctive fourfold pattern of risk attitudes: risk aversion for gains and risk seeking for losses of high probability; risk seeking for gains and risk aversion for losses of low probability.
Journal of Risk and Uncertainty – Springer Journals
Published: May 21, 2004
Read and print from thousands of top scholarly journals.
Already have an account? Log in
Bookmark this article. You can see your Bookmarks on your DeepDyve Library.
To save an article, log in first, or sign up for a DeepDyve account if you don’t already have one.
Copy and paste the desired citation format or use the link below to download a file formatted for EndNote
Access the full text.
Sign up today, get an introductory month for just $19.
All DeepDyve websites use cookies to improve your online experience. They were placed on your computer when you launched this website. You can change your cookie settings through your browser.