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[In Chapter 8, I presented my approach to causation in the special sciences: the comparative variability theory of causation. I argued that my account should replace the interventionist theory of causation because it proves to be superior in meeting the criteria of adequacy for explicating causation in the special sciences. Further, comparative variability theory avoids the semantic and metaphysical problems connected with Woodwardian interventions, because my theory does not rely on interventions in order to explicate causation (and non-universal laws). In this final chapter, I wish to show how my approach has impact on other topics in the philosophy of science. I will focus on three topics that take centre stage in general, and especially philosophy of science: theories of explanation, representations of mechanisms, and the conditional analysis of dispositions. I will conclude this chapter by summarizing the results of the book and by providing an outlook on future research that is suggested in the light of these results.]
Published: Oct 6, 2015
Keywords: Causal Model; Causal Explanation; Special Science; Causal Claim; Birth Control Pill
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