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[In this chapter, I argue that there is a general problem for empiricist justificatory monism, the epistemological position that the only fundamental way to verify any claim is through empirical evidence. I call this problem irreducible justificatory pluralism: since each proponent of a given conception of justificatory monism is bound to this single conception, it is impossible that one of them could convince one of their competitors of their conception of justification. I argue that this dialectical deadlock can only be avoided by adopting scientific realism. I then introduce contemporary scientific realism, and I detail Quine’s rejection of it.]
Published: Jul 28, 2019
Keywords: Irreducible justificatory pluralism; Justificatory monism; Scientific realism; Empirical evidence; Naturalism; Metaphilosophy
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