This paper studies the paradox of the value destroying mergers in a sequential negotiation model in which the synergy accrued from the mergers is private information. This study shows that in a simultaneous competitive bidding process, the winner’s curse of overpaying rarely occurs but may arise in the target firm initiated sequential negotiations; and if the merger is successful then the outcome is never value destroying for the combined firm. Thus the acquirer’s overpayment cannot be considered as the ‘winner’s curse’ that results from the post-announcement competitive bidding but rather than the result of the target’s strengthened bargaining power in the sequential negotiations. The implications and intuition of such value-destroying mergers thus differ substantially from that of existing pre-emptive mergers and acquisitions models that use a simultaneous bidding mechanism. The results also imply that the ‘acquisition premium’ accrues to the target firms.
Journal of Economics – Springer Journals
Published: Nov 9, 2013
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