Access the full text.
Sign up today, get DeepDyve free for 14 days.
J Bulow, P Klemperer (1996)
Auctions vs. negotiationsAm Econ Rev, 86
Lixin Ye (2007)
Indicative bidding and a theory of two-stage auctionsGames Econ. Behav., 58
Flavio Toxvaerd (2004)
Strategic Merger Waves: A Theory of Musical ChairsEconometrics eJournal
E. Howe, Jingang Zhao (2004)
Merger Incentives and Inverse Matrices from Bertrand Competition
Tim Loughran, Anand Vijh (1997)
Do Long‐Term Shareholders Benefit From Corporate Acquisitions?Journal of Finance, 52
Evrim Akdoğu (2010)
Value-Maximizing Managers, Value-Increasing Mergers, and OverbiddingJournal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 46
S. Hackett, Stephen Martin (1994)
Advanced Industrial EconomicsJournal of Economic Education, 25
Jingang Zhao (2009)
Necessary and sufficient conditions for the optimal number of firmsJournal of Economics, 98
E. Cantillon (2006)
The Effect of Bidders' Asymmetries on Expected Revenue in AuctionsHarvard Business School: Strategy Unit Working Paper Series
Michail Pazarskis, T. Karagiorgos, Iordanis Elefteriadis, P. Christodoulou (2009)
The Post-Merger Performance of Acquiring Firms: Evidence from a Comprehensive Greek Sample Using Accounting Data
B. Eckbo (2009)
Bidding Strategies and Takeover Premiums: A ReviewIO: Firm Structure
Sugato Bhattacharyya (1990)
Auctions in corporate finance
Richard Roll (1986)
The Hubris Hypothesis of Corporate TakeoversThe Journal of Business, 59
Paul Povel, Rajdeep Singh (2004)
Takeover Contests with Asymmetric BiddersCorporate Finance: Governance
S-O Fridolfsson, J Stennek (2005)
Why mergers reduce profits and raise prices: a theory of preemptive mergersJ Eur Econ Assoc, 3
A Agrawal, JF Jaffe (2000)
JAI series: advances in mergers and acquisitions
P. Asquith (1983)
Merger bids, uncertainty, and stockholder returns☆Journal of Financial Economics, 11
A Boone, H Mulherin (2007)
How are firms sold?J Finance, 62
M Martynova, L Renneboog (2008)
A century of corporate takeovers: what have we learned and where do we stand?J Bank Finance, 32
J. Franks, Robert Harris (1989)
Shareholder wealth effects of corporate takeovers : The U.K. experience 1955-1985Journal of Financial Economics, 23
(1950)
Monopoly and oligopoly by merger
E Cantillon (2008)
The effect of bidders’ asymmetries on expected revenue in auctionsGames Econ Behav, 62
Richard Ruback, M. Jensen (2002)
The Market for Corporate Control: The Scientific EvidenceCorporate Finance: Governance
(2003)
Stock market driven acquisitions
WL Megginson, A Morgan, L Nail (2004)
The determinants of positive long-term performance in strategic mergers: corporate focus and cashJ Bank Finance, 28
Audra Boone, J. Mulherin (2008)
Do Auctions Induce a Winner's Curse? New Evidence from the Corporate Takeover MarketJournal of Financial Economics, 89
Antonios Antoniou, Philippe Arbour, Huainan Zhao (2008)
How Much is Too Much: Are Merger Premiums Too High?Diversification Strategy & Policy eJournal
Gregor Andrade, Mark Mitchell, Erik Stafford (2001)
New Evidence and Perspectives on MergersIO: Regulation
J Farrell, C Shapiro (1990)
Horizontal mergers: an equilibrium analysisAm Econ Rev, 80
Anup Agrawal, J. Jaffe, G. Mandelker (1992)
The Post-Merger Performance of Acquiring Firms: A Re-examination of an AnomalyJournal of Finance, 47
Anup Agrawal, J. Jaffe (1999)
The Post-Merger Performance PuzzleWharton School: Finance (Topic)
Audra Boone, J. Mulherin (2006)
How are Firms Sold?Microeconomic Theory eJournal
Duarte Brito (2003)
Preemptive mergers under spatial competitionInternational Journal of Industrial Organization, 21
S Dasgupta, H Robert (2006)
The handbook of corporate finance: empirical corporate finance
(2007)
Preemptive horizontal mergers: theory and evidence
A. Gregory (1997)
An Examination of the Long Run Performance of UK Acquiring FirmsJournal of Business Finance & Accounting, 24
Michael Fishman (1988)
A theory of preemptive takeover biddingThe RAND Journal of Economics, 19
Angela Morgan, Lance Nail, W. Megginson (2002)
The Determinants of Positive Long-Term Performance in Strategic Mergers: Corporate Focus and CashCorporate Finance: Governance
MC Jensen, RS Ruback (1983)
The market for corporate control: the scientific evidenceJ Financ Econ, 11
M. Martynova, L. Renneboog (2005)
A Century of Corporate Takeovers: What Have We Learned and Where Do We Stand? (previous title: The History of M&A Activity Around the World: A Survey of Literature)LSN: Takeover Law (Topic)
JC Hartzell, E Ofek, D Yermack (2004)
What’s in it for me? CEOs whose firms are acquiredRev Financ Stud, 17
R. Deneckere, C. Davidson (1985)
Incentives to Form Coalitions with Bertrand CompetitionThe RAND Journal of Economics, 16
A Antoniou, P Arbour, H Zhao (2008)
How much is too much: are merger premiums too high?Eur Financ Manage, 14
I. Png, D. Hirshleifer (1989)
Facilitation of Competing Bids and the Price of a Takeover TargetReview of Financial Studies, 2
J Zhao (2009)
Estimating merging costs by merger preconditionsTheory Decis, 66
S. Fridolfsson, Johan Stennek (2000)
Why Mergers Reduce Profits, and Raise Share Prices: A Theory of Preemptive MergersCorporate Finance: Governance
A. Dixit (1986)
Comparative Statics for OligopolyInternational Economic Review, 27
S. Salant, Sheldon Switzer, R. Reynolds (1983)
Losses From Horizontal Merger: The Effects of an Exogenous Change in Industry Structure on Cournot-Nash EquilibriumQuarterly Journal of Economics, 98
M. Firth (1979)
The Profitability of Takeovers and MergersThe Economic Journal, 89
R. Marquez, Bilge Yilmaz (2008)
INFORMATION AND EFFICIENCY IN TENDER OFFERSEconometrica, 76
(2011)
Do targets benefit from auctions?. Purdue University, Working paper, The role of private information
Jay Hartzell, E. Ofek, D. Yermack (2001)
What S in it for Me? Ceos Whose Firms are AcquiredNew York University Stern School of Business Research Paper Series
(2001)
Auction of companies
V. Kennedy, R. Limmack (1996)
TAKEOVER ACTIVITY, CEO TURNOVER, AND THE MARKET FOR CORPORATE CONTROLJournal of Business Finance & Accounting, 23
F Toxvaerd (2008)
Strategic merger waves: a theory of musical chairsJ Econ Theory, 140
P Povel, R Singh (2006)
Takeover contests with asymmetric biddersRev Financ Studies, 19
This paper studies the paradox of the value destroying mergers in a sequential negotiation model in which the synergy accrued from the mergers is private information. This study shows that in a simultaneous competitive bidding process, the winner’s curse of overpaying rarely occurs but may arise in the target firm initiated sequential negotiations; and if the merger is successful then the outcome is never value destroying for the combined firm. Thus the acquirer’s overpayment cannot be considered as the ‘winner’s curse’ that results from the post-announcement competitive bidding but rather than the result of the target’s strengthened bargaining power in the sequential negotiations. The implications and intuition of such value-destroying mergers thus differ substantially from that of existing pre-emptive mergers and acquisitions models that use a simultaneous bidding mechanism. The results also imply that the ‘acquisition premium’ accrues to the target firms.
Journal of Economics – Springer Journals
Published: Nov 9, 2013
Read and print from thousands of top scholarly journals.
Already have an account? Log in
Bookmark this article. You can see your Bookmarks on your DeepDyve Library.
To save an article, log in first, or sign up for a DeepDyve account if you don’t already have one.
Copy and paste the desired citation format or use the link below to download a file formatted for EndNote
Access the full text.
Sign up today, get DeepDyve free for 14 days.
All DeepDyve websites use cookies to improve your online experience. They were placed on your computer when you launched this website. You can change your cookie settings through your browser.