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A Pluralist Theory of the MindBeyond Dualism and Physicalism

A Pluralist Theory of the Mind: Beyond Dualism and Physicalism [This chapter discusses the relation between conceptual pluralism, dualism, and physicalism. Although I present conceptual pluralism as an alternative to dualism and physicalism, it is important to acknowledge the vagueness of both terms “dualism” and “physicalism”. I suggest that we could use both terms in a very broad sense that includes conceptual pluralism. However, I also argue that philosophers of mind usually use “dualism” and “physicalism” in a narrower sense that is incompatible with conceptual pluralism. Contrary to dualism, conceptual pluralism rejects the idea that mental and physical states are distinct in a metaphysically substantive sense. Contrary to physicalism, conceptual pluralism rejects the ontological priority of the physical.] http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png

A Pluralist Theory of the MindBeyond Dualism and Physicalism

Part of the European Studies in Philosophy of Science Book Series (volume 2)
Ludwig, David
A Pluralist Theory of the Mind — Jul 10, 2015
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References (18)

Publisher
Springer International Publishing
Copyright
© Springer International Publishing Switzerland 2015
ISBN
978-3-319-22737-5
Pages
173 –186
DOI
10.1007/978-3-319-22738-2_9
Publisher site
See Chapter on Publisher Site

Abstract

[This chapter discusses the relation between conceptual pluralism, dualism, and physicalism. Although I present conceptual pluralism as an alternative to dualism and physicalism, it is important to acknowledge the vagueness of both terms “dualism” and “physicalism”. I suggest that we could use both terms in a very broad sense that includes conceptual pluralism. However, I also argue that philosophers of mind usually use “dualism” and “physicalism” in a narrower sense that is incompatible with conceptual pluralism. Contrary to dualism, conceptual pluralism rejects the idea that mental and physical states are distinct in a metaphysically substantive sense. Contrary to physicalism, conceptual pluralism rejects the ontological priority of the physical.]

Published: Jul 10, 2015

Keywords: Physical Entity; Reductive Explanation; Identity Claim; Global Supervenience; Substantive Sense

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