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[This chapter examines how Descartes envisages the relation between the immediately known mind and the only mediately known, mechanical body. We confront his ideas with the empirical case of IW, whom you might call a Cartesian human being: someone who has to consciously control his body. What strikes one most, is that this is someone who is severely handicapped. People usually do not have to operate their body like a machine. I investigate what IW is missing, namely proprioception, and discuss the anti-Cartesian argument that in proprioception you are as immediately conscious of your body as you are of your mind.]
Published: Aug 5, 2022
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