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A Note on Endogenous Spillovers in a Non-Tournament R & D Duopoly

A Note on Endogenous Spillovers in a Non-Tournament R & D Duopoly The paper analyzes a simple non-tournament model of R & D where firms are engaged in cost-reducing innovation. It is shown that when spillovers of information are treated as endogenous firms never disclose any of their information when choosing their R & D non-cooperatively. Under cooperative R & D, firms will always choose to fully share their information, i.e., a research joint venture will operate with a maximal spillover value. http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png Review of Industrial Organization Springer Journals

A Note on Endogenous Spillovers in a Non-Tournament R & D Duopoly

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References (17)

Publisher
Springer Journals
Copyright
Copyright © 1999 by Kluwer Academic Publishers
Subject
Economics; Industrial Organization; Microeconomics
ISSN
0889-938X
eISSN
1573-7160
DOI
10.1023/A:1007732218120
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

The paper analyzes a simple non-tournament model of R & D where firms are engaged in cost-reducing innovation. It is shown that when spillovers of information are treated as endogenous firms never disclose any of their information when choosing their R & D non-cooperatively. Under cooperative R & D, firms will always choose to fully share their information, i.e., a research joint venture will operate with a maximal spillover value.

Journal

Review of Industrial Organization – Springer Journals

Published: Oct 15, 2004

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