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A new approach to manipulation arguments

A new approach to manipulation arguments There are several argumentative strategies for advancing the thesis that moral responsibility is incompatible with causal determinism. One prominent such strategy is to argue that agents who meet compatibilist conditions for moral responsibility can nevertheless be subject to responsibility-undermining manipulation. In this paper, I argue that incompatibilists advancing manipulation arguments against compatibilism have been shouldering an unnecessarily heavy dialectical burden. Traditional manipulation arguments present cases in which manipulated agents meet all compatibilist conditions for moral responsibility, but are (allegedly) not responsible for their behavior. I argue, however, that incompatibilists can make do with the more modest (and harder to resist) claim that the manipulation in question is mitigating with respect to moral responsibility. The focus solely on whether a manipulated agent is or is not morally responsible has, I believe, masked the full force of manipulation-style arguments against compatibilism. Here, I aim to unveil their real power. http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png Philosophical Studies Springer Journals

A new approach to manipulation arguments

Philosophical Studies , Volume 152 (1) – Oct 23, 2009

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References (3)

Publisher
Springer Journals
Copyright
Copyright © 2009 by The Author(s)
Subject
Philosophy; Philosophy, general; Epistemology; Philosophy of Mind; Ethics; Metaphysics; Philosophy of Language
ISSN
0031-8116
eISSN
1573-0883
DOI
10.1007/s11098-009-9465-8
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

There are several argumentative strategies for advancing the thesis that moral responsibility is incompatible with causal determinism. One prominent such strategy is to argue that agents who meet compatibilist conditions for moral responsibility can nevertheless be subject to responsibility-undermining manipulation. In this paper, I argue that incompatibilists advancing manipulation arguments against compatibilism have been shouldering an unnecessarily heavy dialectical burden. Traditional manipulation arguments present cases in which manipulated agents meet all compatibilist conditions for moral responsibility, but are (allegedly) not responsible for their behavior. I argue, however, that incompatibilists can make do with the more modest (and harder to resist) claim that the manipulation in question is mitigating with respect to moral responsibility. The focus solely on whether a manipulated agent is or is not morally responsible has, I believe, masked the full force of manipulation-style arguments against compatibilism. Here, I aim to unveil their real power.

Journal

Philosophical StudiesSpringer Journals

Published: Oct 23, 2009

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