Do we perceive natural kind properties?
Philos Stud (2013) 162:3542 DOI 10.1007/s11098-012-9985-5 Berit Brogaard Published online: 25 July 2012 Ó Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2012 I respond to three arguments aimed at establishing that natural kind properties occur in the experiential content of visual experience: the argument from phenomenal difference, the argument from mandatory seeing, and the argument from associative agnosia. I conclude with a simple argument against the view that natural kind properties occur in the experiential content of visual experience. 1 High-level properties There are lots of properties which human beings cannot visually detect. As a matter of necessity, (normal) human beings cannot visually detect a range of sensory lowlevel properties detectable by other sense modalities. I cannot visually detect the coldness of ice cream, the sweetness of strawberries, the softness of your skin, or the pitch of your voice. And, as a matter of contingent fact, (normal) human beings cannot visually detect low-level properties instantiated exclusively by very large objects, very small objects and objects very far away. Assuming that no other object on earth is shaped just like Utah, we could not visually detect the shape of Utah prior to the invention of modern technology. Which properties can we consciously
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