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Racial classifications are a social construct with no basis in biology; yet, race is an omnipresent and powerful factor in U.S. politics, shaping electoral boundaries, disbursement of resources, and political alliances (Omi and Winant 1994, Haney López 1994). Race, then, is a malleable construct wielded by varying interests, with racial definitions changing in response to social and political battles. Some new immigrant groups initially classified as not white have been reclassified as white over time, thereby benefitting from associated legal, economic, and sociopolitical privileges. More recently, however, some Latinos have sought recognition as a distinct non-white racial group, in acknowledgment of the racialization of their identities over time. We seek to better understand who is most likely to support a racialized Latino identity, and the political consequences of this choice. Using data from the 2020 Collaborative Multiracial Post-election Survey, we test whether individuals who believe that a Latino identity is a racial identity are also more likely to be interested in and engaged in politics. We also examine the extent to which support for a racialized Latino identity is associated with progressive attitudes on racial issues. Keywords Latinos, identity, race, racialization, political behavior, coalitions Racial classifications are a social construct with no basis Farris and Silber Mohamed 2018). Some Latinos respond in biology; yet, race is an omnipresent and powerful factor to this political reality by embracing a white identity in U.S. politics, shaping electoral boundaries, disburse- (Beltran ´ 2021, Jimenez ´ 2009, Gutierrez ´ 1995). ment of resources, and political alliances. American so- This strategy recognizes the legal, economic, and ciety has “guarded the privilege of Whiteness,” through sociopolitical privileges historically associated with policies such as anti-miscegenation and one-drop (hy- whiteness (Haney López 1994). The 1790 Naturalization podescent) laws (Haney López 1996). However, racial Act restricted naturalization (and thus voting and other definitions have changed over time in response to social rights) to “free white persons.” Many states allowed only and political battles. New immigrant groups initially white citizens to own or lease land. These restrictions classified as not white, for example, Polish, Irish, Cath- stayed in place, with only minor adjustments for African olics, and Italians, have been reclassified as white over Americans after slavery was abolished, until the time, and have benefited from the associated legal, eco- McCarran–Walter Act of 1952. In restricting naturaliza- nomic, and sociopolitical privileges of whiteness in- tion to whites, the U.S. government laid the foundation for cluding citizenship and the right to own land (Lajevardi Latino groups to be classified as white. The 1848 Treaty of et al. 2019; Omi and Winant 1994, 2004; Tehranian 2008). Immigrants from Latin America have been treated as an Department of Political Science, University of Pennsylvania, exception in the U.S. racial classification system, with Philadelphia, PA, USA Latino identity considered an ethnicity rather than as a Department of Political Science, Clark University, Worcester, MA, USA Department of Political Science, Menlo College, Atherton, CA, USA race. Yet, most Americans understand Latinos to belong to a separate and identifiable group that is phenotypically Corresponding Author: distinct from the majority white population in the United Kimberly Cardenas, Department of Political Science, University of States (Telles and Ortiz 2008), and anti-Latino prejudice Pennsylvania, 133 S 36th St, Philadelphia, PA 19104-6243, USA. and discrimination are well documented (Chavez 2008, Email: kjc9@sas.upenn.edu 2 Political Research Quarterly 0(0) Guadalupe Hidalgo, ending the Mexican American War, Lives Matter movement and hold progressive attitudes on conferred citizenship eligibility on Mexicans living in racial issues. Yet, our analysis also suggests that while this land that was newly part of the United States. In 1897, the belief may increase passive political participation, such as Supreme Court decision In re Rodriguez reinforced the signing a political petition or discussing politics with right of Mexicans to naturalize according to the 1848 friends, it does not always translate into more active treaty and, consequently, asserted that Mexicans were political behaviors, such as participating in a community considered legally white (Cantrell 2013). organization or attending a protest march. We conclude The assumption that Latinos were not a distinct racial that members of the Latino community who understand group brought some initial benefits, but community their Latino identity as racialized may be more likely to be leaders eventually found it important to pursue legal a coalitional partner in the quest for broader racial justice recognition as a distinct group in order to secure civil efforts but that further mobilization from within may be protections initially designed to support the rights of needed to build active support of these efforts. Black Americans, for example, the right to not be tried by all-white (Anglo) juries and the right to not be discrim- Racial versus Ethnic Categories inated against in voting, housing, or public accommo- dations, and access to Affirmative Action programs. There is increasing evidence that the U.S. public, and even Recently, some Latinos have sought government ac- some governmental agencies (e.g., the U.S. Department of knowledgment of the racialization of their non-white Education and the Equal Employment Opportunity identity via changed U.S. federal policies to include Commission), consider Black, white, and Latino to be Latino as a distinct racial category on government doc- mutually exclusive racial categories (Roth 2012). In uments such as U.S. Census forms (Strmic-Pawl et al. popular usage, including public media and mainstream 2018, Hernandez ´ 2021). These Latinos might be politi- news, Latino identity is increasingly treated as a race. This cally different from those that do not seek recognition as a can be traced back to the 1960s, when federal agencies, distinct racial group. Latino activists, and media organizations collaborated to Specifically, our analysis builds on the work of Stokes- create a Hispanic pan-ethnicity to unify Latin Americans Brown (2012), who used the 2006 Latino National Survey from different countries of origin, obscuring important to explore the predictors and effects of Latino self- national origin differences between these groups (Beltran identification as “some other race.” She finds that for 2010, Mora 2014). This reworking of racial categories, some individuals, the “some other race” label represents a what Roth dubs the “Hispanicized U.S. schema,” is a racialized pan-ethnic identification. Similarly, when La- consequence of “the efforts of many Latinos to differ- tinos check the “some other race” box, they may not entiate themselves from Black Americans at the same time necessarily be asserting that Latino is a race, but they may that White Americans sought to distance themselves from be acknowledging that they do not see themselves within Latinos” (Roth 2012, p. 180; see also Marrow 2003 and the standard U.S. racial schema (Hernandez ´ 2021). Using Hernand ´ ez 2021). data from a large 2020 survey of the Latino population, we In addition, Latinos are increasingly likely to insist that build on Stokes-Brown’s work on what predicts racialized their ethnic identity is also their racial identity. In the 2010 Latino identities. We are primarily interested here in the U.S. Census, 37% of Latinos identified themselves as political consequences of Latinos’ ongoing battle for “some other race,” evidence that a significant subsection racial recognition as a distinct group and hypothesize that of this community is rejecting the existing official racial individuals who believe their Latino identity is a racial categories, and 90% of those “some other race” Latinos identity are more likely to be interested in and involved in indicated that their race was Hispanic or Latino (Prewitt politics and are more likely to feel a sense of commonality 2013). Census studies have documented that Latinos find with other marginalized racial groups, namely Black the separate race and ethnicity questions confusing, and Americans. In addition, we argue that racialized under- that combining the items would improve data accuracy standings of Latino identity are encouraged due to about Latinos (Strmic-Pawl et al. 2018). In the 2020 U.S. widespread and persistent discrimination. Latinos who Census, an estimated 45.3 million Latinos classified believe their identity is a race are more likely to under- themselves as “some other race,” either alone or with stand the political power implications of those identities another racial identity. Of all census respondents who self- and thus to have adopted them in recognition of the identified only as “some other race,” 93.9% were Latino, political statements they represent. representing 42.2% of Latinos included in the census. We find mostly positive support for our hypotheses: This preference by Latinos for their own racialized Latinos who believe Latino is a race are indeed more identity, rather than for inclusion in the racial category of interested in politics, participate more in some aspects of white, lies in stark contrast to how previous ethnic im- political life, and are more likely to support the Black migrant groups have worked to assimilate into the Cardenas et al. 3 dominant racial group in the United States (Lajevardi et al. item include racial and national origin or sociocultural 2019). Some observers caution that this strategy, while groups” (U.S. Census Bureau, n.d.). perhaps appealing in the short run due to a desire for Political science as a discipline has long been aware of distinct racial visibility and pride, may have long term racial fluidity, or “theideathatraceis flexible and im- disadvantages. For example, Roth (2012) warns that the permanent” (Davenport 2020, p. 221). Yet, despite the designation of Latino as a race and not an ethnicity may “constructed, contradictory, and fickle nature of U.S. work against Latinos in the long run because racialized racial classification” (p. 223), racial identification is categories are less easily shed than are ethnic categories. largely uncontested and highly stable for the majority of Thus, as Latinos succeed in reclassifying Latino as a race, the U.S. population. Instead, the fluid nature of race is they are also making it more likely that they will be illustratedbythe shifting of whoisincludedinvarious “perpetually defined as foreigners even after many gen- categories over time, and the ability of individuals to erations and full acculturation to American norms” (Roth migrate from one racial identity to another based in part 2012, p. 156). In other words, the reclassification of on phenotypic differences, for example, light-skinned Latino as a race might make it less possible for Latinos to Black people passing as white, or Chinese people follow the route of previous ethnic groups of being as- passing as Mexican (Hobbs 2014). In 1930, the census similated as white. This builds on work by Hattam (2007), listed Mexican as a race, while today it is listed as part of who contends that ethnically defined groups have had a Hispanic/Latino ethnic option. Historically, changes in more success in achieving social mobility and integration self-identification have been influenced by social, po- while those defined racially tend to suffer greater disad- litical, and economic factors including emancipation, vantages. Hernandez ´ (2021) cautions that if Latino offi- immigration and civil rights (Pratt et al. 2015). At cially becomes a separate racial category, the Afro-Latino varying points, individuals have also pushed for such community may be rendered less visible and this clas- changes. sification may mask differences that the racial hierarchy continues to perpetuate within the Latino community. Latino is a Race Persistent racism toward Latinos, including percep- tions that they are perpetual outsiders or perpetual for- As Stokes-Brown (2012, p. 5) notes, “the structuring of eigners, however, suggests that whether Latinos choose to Latino racial identity is a complex interaction between identify as a race will have little impact on their ability to policies of the state and institutional practices, primordial fully assimilate into U.S. society (Ngai 2014, Rocco 2014, ties, individual characteristics, and social interactions.” Sampaio 2015). In other words, the policies of the host Individuals are also thought to select a racial identity in a society constrain the ability of Latinos to assimilate. This way that reacts to perceptions of racial dynamics and ´ ´ conclusion is reinforced by work from Tomas Jimenez and potential for coalition-building in the United States his colleagues that demonstrates that Latino feelings of (Dowling 2014). Indeed, some Latinos may be motivated belonging—among both immigrants and the U.S. born— by the importance of recognition as a racial group “for are affected by whether they live in an area with policies visibility and claims-making in a multiracial society” (p. that are welcoming toward immigrants (Jimenez ´ et al. 1834), and scholars contend that the lack of racial group 2021). Latinos may also reject traditional “hard” forms of designation as it stands reduces perceptions of belonging assimilation in favor of a “softer” form that preserves their (Flores-Gonzalez ´ et al. 2014). Often this leads Latinos to politicized group consciousness (Citrin and Sears 2014). check the box for “some other race” when filling out U.S. The distinction between ethnicity and race is somewhat Census Bureau and other forms, where they do not see arbitrary, based on societal norms. Race is socially con- themselves in any of the standard racial categories structed, but outside of academia it is generally considered (Stokes-Brown 2009, Golash-Boza and Darity 2008, fixed and based on physical traits such as hair texture and Strmic-Pawl et al. 2018). skin tone, whereas ethnicity (also considered fixed) is In many Latin American and Caribbean countries, race perceived as based in cultural identity and expression is understood differently, often including conceptions of (Shelton and Sellers 2000). Latinos are thus considered a white, Black, Indigenous, and mixed race (Marrow 2003). pan-ethnic group in the United States because of their Yet, data from Latin America also suggests a preference shared culture and heritage, while their varied phenotypes for identifying racially as white, even when this category signal that they can be of any race. The U.S. Census does not match with an individual’s phenotype (Telles Bureau notes: “The racial categories included in the 2014). Immigrant Latinos bring their understanding of census questionnaire generally reflect a social definition race from their home country, and may or may not re- of race recognized in this country and not an attempt to categorize their own racial identification as they assimilate define race biologically, anthropologically, or genetically. into the U.S. racial classification system (which generally In addition, it is recognized that the categories of the race does not include Latino as a race), including the persistent 4 Political Research Quarterly 0(0) preference for selecting a white identity (Hernandez ´ 2021, discrimination (Golash-Boza and Darity 2008). Other Ostfeld and Yadon 2022). scholars find very different results. Stokes-Brown (2012) Legal whiteness of many Latinos notwithstanding, finds no evidence that education, Puerto Rican national discrimination against Latino Americans, and targeting of origin, or gender matter, but unlike Zepeda-Millan ´ and Latino immigrants, has increased over time. For instance, Wallace finds positive correlations with higher income, beginning in 2001, the U.S. government significantly darker skin, and lower ages. Flores-Gonzalez, Aranda, expanded a range of immigration enforcement programs, and Vaquera (2014) also find that Latino young adults are resulting in heightened arrest rates, deportations, and fear more likely to embrace a Latino racial designation. within Latino communities (Capps et al. 2018). Under We begin our analysis by using recent data to revisit certain circumstances this increase in enforcement indi- these questions. Given the importance of political context rectly impacted levels of linked fate among Latinos in shaping individual identities (Silber Mohamed 2017, (Maltby et al. 2020). Anti-Latino discrimination further Zepeda-Millan ´ and Wallace 2013), we are interested in intensified beginning in 2015, in response to the racist exploring whether the factors above continue to contribute presidential campaign and subsequent administration of to perceptions of whether Latinos constitute a separate Republican President Donald Trump. The Southern race in the distinct context of the 2020 election. After Poverty Law Center reported a spike in anti-immigrant exploring which group members perceive Latinos to be a hate crimes after Trump was elected, mostly aimed at separate race, we then explore the political consequences people of Latino descent (SPLC 2016). This trend con- of this choice. We anticipate that perceptions of Latino as tinued throughout his presidency, with record increases in a racialized rather than an ethnic category will be asso- anti-Latino hate crimes reported to the FBI, and the ciated with distinct political behaviors and attitudes. massacre in El Paso in 2019, in which 23 people were Specifically, we hypothesize: killed and another 23 injured in one of the deadliest anti- Latino attacks in US history (Beirich 2019). H1: Latinos who believe that Latino is a distinct race The rampant proliferation of negative and discrimi- are more interested in politics than Latinos who do not natory attitudes, behaviors, and policies makes it difficult, think Latino is a race. if not impossible, for many Latinos to take advantage of H2: Latinos who believe that Latino is a distinct race the protections and privileges of whiteness, regardless of are more likely to participate politically than Latinos how they racially identify. Prior research explores when who do not think Latino is a race. and why a pan-ethnic Latino identity will emerge (Jones- Correa and Leal 1996), and finds that a sense of Latino We expect that Latinos who understand their identity as solidaridad (Barreto et al. 2009) and perceived racial racialized will be more participatory because of the discrimination against Latinos (Gutierrez et al. 2019) mobilizing effect of discrimination. Those who think their mobilize participation, particularly in times of hostility. identity is racialized are also more likely to acknowledge We build on this scholarship, but focus on a distinct re- discrimination as political ontology and understand the search question and theoretical process. We theorize that political implications of their participation, resulting in this persistent discrimination may be generating a new increased interest and participation. understanding of Latino identity as a race, rather than as We further hypothesize that racial identification an ethnicity, among many Latinos, and further contend choices will have political consequences for coalition that this racialized understanding of group identity has a building, including harboring feelings of commonality significant effect on political attitudes and behaviors. with Black Americans and expressing support for anti- Scholars have examined other variables associated racism struggles. This is consistent with previous findings with the adoption of a racialized Latino identity. Zepeda- in which Latinos who racially identified as non-white Millan ´ and Wallace (2013) find that first generation re- were more likely to report a sense of commonality with spondents are less likely to view Latinos as a distinct racial African Americans, compared to their racially white- group, as are respondents of Cuban or Puerto Rican na- identifying counterparts (Kaufmann 2003). The pro- tional origin, and men, while stronger support for Latino posed mechanism is racialization, whereby individuals as a distinct racial group is reported by Latinos with who experience racial/ethnic discrimination may find higher levels of education, Democrats, those who see anti- common ground with African Americans, a historically Latino discrimination, and those who have personally racialized group. experienced discrimination. Some of these results are Using Pew Research Center’s 2016 Racial Attitudes in consistent with that of other scholars, including effects of America III Survey, Corral (2020) corroborates this generation (Fraga et al. 2012), Cuban national finding. Corral’s data is notable in that Latino is included origin (Stokes-Brown 2012), group discrimination as one of the categories available for participants to (Stokes-Brown 2012), and individual experiences of choose as their racial identity. He finds that Latinos who Cardenas et al. 5 identify racially as Black are most likely to be aware of includes respondents who identify as Latino and another and support BLM. However, the dataset included just 48 racial/ethnic group. Black Latinos (of 654 Latinos overall). More robust are Our primary variable of interest is the belief among Corral’s findings comparing Latinos who racially identify Latinos that Latinos constitute a separate racial group. The as white to those who racially identify as Latino. He finds CMPS asked all Latino respondents, “In the US we use a the latter group is less likely to have heard of BLM, al- number of categories to describe ourselves racially. Do though those who are familiar with the movement are you feel that Latinos make up a distinctive racial group in more supportive compared to members of the former America?” The variable is recoded such that 1 indicates a group, a finding he attributes to their non-white racial belief that Latinos make up a distinct group and 0 does identity. not. Using the weighted data, an estimated 72.9% of Corral’s findings support our underlying hypothesis Latino respondents agree that Latinos constitute a distinct that racial identity matters, as the racial identities of racial group, suggesting surprisingly high agreement on both Black and Latino-identifying respondents are this question. strong predictors of their support for Black Lives We first examine the factors associated with cate- Matter. We replicate and build on his work by exam- gorizing Latinos as a distinct racial group; because this ining whether a belief that Latinos constitute a distinct variable is binary, we use logistic regression analysis. racial group is correlated with broader attitudes on After this reassessment, we then use this measure as an racial relations in the United States. Yet, while Corral independent variable to test the hypotheses outlined focuses on the distinction between white-identifying above. Our analysis uses continuous measures of in- Latinos and non-white identifying Latinos, we focus come, education, and age. We also add a series of primarily on Latinos who view this identity as racial dummy variables, including for gender (women as the versus those that do not. In doing so, we focus on those reference group, with a separate category for re- who distinctly reject the imposed racial-ethnic divide. spondents who identify as non-binary or other) and Additionally, Corral’s work focuses on self- immigrant generation (reference category = first identification, while our research goes beyond indi- generation, referring to respondents born in another vidual identity to examine a general belief measuring country or the island of Puerto Rico; second genera- whether Latinos should constitute a distinct racial tion = respondent born in the United States with at group in the United States. As such, we are interested in least one parent born elsewhere; third generation and understanding if attitudes about whether Latino is a above = respondent has at least one grandparent born racialized group identity are associated with greater in the United States). awareness of the U.S. racial hierarchy, as outlined in While our analysis is limited to respondents whose our final hypothesis: primary identity is Latino (or Hispanic), we also include dummy variables to capture additional identities that re- H3: Latinos who believe that Latino is a distinct race spondents may have indicated, including white (23.0% of will be more supportive of efforts to fight racism respondents) and Asian American, Native American/ compared to Latinos who do not think Latino is a race. Indian, Middle Eastern/North African, or Pacific Is- H3A: They will express higher support for the Black lander (1.98%). Rather than including a dummy variable Lives Matter Movement and for respondents who identify as Black, we instead use a H3B: They will be more likely to agree that infor- separate question asking respondents whether they mation about race and racism in U.S. history should be “identify as Afro-Latino, or being Black with Latin taught in grades K-12. American ancestry.” Clealand and Gutierrez (2022) note that fewer Latinos self-identify as Black than as Afro- Data and Methods Latino due to the devaluation of Blackness within Latino We test these hypotheses using the Latino subsample of communities, and thus which racial groups they feel the 2020 Collaborative Multiracial Post-Election Survey aligned with, regardless of skin tone. In addition, while (CMPS), an online survey fielded between April 2, 2021 Latinos may identify as Afro-Latino as an indication of and August 25, 2021 (Frasure et al. 2021). The size of the their mixed race and darker skin tone, many Latinos in- Latino subsample (n = 3529) allows us to revisit the terpret the terms Black and African American as exclu- question of who in the Latino community believes that sively referencing Americans with ancestry in the United Latinos should be categorized as a separate racial group States, but not Black Latinos from Latin America and the and provides the opportunity for a more robust explora- Caribbean. Indeed, this pattern holds in the CMPS data, tion of Corral’s (2020) theory about the political oppor- with just 1.98% of respondents identifying as Black, but tunity structure created by racialized Latino identities for 15.8% indicating yes to this question, which includes both Black–Brown coalitions. The Latino subsample also the respondent and their ancestors. 6 Political Research Quarterly 0(0) Existing research demonstrates that political attitudes party, or some other campaign organization; participating and behavior vary by national origin (Masuoka 2008, in one or more social, cultural, civic, or political groups or Wals 2011, Silber Mohamed 2017). As such, we include a unions; attending a meeting to discuss issues facing the series of dummy variables to capture a respondent’s community; attending a campaign rally, meeting, or event; country or region of origin or ancestry, including Cuban, and attending a protest, march, demonstration, or rally. Puerto Rican, Dominican, Mexican (reference category), Our approach is similar to Gutierrez et al. (2019, p. 965), Central American (El Salvador, Costa Rica, Guatemala, who create an aggregate scale of 6 indicators of partici- Honduras, Nicaragua, and Panama), South American pation using 2016 CMPS data, including actions that are (Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, costlier to voters and thus are likely to be undertaken Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela), Spanish, and “only (by) those who are really invested in the political other Latino national origin groups. We additionally in- outcome.” clude two sets of dummy variables to capture partisanship The second scaled measure captures passive engage- and ideology, including Democrat, Republican, or ment. The activities in this category require less of a time independent/other (reference group), as well as liberal, commitment and are more accessible to a wider range of moderate (reference group), conservative, or non- respondents, including non-citizens. These include sign- ideological. Because darker skin tone has been found ing a petition regarding a problem or issue of concern; to increase the perception that Latino is a racialized wearing a campaign button or posting a campaign sticker identity (Stokes-Brown 2012) and the prevalence of or sign; boycotting a company or product for political liberal positions on racialized political issues (Ostfeld and reasons; discussing a candidate or political issue by Yadon 2022), we include skin tone as a control variable posting on an internet site or social media like Facebook, across our models. To capture skin tone, we use a Twitter, or WeChat; and discussing politics with family or question in the CMPS asking respondents to pick an friends. image that best matches the shade of their skin, ranging For both of the scaled variables, values range from 0 to from 1 (lightest) to 10 (darkest). We also include two 5, with results standardized on a 0–1 scale. In both variables to capture perceptions of discrimination, which measures, respondents were given a point for each activity are both correlated with the adoption of a racialized Latino they engaged in, and Cronbach’s alpha suggests high identity in existing literature (Golash-Boza and Darity internal consistency within each scale (alpha = 0.82 for 2008, Stokes-Brown 2012, Zepeda-Millan and Wallace active engagement and 0.77 for passive engagement). We 2013). The first of these variables captures personal ex- also explored whether the respondent reported voting in periences, asking whether respondents themselves have 2020 as an alternative dependent variable. However, experienced discrimination because they are Latino (1 = consistent with other surveys, CMPS respondents sig- discrimination in any setting; 0 = no discrimination), nificantly overreported voting, with 94.1% of respondents while the second variable asks the extent to which Latinos who are either born in the United States or Puerto Rico or as a group experience discrimination (recoded, 3 = a lot to are naturalized U.S. citizens reporting that they voted. As 0 = none at all). such, we did not use reported turnout in our analysis. Table 1 includes descriptive statistics for each of our measures of political participation pertaining to H2 for the Political Interest and Political Participation full Latino subsample of the CMPS. Only a minority of H1 anticipates that individuals who believe Latinos are a participants (<19% for all measures) reported having done distinct race also have greater political interest. To capture any of the active engagement activities. There is greater this dependent variable, we use the question: “Some variation with respect to the passive engagement mea- people are very interested in politics while other people sures, ranging from 21.71% of respondents who report can’t stand politics, how about you?” We have recoded wearing a campaign button or posting a sign or sticker to responses such that very interested represents the highest 72.91% of respondents who indicated discussing politics value (4) while not at all interested is the lowest (1). with family or friends To test H2, we develop two scaled measures of political participation using a series of questions that ask about Attitudes about Race and Racism engagement in various other political activities since January 2020 (each activity is recoded such that 1 = yes, I Finally, we test H3 with three dependent variables related am certain I did that last year or I think I did that, I can’t to coalitional racial politics. Following Corral (2020), our remember for sure; 0 = all other responses). The first of first hypothesis gauges support for the BLM Movement, these measures, active engagement, focuses on activities examining responses to the question, “Based on what you that require a more intense level of participation, in- have heard or seen, how much do you support or oppose cluding: working or volunteering for a candidate, political the Black Lives Matter Movement?” (recoded 1 = strongly Cardenas et al. 7 Table 1. Descriptive Statistics, Latino Racial Identity, and Political Participation (CMPS 2021). Active Engagement Participated (%) Did Not Participate (%) Worked or volunteered for a candidate 11.62 88.38 Participated in one or more social, cultural, civic, political groups, or unions 18.59 81.41 Attended campaign rally, meeting, or event 12.27 87.73 Attended protest march, demonstration, or rally 12.38 87.82 Attended a meeting to discuss issues facing the community 18.36 81.64 Passive engagement Signed a petition regarding an issue of concern 38.76 61.24 Wore campaign button, posted sticker or sign 21.71 78.29 Boycotted company or product for political reasons 29.02 70.98 Discussed politics with family and friends 72.91 27.09 Discussed candidate or political issue on internet/social media 31.65 68.35 Note: N = 3529. oppose to 5 = strongly support). Because we are broadly Table 2. Predictors of Viewing Latino as a Separate Race interested in political participation, we also measure this (Logistic Regression, CMPS 2020). support using a binary measure for attendance at a BLM Latino is a Distinct Race protest: “Over the past year, did you participate in a Black Lives Matter protest or a protest against police brutality?” Coefficient Estimate Robust S.E. (1 = participated, 0 = did not). A third measure asks Men 0.073 0.113 whether respondents agree that children in grades K-12 Non-binary gender 1.872** 0.539 should be taught about race and racism: “During the White racial identity 0.150 0.135 summer of 2020, Black Lives Matter and protesters Other multiracial id 0.692 0.429 around the world stressed bringing an end to racism Afro-Latino 0.132 0.159 among individuals and within larger society. Part of Puerto Rican 0.272 0.170 these protests involved acknowledging the history of Cuban 0.212 0.226 racism in the United States and beyond. Do you agree Dominican 0.344 0.302 or disagree that children in grades K-12 should learn Central American 0.446* 0.183 about race and racism in their U.S. history curricu- South American 0.151 0.174 lum?” (recoded 1 = strongly disagree through 5 = Spanish origin 0.113 0.239 strongly agree). While it is possible that respondents Other Latino nationality 0.215 0.469 may also be thinking about anti-Latino racism in their Democrat 0.248* 0.127 responses, the question is clearly phrased to evoke the Republican 0.177 0.180 BLM protests. We include this alternative measure to Liberal 0.428** 0.136 capture whether the belief that Latinos constitute a Conservative 0.003 0.159 distinct racial group is associated more broadly with a Non-ideological 0.401 0.192 greater awareness of, and emphasis on, racialized Skin color (self-id) 0.036 0.032 structures in the United States, as well as the need to Income 0.026* 0.013 acknowledge them. Education 0.020 0.025 Age 0.043 0.039 Second generation 0.452*** 0.126 Findings Third generation 0.389* 0.158 Personal discrimination 0.029 0.117 Who Believes Latino is a race? Latino discrimination 0.471*** 0.065 Table 2 presents the results of our multivariate analysis Constant 0.264 0.395 that re-examines the question of which members in the Notes: N = 2901. * = p ≤0.05, ** = p < 0.01, *** = p < 0.001. Robust Latino community believe that Latinos constitute a sep- standard errors in parentheses. Excluded categories are women; Latino/ arate race. Existing literature finds mixed evidence for the Black self-identification; not Afro-Latino; Mexican origin/ancestry; in- effects of gender, age, education, and national origin. In dependent (partisanship); moderate; and first generation. 8 Political Research Quarterly 0(0) our analysis, very few variables are statistically signifi- Political Interest cant. However, our few significant variables do suggest We next turn to the question of whether believing that support for the idea that in general, more politically in- Latinos constitute a separate race is associated with dif- corporated and progressive respondents believe that La- ferent political attitudes and behaviors. Table 3 displays tinos represent a distinct racial group, as evidenced by the the results for our test of H1, that respondents who believe statistical significance of immigrant generation, income, Latinos constitute a distinctive racial group will generally liberal ideology, identifying as a Democrat, and perceived be more interested in politics. Because the response group-based discrimination. These results suggest that as categories range from one through four, we evaluate this Latinos spend more time in and become more incorpo- hypothesis using ordered logistic regression analysis. rated into life in the United States, they may develop a Consistent with our hypothesis, we find that respondents distinct and more nuanced understanding of racial dy- who believe Latino is a separate race report greater interest namics in the United States. in politics when compared to those who do not, at p < 0.01 Consistent with Zepeda-Milla´n and Wallace (2013), significance. We also calculated predicted probabilities to in comparison to first generation respondents, second explore the magnitude of this difference, finding that and third generation immigrants are more likely to respondents who think that Latino should be a separate believe that Latinos represent a separate racial group. race are approximately 4 percentage points more likely to This belief also correlates with a higher income, con- say that they are very interested in politics (17.9%) sistent with Stokes-Brown (2012).We find that liberal compared to those who do not think Latinos constitute a Latinos are more likely to view their identity as racial, separate racial group (14.0%). suggesting that there is a progressive dynamic at work. Consistent with existing research, political interest is Interestingly, while personal experiences with dis- higher among respondents with higher socioeconomic crimination are not significant, diverging from Golash- status (Verba et al. 1995), later generation immigrants, Boza and Darity (2008), respondents who believe that older respondents, and Latino men (Silber Mohamed Latinos as a group experience high levels of discrim- 2017). Individuals who identify as Afro-Latino as well ination are significantly more likely to believe that as those who report having darker skin tones also report Latinos constitute a separate racial group, consistent greater political interest. While we discuss the importance with the findings of Zepeda-Millan and Wallace (2013) of the skin color variable in greater detail below, we note and Stokes-Brown (2012). In contrast to prior research, the inherent challenges and subjectivity of using a self- the only national origin difference in our model is that, reported measure, as skin color and racial identity do not compared to Mexican Americans, Central Americans always align within the Latino community; for instance, are less likely to believe Latinos constitute a separate while Latinos with dark skin often identify as Black, this is racial group; we do not replicate previous findings not always the case (Dowling 2014, Ostfeld and Yadon (Zepeda-Milla´n and Wallace 2013, Stokes-Brown 2022). In comparison to respondents who say that they are 2012) that Cuban and Puerto Ricans are less likely non-partisan, we find that political interest is also greater than Mexican Americans to view Latinos as a separate among respondents who identify as members of a political race. The small number of respondents who do not party. Additionally, in comparison to ideological mod- identify with the gender binary (n = 25) are less likely to erates, self-described liberals are much more likely to be indicate that Latinos represent a distinct race but we find interested in politics, while people who decline to share no other gender differences; given the small number of their political ideology are less likely to express political non-binary respondents, we interpret this result with interest. caution. Future research should continue to explore potential relationships between gender, broadly de- Political Participation fined, and racial identities. Despite concerns that a racialized Latino identity might further marginalize Next, we turn to measures of political participation. H2 Afro-Latinos (Hernan ´ dez 2021), we see no significant anticipates that respondents who think Latinos comprise a difference in the extent to which members of this group separate race will be more likely to participate in political believe Latinos constitute a separate race. Consistent activities. Table 4 displays the results of our second hy- with the findings of Stokes-Brown (2012) we also find pothesis using ordered logistic regression models. We use no effect for education. In contrast with previous re- ordered logistic regression to test our hypothesis because search, we find no evidence that age (Flores-Gonzalez the active and passive measures of participation are both et al. 2014)or skintone(Stokes-Brown 2012)is as- 5-point scales (standardized to range from 0 to 1). sociated with the perception that Latino is a racialized Looking across the first row, we find mixed support for identity. H2. While respondents who believe Latinos are a distinct Cardenas et al. 9 Table 3. Political Interest and Latino Racialization (Ordered Logistic Regression, CMPS 2021). Coefficient Estimate Robust Standard Error Latino is a race 0.289** 0.093 Men 0.396*** 0.086 Non-binary gender 0.764 0.685 White 0.141 0.110 Other/multiracial 0.503 0.403 Afro-Latino 0.311* 0.125 Puerto Rican 0.472** 0.131 Cuban 0.2146 0.194 Dominican 0.359 0.237 Central American 0.016 0.138 South American 0.045 0.138 Spanish origin 0.083 0.195 Other nationality 0.241 0.403 Democrat 0.426*** 0.10 Republican 0.952*** 0.141 Liberal 0.552*** 0.10 Conservative 0.195 0.121 No political ideology 1.498*** 0.175 Skin color 0.075** 0.025 Income 0.030** 0.009 Education 0.107** 0.030 Age 0.110*** 0.030 Second generation 0.286** 0.098 Third generation and up 0.246* 0.123 Notes: N = 3001. * = p < 0.05, ** = p < 0.01, *** = p < 0.001. Excluded categories are women; Latino/Black self-identification; not Afro-Latino; Mexican origin/ancestry; independent (partisanship); moderate; and first generation. race are more likely to engage in passive political survey focuses on participation between spring 2020– participation, they are not more likely to engage in the spring 2021, at the start of the COVID-19 pandemic active participation activities included in our first scaled and a time of heightened fears and when vaccines for measure. In some sense, we might consider the passive COVID were not widely available, it is perhaps less participation measures to be more closely related to po- surprising that older respondents would score lower on litical interest than the active participation measure. Thus, measures of political participation. Our analysis in Table 3 the combined findings in Tables 3 and 4 suggest that suggests a correlation between (self-reported) darker skin respondents who believe Latinos constitute a separate race tone and greater political interest; here, we see that re- are generally more engaged with political ideas, even if porting darker skin is also correlated with a higher score they are not participating actively. on our active participation scale, but not for the passive Republicans and liberals (but neither Democrats nor participation measures. Identifying as Afro-Latino is as- conservatives) are more likely to report having engaged in sociated with higher levels of participation using both of active and passive participation, while respondents who our scales, and white respondents are also more likely to report that they are non-ideological are significantly less report active participation. likely to participate in any capacity. The variables for socioeconomic status and immigrant generation are Attitudes about Race and Racism generally significant in the expected direction for both of our scaled variables, but third generation and up is not Finally, H3 explores whether respondents who think that statistically significant in our active participation model. Latinos constitute a separate race hold distinctive views The age variable is significant in the opposite direction about coalitional racial politics in the United States. We than we anticipated, such that older respondents are less test this hypothesis in Table 5. The first and third de- likely to participate. Notably, however, many of the pendent variables are categorical, with responses ranging participation items imply in-person participation, partic- from strongly oppose (1) to strongly support (5). As such, ularly in the active participation scale. Given that the ordered logistic regression is used for the analyses in these 10 Political Research Quarterly 0(0) Table 4. Perceptions of Latino as a Race and Political Participation (CMPS 2020). Active Participation Passive Participation Coefficient Robust S.E. Coefficient Robust S.E. Latino is a race 0.054 0.112 0.373*** 0.094 Men 0.217** 0.097 0.075 0.082 Non-binary 0.535 0.471 0.953 0.567 White 0.229* 0.117 0.194 0.095 Other/multiracial 1.199* 0.521 0.407 0.328 Afro-Latino 0.901*** 0.133 0.686*** 0.137 Puerto Rican 0.295 0.153 0.322* 0.134 Cuban 0.046 0.202 0.108 0.152 Dominican 0.217 0.235 0.308 0.167 Central American 0.178 0.169 0.059 0.148 South American 0.310* 0.155 0.071 0.133 Spanish nationality 0.037 0.194 0.063 0.158 Other nationality 0.094 0.417 0.011 0.262 Democrat 0.189 0.109 0.162 0.091 Republican 0.260* 0.152 0.373** 0.125 Liberal 0.327** 0.109 0.704*** 0.100 Conservative 0.134 0.14 0.062 0.106 Non-ideological 0.839*** 0.224 0.972*** 0.165 Skin color 0.190*** 0.027 0.019 0.026 Income 0.021* 0.010 0.039*** 0.01 Education 0.065* 0.026 0.059** 0.018 Age 0.286*** 0.036 0.089** 0.028 Second generation 0.265* 0.107 0.459*** 0.096 Third generation+ 0.149 0.14 0.361** 0.118 N 3001 3001 Notes: *= p < 0.05, ** = p < 0.01, *** = p < 0.001. Excluded categories are women; Latino/Black self-identification; Mexican origin/ancestry; independent (partisanship); moderate (ideology); and first generation. columns. The second dependent variable, attendance at a express support for the BLM movement and to protest in BLM protest in the last year, is binary, with logistic re- support of the movement, but are not more likely to gression analysis used in the middle column. support teaching about race and racism. Respondents who Looking across the first row, we find consistent support report having darker skin color are more likely to report for our third hypothesis: respondents who believe Latinos attendance at a protest in support of BLM, but skin color is constitute a separate race are significantly more likely to not significant for the other dependent variables. We also support the Black Lives Matter movement generally, more find strong effects of partisanship and ideology in the likely to report having attended a protest in support of expected directions, with self-identifying Democrats and BLM over the past year, and more likely to emphasize the liberals demonstrating more awareness about racial issues importance of teaching children in K-12 schools about compared to Republicans and conservatives. Although racism. Overall, our results indicate that respondents who there is no correlation between income and any of the believe Latinos represent a separate race have a greater racism variables, more educated respondents are signifi- awareness of racialized inequalities in the United States cantly more likely to be supportive of the BLM movement and may be stronger coalitional partners in the fight and to express support for teaching children about the against social injustice. history of racism in the United States. While there is no Our control variables also yield some interesting re- significant relationship between age and attitudes about sults. Latino men are less likely to support the BLM teaching race and racism, there is a negative relationship movement and are less likely to endorse teaching about between age and both of our BLM variables, indicating racism than are Latinas. Identifying as white or other/ less support for the movement among older respondents. multiracial is not significant in any of our models. Re- Our results are consistent with the findings in Terriquez spondents who identify as Afro-Latino are more likely to and Milkman (2021), who find that women and nonbinary Cardenas et al. 11 Table 5. Perceptions of Latino as a Race and Broader Racial Attitudes in the United States (CMPS 2021). Support BLM Attend BLM Protest Teach K-12 about Racism Coefficient Robust S.E. Coefficient Robust S.E. Coefficient Robust S.E. Latino is a race 0.274** 0.091 0.440** 0.166 0.524*** 0.091 Men 0.332*** 0.082 0.209 0.131 0.232** 0.086 Non-binary 0.509 0.571 0.876 0.589 0.742 0.548 White 0.065 0.094 0.048 0.165 0.051 0.099 Other/multiracial 0.546 0.340 0.296 0.571 0.657 0.487 Afro-Latino 0.423*** 0.117 0.650*** 0.166 0.036 0.120 Puerto Rican 0.295* 0.123 0.248 0.208 0.131 0.128 Cuban 0.231 0.181 0.662* 0.273 0.248 0.184 Dominican 0.379 0.199 0.161 0.317 0.225 0.223 Central American 0.083 0.132 0.402 0.219 0.105 0.146 South American 0.032 0.131 0.249 0.235 0.164 0.146 Spanish 0.069 0.186 0.355 0.272 0.032 0.159 Other nationality 0.320 0.361 0.595 0.571 0.565 0.331 Democrat 0.569*** 0.092 0.446** 0.154 0.318** 0.092 Republican 0.865*** 0.14 0.208 0.223 0.761*** 0.136 Liberal 0.750*** 0.095 0.565*** 0.148 0.764*** 0.100 Conservative 0.641*** 0.121 0.028 0.220 0.439*** 0.115 Non-ideological 0.194 0.138 0.332 0.266 0.167 0.158 Skin color 0.026 0.025 0.203*** 0.034 0.020 0.024 Income 0.005 0.009 0.006 0.016 0.010 0.010 Education 0.072*** 0.016 0.021 0.028 0.052** 0.019 Age 0.204*** 0.028 0.697*** 0.066 0.010 0.030 Second generation 0.011 0.092 0.310* 0.152 0.035 0.093 Third generation+ 0.142 0.118 0.393* 0.20 0.104 0.120 Constant —— 1.863*** 0.456 —— Notes: N = 3001. * = p < 0.05, ** = p < 0.01, *** = p < 0.001. Excluded categories are women; Latino/Black self-identification; Mexican origin/ancestry; independent (partisanship); moderate (ideology); and first generation respondents. youth are disproportionately represented in solidarity We revisit these questions by first re-examining, with movements with Black lives. new and more comprehensive survey data, the question of who within the Latino community is most likely to think that Latinos constitute a separate race. We contribute to Discussion this literature by finding that the belief Latinos constitute a The sociopolitical status of Latinos in the United States is separate race is more common among Latinos who are complicated by the designation of Latino as an ethnicity more incorporated into the United States, including later and not a race. This status contrasts with the increasingly generation respondents and those with higher income, as popular public attitude that Latinos are uniquely racialized well as respondents who identify as liberal, as Democrats, as evident in discriminatory attitudes and policies. Latinos and those who report more group-level (but not want to be recognized as a distinct racial group, possibly individual-level) discrimination. in order to receive recognition for the discrimination they We also hypothesized that Latinos who believe Latino face and to align themselves in solidarity with fellow is a distinct racial category in the United States would hold racialized groups in the United States (but see Hernandez ´ distinct political behaviors and attitudes from those group 2021). Yet, solidarity with other racialized groups is not a members who do not, with the expectation that attitudes given, as some members of the Latino community have about whether Latino is a racialized identity would be responded to marginalization with anti-Black attitudes associated with increased political interest and partici- and actions (Benson and Clealand 2021, Perez et al. pation, as well as progressive racial attitudes. We 2023). Moreover, the quest among Latinos for recogni- evaluate these hypotheses across multiple political out- tion as a separate racialized group is inextricably bound comes, including political interest, active and passive with other social justice struggles. political participation, support for the BLM movement 12 Political Research Quarterly 0(0) (including political views and protest participation), and Conclusion broader views about racial dynamics in the United States, Focusing on the inherent tension that exists between the captured by the extent to which respondents believe that way Latino identity is designated by government officials K-12 students should be taught about issues relating to and the way it is experienced by many within the Latino race and racism. community, we analyze data from the 2020 CMPS to Overall, we find positive support for our hypotheses. evaluate whether group members who believe Latino Respondents who believe that Latinos represent a separate represents a distinct race engage differently in politics race are generally more interested and engaged in politics than those who do not. We find that respondents who and racial justice issues, including having a higher basic understand Latino to be a separate race generally hold level of political interest; ranking higher on a scale of passive participation (including discussing politics with distinct political views, including greater political interest, friends/family, posting about politics on social media, greater awareness of and support for policies related to signing a petition, boycotting a company, or wearing a race and racism, and increased passive political partici- campaign button or sticker/posting a sign); and expressing pation. However, we find no significant relationship with greater support for the Black Lives Matter movement (in active participation, suggesting that these views do not attitudes and protest participation) as well as teaching always translate into distinct political behaviors. Grass- about the U.S. history of racism in K-12 schools. How- roots youth organizations in particular have been critical ever, we do not find a significant difference between in training and mobilizing Latino young people in ad- attitudes about whether Latinos represent a distinct race vancing Black Lives Matter causes and also fighting for and our scaled measure of active political participation related struggles (Terriquez and Milkman 2021), sug- (working or volunteering for a candidate; participating in gesting these are significant channels of politicization and mobilization around cross-racial solidarity. political organizations; attending a campaign rally or Our analysis also underscores additional demographic meeting, protest march, or community meeting). These differences within the Latino population based on whether results suggest that attitudes about whether Latinos a respondent identifies as Afro-Latino and reported skin comprise a unique racial group are politically conse- color. These findings underscore the importance of on- quential and carry coalitional implications for cross-racial going research about the relationship between self- solidarity, but that there also may be some limits in the reported skin color and racial self-identification extent to which these attitudes have consequences for (Dowling 2014, Ostfeld and Yadon 2022) as well as political mobilization. the need for further study about the distinct views and The belief that Latino is a race is a fundamentally experiences of Afro-Latinos (Clealand and Gutierrez politicized view in that individuals who share it are 2022, Hernandez ´ 2021). consciously rejecting constructed distinctions between ethnicity and race because these distinctions fall short in An ethnic designation by the government does not capturing the racialization processes shaping Latinos’ fully capture the persistent racialized discrimination ex- experiences. It is thus not surprising that this view is also perienced by Latinos at the hands of politicians, policies, associated with unique political behaviors like increased and society writ large. In contrast, a Latino racial des- political interest, some increased political participation, ignation adopted by Latinos emphasizes a recognition of and solidarity with cross-racial justice efforts that illus- such discrimination by aligning itself in relation to and in trate an active reclaiming of power and representation. solidarity with Black experiences in the United States. However, because of the correlational nature of our survey Corral (2020) shows that Latino racially identifying La- research design, we acknowledge that this relationship tinos, while less likely to have heard of BLM, are more could be bidirectional. Latinos who believe Latino is a likely to support it, compared to white racially identifying race are more likely to have a progressive, anti-racist Latinos. We find that individuals who believe Latinos represent a separate race are more likely to support the orientation, but it might also be the case that Latinos who BLM movement, more likely to report attendance at a hold more progressive attitudes in general are thus more protest in support of BLM, and more likely to support likely to adopt the belief that Latinos should be designated teaching children about the history of racism in the United as a racial group in the United States. Future research States. Our analysis extends Corral’s findings by showing should deploy a causal inference approach to eliminate that a belief that Latino is a race is likely to be politically endogeneity. As the debate over measuring racial cate- consequential for Brown–Black solidarity politics. gories in the United States continues to evolve, additional Our results indicate that respondents who believe research is needed to better understand both a growing Latinos represent a separate race may be more oriented subgroup within the Latino community, and the broader towards cross-racial solidarity struggles than those who dynamics within and between racial groups in the United do not since they may be more likely to see their States. Cardenas et al. 13 experiences as shared with Black Americans, who have References experienced long, historical systemic discrimination. 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Only Latino respondents to the CMPS were asked whether Clealand, Danielle, and Angela Gutierrez. 2022. “More Than Latino is a race. Thus, we cannot test for similar correlations Brown: How Race and Skin Tone Matter for Latino Group for non-Latinos. Identity.” APSA Preprints. https://doi.org/10.33774/apsa- 2. Notably, 88.6% of respondents who identify as Afro-Latino 2022-4r9wq also identify as Black. See Appendix for alternative models Corral, Alvaro J. 2020. “Allies, Antagonists, or Ambivalent? that include only the dummy variable for a Black identity Exploring Latino Attitudes About the Black Lives Matter rather than Afro-Latino. Movement.” Hispanic Journal of Behavioral Sciences 42 3. Ostfeld and Yadon (2022, p. 1822) note that self-reported skin (4): 431-454. color captures “the political views that emerge from living in a Dowling, Julie. Mexican Americans and the Question of Race. society that discriminates based upon race and color, as much Austin: University of Texas Press, 2014. as it is reflecting the physiological characteristics of one’s Farris, Emily M., and Heather Silber Mohamed. 2018. “Picturing skin.” See their work as well as Monk (2015) for a discussion Immigration: How the Media Criminalizes Immigrants.” of concerns related to a self-reported skin color variable. Politics, Groups, and Identities 6 (4): 814-824. 4. There is a slight difference in the participation measures Flores-Gonzalez, ´ Nilda, Elizabeth Aranda, and Elizabeth included by Gutierrez et al., who use 2016 CMPS data, and Vaquera. 2014. “Doing Race: Latino Youth’s Identities our active participation measure, which uses the 2020 data. and the Politics of Racial Exclusion.” American Behavioral Importantly, however, they distinguish between these mea- Scientist 58 (14): 1834-1851. sures and less costly participation activities such as wearing a Frasure, Lorrie, Janelle Wong, Matt Barreto, and Edward Vargas. campaign button or posting on the internet, both of which are 2021. The 2020 Collaborative Multiracial Post-election included in our passive scale. Survey (CMPS). 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Political Research Quarterly – SAGE
Published: Dec 1, 2023
Keywords: Latinos; identity; race; racialization; political behavior; coalitions
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