'Barbarossa':Surprise Attack and Communication

'Barbarossa':Surprise Attack and Communication 'Barbarossa'Surprise Attack and Communication SAGE Publications, Inc.1978DOI: 10.1177/002200947801300308 Amnon Sella Since the beginning of the second world war there have been four surprise attacks which have made a world-wide impact on political-military thinking: 'Barbarossa', Pearl Harbour, the Six-Day War and the October War. Despite some differences, these four present noteworthy similarities and can be considered as a group. In general terms the intention of a surprise attack is to shock and paralyze the political-military system, in the hope that any recovery will at best be slow. If it is successful, the shock of the attack will make it difficult for those immediately involved to understand what is happening (that is to 'read' the battle), it will confuse priorities and disrupt communications. These three shock effects are complementary and reinforcing. The victims and defenders are hard-pressed to adjust to their new and rapidly changing situation, so that they can scarcely pull themselves together and make useful reports. Their commanders, for lack of information or worse still, on the basis of inaccurate information, tend to go on doing what they have been trained to do and to take measures they believe are still appropriate. One crucial problem for people under http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png Journal of Contemporary History SAGE

'Barbarossa':Surprise Attack and Communication

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'Barbarossa':Surprise Attack and Communication

Abstract

'Barbarossa'Surprise Attack and Communication SAGE Publications, Inc.1978DOI: 10.1177/002200947801300308 Amnon Sella Since the beginning of the second world war there have been four surprise attacks which have made a world-wide impact on political-military thinking: 'Barbarossa', Pearl Harbour, the Six-Day War and the October War. Despite some differences, these four present noteworthy similarities and can be considered as a group. In general terms the intention of a surprise attack is to shock and paralyze the political-military system, in the hope that any recovery will at best be slow. If it is successful, the shock of the attack will make it difficult for those immediately involved to understand what is happening (that is to 'read' the battle), it will confuse priorities and disrupt communications. These three shock effects are complementary and reinforcing. The victims and defenders are hard-pressed to adjust to their new and rapidly changing situation, so that they can scarcely pull themselves together and make useful reports. Their commanders, for lack of information or worse still, on the basis of inaccurate information, tend to go on doing what they have been trained to do and to take measures they believe are still appropriate. One crucial problem for people under
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Publisher
SAGE
Copyright
Copyright © 1978 by SAGE Publications
ISSN
0022-0094
eISSN
0022-0094
D.O.I.
10.1177/002200947801300308
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

'Barbarossa'Surprise Attack and Communication SAGE Publications, Inc.1978DOI: 10.1177/002200947801300308 Amnon Sella Since the beginning of the second world war there have been four surprise attacks which have made a world-wide impact on political-military thinking: 'Barbarossa', Pearl Harbour, the Six-Day War and the October War. Despite some differences, these four present noteworthy similarities and can be considered as a group. In general terms the intention of a surprise attack is to shock and paralyze the political-military system, in the hope that any recovery will at best be slow. If it is successful, the shock of the attack will make it difficult for those immediately involved to understand what is happening (that is to 'read' the battle), it will confuse priorities and disrupt communications. These three shock effects are complementary and reinforcing. The victims and defenders are hard-pressed to adjust to their new and rapidly changing situation, so that they can scarcely pull themselves together and make useful reports. Their commanders, for lack of information or worse still, on the basis of inaccurate information, tend to go on doing what they have been trained to do and to take measures they believe are still appropriate. One crucial problem for people under

Journal

Journal of Contemporary HistorySAGE

Published: Jan 1, 1978

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