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Scars of War, Wounds of Peace: The Israeli-Arab Tragedy (review)

Scars of War, Wounds of Peace: The Israeli-Arab Tragedy (review) Israel would make no effort to get masses of American Jews to emigrate, except for a limited number of specialists to help Israel develop. However, Ganin documents how Ben-Gurion frequently backtracked on these promises, much to the consternation not only of Blaustein and other American Jewish leaders, some of whom feared charges of "dual loyalty," but also of some Israeli diplomats. The second part of the book, which discusses the often troubled course of Israeli-American relations from 1948 to 1956, will be particularly useful for readers without a detailed knowledge of the diplomacy of this period. The problems Israel encountered in the Truman Administration (1945­53) included the delay in awarding de jure diplomatic recognition until January 1949, a similar delay in the granting of an Import-Export Bank loan, and pressure from the U.S. to allow the repatriation of hundreds of thousands of Palestinian refugees from Israel's 1948­49 War of Independence and to cede some of the territory it had won in the war. During the first term of the Eisenhower Administration (1953­57), relations deteriorated as the U.S. pushed the socalled Alpha Plan to get Israel to cede territory to Egypt, criticized Israel for its retaliatory strikes against terrorist http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png Shofar: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Jewish Studies Purdue University Press

Scars of War, Wounds of Peace: The Israeli-Arab Tragedy (review)

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Publisher
Purdue University Press
Copyright
Copyright © 2008 Purdue University
ISSN
1534-5165
Publisher site
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Abstract

Israel would make no effort to get masses of American Jews to emigrate, except for a limited number of specialists to help Israel develop. However, Ganin documents how Ben-Gurion frequently backtracked on these promises, much to the consternation not only of Blaustein and other American Jewish leaders, some of whom feared charges of "dual loyalty," but also of some Israeli diplomats. The second part of the book, which discusses the often troubled course of Israeli-American relations from 1948 to 1956, will be particularly useful for readers without a detailed knowledge of the diplomacy of this period. The problems Israel encountered in the Truman Administration (1945­53) included the delay in awarding de jure diplomatic recognition until January 1949, a similar delay in the granting of an Import-Export Bank loan, and pressure from the U.S. to allow the repatriation of hundreds of thousands of Palestinian refugees from Israel's 1948­49 War of Independence and to cede some of the territory it had won in the war. During the first term of the Eisenhower Administration (1953­57), relations deteriorated as the U.S. pushed the socalled Alpha Plan to get Israel to cede territory to Egypt, criticized Israel for its retaliatory strikes against terrorist

Journal

Shofar: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Jewish StudiesPurdue University Press

Published: Feb 13, 2009

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