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What Does Nietzsche Mean by “the Same” in His Theory of Eternal Recurrence?

What Does Nietzsche Mean by “the Same” in His Theory of Eternal Recurrence? <p>Abstract:</p><p>In this article, I examine the linguistic features in Nietzsche’s presentations that have led readers to assume that “the same” means numerical identity. I also evaluate the following argument about personal identity that has been used to support this assumption: if we are not numerically identical to our recurring counterparts, then we have no reason to be concerned about the prospect of reliving our lives and Nietzsche’s theory cannot have any of the existential significance he ascribes to it. My conclusion is that Nietzsche actually has in mind a complete qualitative identity that includes all spatiotemporal properties. Thus, the supporting argument fails because the problem of persistence through change over time is not relevant to a theory in which persons are neither recurring at a later time nor undergoing any change when they recur.</p> http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png The Journal of Nietzsche Studies Penn State University Press

What Does Nietzsche Mean by “the Same” in His Theory of Eternal Recurrence?

The Journal of Nietzsche Studies , Volume 53 (1) – Mar 15, 2022

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Publisher
Penn State University Press
Copyright
Copyright © The Pennsylvania State University.
ISSN
1538-4594

Abstract

<p>Abstract:</p><p>In this article, I examine the linguistic features in Nietzsche’s presentations that have led readers to assume that “the same” means numerical identity. I also evaluate the following argument about personal identity that has been used to support this assumption: if we are not numerically identical to our recurring counterparts, then we have no reason to be concerned about the prospect of reliving our lives and Nietzsche’s theory cannot have any of the existential significance he ascribes to it. My conclusion is that Nietzsche actually has in mind a complete qualitative identity that includes all spatiotemporal properties. Thus, the supporting argument fails because the problem of persistence through change over time is not relevant to a theory in which persons are neither recurring at a later time nor undergoing any change when they recur.</p>

Journal

The Journal of Nietzsche StudiesPenn State University Press

Published: Mar 15, 2022

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