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<p>Abstract:</p><p>This article, invited for presentation to the North American Nietzsche Society at the 2020 Pacific Division Meeting of the American Philosophical Association, is a commentary on Mark Alfano's 2019 monograph, <i>Nietzsche's Moral Psychology</i>. I commend Alfano's productive, innovative use of digital humanities methods as well as his more traditional textual interpretation. But I raise some doubts about Alfano's proposed criterion of "external integration" for a drive to qualify as a Nietzschean virtue: the claim that if a drive systematically and reliably meets with condemnation from an agent's community, it <i>cannot</i> be a virtue. I suggest that the criterion be amended either so that it is disapproval from the agent's <i>true</i> community, which for a solitary moral innovator may be an imagined community of past and future peers, that disqualifies a drive from virtue status; or so that community disapproval is disqualifying only if the agent internalizes it.</p>
The Journal of Nietzsche Studies – Penn State University Press
Published: Nov 23, 2020
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