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<p>Abstract:</p><p>The âterribleâ existential truths about the human situation raise Schopenhauerâs question: why continue living at all? Nietzscheâs answer is that only viewed in terms of aesthetic values can life itself be âjustifiedâ (where âjustificationâ really means restoring an affective attachment to life). But how could the fact that life exemplifies <i>aesthetic</i> value restore our attachment to life in the face of these terrible <i>existential</i> truths? I suggest that there are two keys to understanding Nietzscheâs answer: first, his assimilation of aesthetic pleasure to a kind of sublimated sexual pleasure; and second, his psychological thesis that powerful affects neutralize pain, and thus can âseduceâ the sufferer back to life. Life can supply the requisite kind of aesthetic pleasure only if it features what I call the âspectacle of genius,â the spectacle represented by the likes of Beethoven, Goethe, and Napoleon. Since such geniuses are not possible in a culture dominated by âmoralityâ (in Nietzscheâs pejorative sense), the critique of morality is essential to the restoration of an affective attachment to life.</p>
The Journal of Nietzsche Studies – Penn State University Press
Published: Dec 5, 2018
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