Get 20M+ Full-Text Papers For Less Than $1.50/day. Start a 14-Day Trial for You and Your Team.

Learn More →

The Lived Human Body from the Perspective of the Shared World ( Mitwelt )

The Lived Human Body from the Perspective of the Shared World ( Mitwelt ) jsp carl von ossietzky universität oldenburg Translated by Millay Hyatt The lived body (Leib) in the phenomenological tradition tends to be thought as the living body of the acting and perceiving subject, which is then analyzed by way of subjective self-reflection. This is true for Husserl (1970) as well as for Merleau-Ponty (1962) and Sartre (1992). When, however, the lived body is made the starting point of analysis in this way, it becomes a general and thus transhistorical condition of experience, and it is only in a second step that social relations and historical formation can be inscribed into it. Plessner's concept of the lived body (Leib) differs in two ways from this view predominant in phenomenology. First, Plessner does not approach the lived body in terms of a reflection of subjective experience. Rather than taking as his object the lived body of an ego that experiences it, Plessner seeks to understand from the outside the fact that there is an ego that experiences his or her living body. Second, Plessner's (1975) theory of ex-centric positionality regards the structure of bodily experience from the perspective of the Shared World (Mitwelt), that is to say, the relationship to the http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png The Journal of Speculative Philosophy Penn State University Press

The Lived Human Body from the Perspective of the Shared World ( Mitwelt )

Loading next page...
 
/lp/penn-state-university-press/the-lived-human-body-from-the-perspective-of-the-shared-world-mitwelt-nTsk9aDKud
Publisher
Penn State University Press
Copyright
Copyright © Penn State University Press
ISSN
1527-9383
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

jsp carl von ossietzky universität oldenburg Translated by Millay Hyatt The lived body (Leib) in the phenomenological tradition tends to be thought as the living body of the acting and perceiving subject, which is then analyzed by way of subjective self-reflection. This is true for Husserl (1970) as well as for Merleau-Ponty (1962) and Sartre (1992). When, however, the lived body is made the starting point of analysis in this way, it becomes a general and thus transhistorical condition of experience, and it is only in a second step that social relations and historical formation can be inscribed into it. Plessner's concept of the lived body (Leib) differs in two ways from this view predominant in phenomenology. First, Plessner does not approach the lived body in terms of a reflection of subjective experience. Rather than taking as his object the lived body of an ego that experiences it, Plessner seeks to understand from the outside the fact that there is an ego that experiences his or her living body. Second, Plessner's (1975) theory of ex-centric positionality regards the structure of bodily experience from the perspective of the Shared World (Mitwelt), that is to say, the relationship to the

Journal

The Journal of Speculative PhilosophyPenn State University Press

Published: Apr 1, 2010

There are no references for this article.