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On the Problem of Affective Nihilism

On the Problem of Affective Nihilism <p>Abstract:</p><p>Bernard Reginster has argued that Nietzschean nihilism is best characterized as a "philosophical claim." This account has inspired a number of critical responses. While Reginster&apos;s characterization presents nihilism as a purely <i>cognitive phenomenon</i>, involving particular beliefs about meaning and value, it is just as frequently presented by Nietzsche as a <i>feeling-based phenomenon</i>, a weariness with one&apos;s world that comports one negatively toward the world. How, then, should Nietzsche&apos;s reader understand the problem of nihilism in his thought? In this article, I examine Nietzsche&apos;s account of drives, affects, and the relations he establishes between them to show that nihilism must be understood not only as involving particular beliefs, but as a psychophysiological condition, which I call, following Ken Gemes and John Richardson, affective nihilism.</p> http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png The Journal of Nietzsche Studies Penn State University Press

On the Problem of Affective Nihilism

Creasy, Kaitlyn
The Journal of Nietzsche Studies , Volume 49 (1) – Mar 13, 2018
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Publisher
Penn State University Press
Copyright
Copyright © The Pennsylvania State University.
ISSN
1538-4594

Abstract

<p>Abstract:</p><p>Bernard Reginster has argued that Nietzschean nihilism is best characterized as a "philosophical claim." This account has inspired a number of critical responses. While Reginster&apos;s characterization presents nihilism as a purely <i>cognitive phenomenon</i>, involving particular beliefs about meaning and value, it is just as frequently presented by Nietzsche as a <i>feeling-based phenomenon</i>, a weariness with one&apos;s world that comports one negatively toward the world. How, then, should Nietzsche&apos;s reader understand the problem of nihilism in his thought? In this article, I examine Nietzsche&apos;s account of drives, affects, and the relations he establishes between them to show that nihilism must be understood not only as involving particular beliefs, but as a psychophysiological condition, which I call, following Ken Gemes and John Richardson, affective nihilism.</p>

Journal

The Journal of Nietzsche Studies – Penn State University Press

Published: Mar 13, 2018

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