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Nietzsche’s Psychology as a Refinement of Plato’s

Nietzsche’s Psychology as a Refinement of Plato’s Clark and Dudrick claim that Nietzsche takes Plato’s theory of the soul to be “a hypothesis, which his own psychology is an attempt to <i>refine</i>.” This essay accepts that claim, but argues for a more streamlined account of the relation between Nietzsche and Plato than Clark and Dudrick give. (1) There is no justification for their suggestion that Nietzsche diagnoses an “atomistic need” as responsible for what he objects to in Plato’s model. (2) The claim that “reason” is a motivationally inert set of cognitive capacities is not necessarily a point of disagreement with Plato. (3) Nietzsche’s psychology does not require a generalized “will to value” as a counterpart to the will to truth. (4) Clark and Dudrick fail to recognize the Platonic soul elements as drives, and that the element that for Plato should govern in the best of souls can be interpreted as closely analogous to Nietzsche’s will to truth. http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png The Journal of Nietzsche Studies Penn State University Press

Nietzsche’s Psychology as a Refinement of Plato’s

The Journal of Nietzsche Studies , Volume 45 (1) – Mar 26, 2014

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Publisher
Penn State University Press
Copyright
Copyright © The Pennsylvania State University.
ISSN
1538-4594

Abstract

Clark and Dudrick claim that Nietzsche takes Plato’s theory of the soul to be “a hypothesis, which his own psychology is an attempt to <i>refine</i>.” This essay accepts that claim, but argues for a more streamlined account of the relation between Nietzsche and Plato than Clark and Dudrick give. (1) There is no justification for their suggestion that Nietzsche diagnoses an “atomistic need” as responsible for what he objects to in Plato’s model. (2) The claim that “reason” is a motivationally inert set of cognitive capacities is not necessarily a point of disagreement with Plato. (3) Nietzsche’s psychology does not require a generalized “will to value” as a counterpart to the will to truth. (4) Clark and Dudrick fail to recognize the Platonic soul elements as drives, and that the element that for Plato should govern in the best of souls can be interpreted as closely analogous to Nietzsche’s will to truth.

Journal

The Journal of Nietzsche StudiesPenn State University Press

Published: Mar 26, 2014

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