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Nietzsche: Old and New Questions

Nietzsche: Old and New Questions 228 | JOURNAL OF NIETZSCHE STUDIES of perspectives and ae ff ctive interpretations in the service of cognition” (GM III:12) is simultaneously the main aim of perspectivist epistemology and one route—arguably Nietzsche’s main or preferred route (GS 324)—to independent selfhood itself (understood as the self ’s liberating emergence over and above the drives). At the same time, the potential ascetic tenden- cies of such a will to truth—of this drive for “control” over any one of the self ’s ae ff ctive perspectives—are meant to be held in check precisely by the perspectivist acknowledgment of the essential role of ae ff cts in constituting perspectives, and hence intellection, themselves. In sum, once we come to grips with the full psychological foundation of Nietzschean perspectives, we will see that the special problem of form- ing oneself as a perspectivist cognitive agent, and the general psychologi- cal problem of forming a genuine self at all out of an internally contested complex of drives and ae ff cts, are not two problems, but one. For Nietzsche, however, this is genuinely a problem—a question, not an answer; a task, not a promise. The finitude of our condition, marked decisively by perspec- tivism itself, http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png The Journal of Nietzsche Studies Penn State University Press

Nietzsche: Old and New Questions

The Journal of Nietzsche Studies , Volume 49 (2) – Dec 5, 2018

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Publisher
Penn State University Press
Copyright
Copyright © The Pennsylvania State University.
ISSN
1538-4594

Abstract

228 | JOURNAL OF NIETZSCHE STUDIES of perspectives and ae ff ctive interpretations in the service of cognition” (GM III:12) is simultaneously the main aim of perspectivist epistemology and one route—arguably Nietzsche’s main or preferred route (GS 324)—to independent selfhood itself (understood as the self ’s liberating emergence over and above the drives). At the same time, the potential ascetic tenden- cies of such a will to truth—of this drive for “control” over any one of the self ’s ae ff ctive perspectives—are meant to be held in check precisely by the perspectivist acknowledgment of the essential role of ae ff cts in constituting perspectives, and hence intellection, themselves. In sum, once we come to grips with the full psychological foundation of Nietzschean perspectives, we will see that the special problem of form- ing oneself as a perspectivist cognitive agent, and the general psychologi- cal problem of forming a genuine self at all out of an internally contested complex of drives and ae ff cts, are not two problems, but one. For Nietzsche, however, this is genuinely a problem—a question, not an answer; a task, not a promise. The finitude of our condition, marked decisively by perspec- tivism itself,

Journal

The Journal of Nietzsche StudiesPenn State University Press

Published: Dec 5, 2018

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