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Love and the Moral Psychology of the Hegelian Nietzsche: Comments on Robert Pippin’s Nietzsche, Psychology, and First Philosophy

Love and the Moral Psychology of the Hegelian Nietzsche: Comments on Robert Pippin’s Nietzsche,... Pippin treats Nietzsche’s moral psychology as the key to his philosophy. Three aspects of the psychology are meant to bear this weight: (1) a critical and deflationary, but irreducibly hermeneutic, conception of the nature of moral psychology itself; (2) a thesis that eros is central to Nietzsche’s theory of valuing; and (3) an expressivist theory of action, which replaces the <i>causal</i> role of intention with an interpretive notion of expression in explaining action. Pippin’s handling of all three, but especially the third, places Nietzsche’s philosophy in a Hegelian light, as does his view that genuine action arises from a deep-going self-dissatisfaction. I raise doubts about whether the expressivist theory of action can be adequate to all actions and suggest that the centrality of self-dissatisfaction for Pippin stands in tension with Nietzsche’s own construal of the demand for <i>affirmation</i> of life. http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png The Journal of Nietzsche Studies Penn State University Press

Love and the Moral Psychology of the Hegelian Nietzsche: Comments on Robert Pippin’s Nietzsche, Psychology, and First Philosophy

The Journal of Nietzsche Studies , Volume 44 (2) – Aug 15, 2013

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Publisher
Penn State University Press
Copyright
Copyright © The Pennsylvania State University.
ISSN
1538-4594

Abstract

Pippin treats Nietzsche’s moral psychology as the key to his philosophy. Three aspects of the psychology are meant to bear this weight: (1) a critical and deflationary, but irreducibly hermeneutic, conception of the nature of moral psychology itself; (2) a thesis that eros is central to Nietzsche’s theory of valuing; and (3) an expressivist theory of action, which replaces the <i>causal</i> role of intention with an interpretive notion of expression in explaining action. Pippin’s handling of all three, but especially the third, places Nietzsche’s philosophy in a Hegelian light, as does his view that genuine action arises from a deep-going self-dissatisfaction. I raise doubts about whether the expressivist theory of action can be adequate to all actions and suggest that the centrality of self-dissatisfaction for Pippin stands in tension with Nietzsche’s own construal of the demand for <i>affirmation</i> of life.

Journal

The Journal of Nietzsche StudiesPenn State University Press

Published: Aug 15, 2013

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