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Le colombe dello scettico. Riflessioni di Nietzsche sulla coscienza negli anni 1880-1888 (review)

Le colombe dello scettico. Riflessioni di Nietzsche sulla coscienza negli anni 1880-1888 (review) judgments of fact will turn out to be surprisingly similar to moral judgments as seen by emotivists: their surface grammar would misleadingly suggest that they are fact-stating when actually, they are merely expressions of attitude, the products of our "drives." Green embraces this latter alternative and argues quite convincingly that Nietzsche is precisely such a global "noncognitivist." And it is the case that Nietzsche, even very late in his authorship, extensively in his unpublished notes but occasionally in his published works as well, writes as if there is some sort of deep problem with our truth-claiming practices. What is more, most of Nietzsche's discussions of this sort do seem to wear a Kantian ancestry on their sleeve, not least in their choice of terminology. Since Nietzsche did not, on the whole, publish the notes in which these reflections take place, it may not be necessary to choose between these two options as a matter of intellectual history: Nietzsche himself may have been quite uncertain about the implications of his commitments and may have been in the process of trying to sort out what to do with them when madness descended and he fell silent. However that may be, http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png The Journal of Nietzsche Studies Penn State University Press

Le colombe dello scettico. Riflessioni di Nietzsche sulla coscienza negli anni 1880-1888 (review)

The Journal of Nietzsche Studies , Volume 39 (1) – May 30, 2010

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Penn State University Press
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Copyright © Penn State University Press
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Abstract

judgments of fact will turn out to be surprisingly similar to moral judgments as seen by emotivists: their surface grammar would misleadingly suggest that they are fact-stating when actually, they are merely expressions of attitude, the products of our "drives." Green embraces this latter alternative and argues quite convincingly that Nietzsche is precisely such a global "noncognitivist." And it is the case that Nietzsche, even very late in his authorship, extensively in his unpublished notes but occasionally in his published works as well, writes as if there is some sort of deep problem with our truth-claiming practices. What is more, most of Nietzsche's discussions of this sort do seem to wear a Kantian ancestry on their sleeve, not least in their choice of terminology. Since Nietzsche did not, on the whole, publish the notes in which these reflections take place, it may not be necessary to choose between these two options as a matter of intellectual history: Nietzsche himself may have been quite uncertain about the implications of his commitments and may have been in the process of trying to sort out what to do with them when madness descended and he fell silent. However that may be,

Journal

The Journal of Nietzsche StudiesPenn State University Press

Published: May 30, 2010

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