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Edward Feser The problem of evil is often thought to be a peculiarly theologbeen labeled evildoing stems from nothing more than irrationalical problem, in at least two respects. First, it is held that evil is a ity and ignorance, and can be eliminated if only the right educa"problem," philosophically anyway, only insofar as its existence tional and other social conditions are established. Indeed, he seems hard to reconcile with the existence of an omnipotent and allows that, given the sorts of circumstances in which at least all-good God. For those who do not believe in such a God, the bad many evildoers find themselves, evildoing can seem to be a "natthings that happen in the world remain a practical problem, of ural and reasonable reaction" (219); the demands of morality, in course, but not an intellectual one. Second, the very concept of his view, are not necessarily the demands of reason. Accordingly, "evil" seems itself inherently theological, essentially linked to the "secular problem of evil" he wants to solve is the problem of such other theological concepts as sin and the demonic. For those explaining how evil can be dealt with when one rejects both the who deny
The Good Society – Penn State University Press
Published: May 21, 2006
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