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Kekes on Religion and Evil

Kekes on Religion and Evil Edward Feser The problem of evil is often thought to be a peculiarly theologbeen labeled evildoing stems from nothing more than irrationalical problem, in at least two respects. First, it is held that evil is a ity and ignorance, and can be eliminated if only the right educa"problem," philosophically anyway, only insofar as its existence tional and other social conditions are established. Indeed, he seems hard to reconcile with the existence of an omnipotent and allows that, given the sorts of circumstances in which at least all-good God. For those who do not believe in such a God, the bad many evildoers find themselves, evildoing can seem to be a "natthings that happen in the world remain a practical problem, of ural and reasonable reaction" (219); the demands of morality, in course, but not an intellectual one. Second, the very concept of his view, are not necessarily the demands of reason. Accordingly, "evil" seems itself inherently theological, essentially linked to the "secular problem of evil" he wants to solve is the problem of such other theological concepts as sin and the demonic. For those explaining how evil can be dealt with when one rejects both the who deny http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png The Good Society Penn State University Press

Kekes on Religion and Evil

The Good Society , Volume 15 (2) – May 21, 2006

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Publisher
Penn State University Press
Copyright
Copyright © 2006 by The Pennsylvania State University. All rights reserved.
ISSN
1538-9731
Publisher site
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Abstract

Edward Feser The problem of evil is often thought to be a peculiarly theologbeen labeled evildoing stems from nothing more than irrationalical problem, in at least two respects. First, it is held that evil is a ity and ignorance, and can be eliminated if only the right educa"problem," philosophically anyway, only insofar as its existence tional and other social conditions are established. Indeed, he seems hard to reconcile with the existence of an omnipotent and allows that, given the sorts of circumstances in which at least all-good God. For those who do not believe in such a God, the bad many evildoers find themselves, evildoing can seem to be a "natthings that happen in the world remain a practical problem, of ural and reasonable reaction" (219); the demands of morality, in course, but not an intellectual one. Second, the very concept of his view, are not necessarily the demands of reason. Accordingly, "evil" seems itself inherently theological, essentially linked to the "secular problem of evil" he wants to solve is the problem of such other theological concepts as sin and the demonic. For those explaining how evil can be dealt with when one rejects both the who deny

Journal

The Good SocietyPenn State University Press

Published: May 21, 2006

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