Get 20M+ Full-Text Papers For Less Than $1.50/day. Start a 14-Day Trial for You or Your Team.

Learn More →

Does Rarity Confer Value?: Nietzsche on the Exceptional Individual

Does Rarity Confer Value?: Nietzsche on the Exceptional Individual Abstract: By drawing upon contemporary debates in the theory of value, in this article I explore the evidence for taking Nietzsche to defend the view that rarity—at least under certain qualified conditions—matters for its own sake. I argue that this evidence is compelling, and that many intuitive objections to the view can be deflected by challenging the axiological assumptions that motivate them. The question concerning the value of rarity has significant evaluative implications concerning Nietzsche’s famed critique of morality, and in particular the component of equality. While Nietzsche is traditionally interpreted as rejecting equality in virtue of its “leveling-down” effects upon certain perfectionist values, I claim that if rarity is itself valuable then we are left with a second critique of equality: that it undercuts the value of peculiarity. I explore the extent and significance of this objection in the final section of the article. http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png The Journal of Nietzsche Studies Penn State University Press

Does Rarity Confer Value?: Nietzsche on the Exceptional Individual

The Journal of Nietzsche Studies , Volume 48 (2) – Jul 10, 2017

Loading next page...
 
/lp/penn-state-university-press/does-rarity-confer-value-nietzsche-on-the-exceptional-individual-wkSzqrUDXN
Publisher
Penn State University Press
Copyright
Copyright © The Pennsylvania State University.
ISSN
1538-4594
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

Abstract: By drawing upon contemporary debates in the theory of value, in this article I explore the evidence for taking Nietzsche to defend the view that rarity—at least under certain qualified conditions—matters for its own sake. I argue that this evidence is compelling, and that many intuitive objections to the view can be deflected by challenging the axiological assumptions that motivate them. The question concerning the value of rarity has significant evaluative implications concerning Nietzsche’s famed critique of morality, and in particular the component of equality. While Nietzsche is traditionally interpreted as rejecting equality in virtue of its “leveling-down” effects upon certain perfectionist values, I claim that if rarity is itself valuable then we are left with a second critique of equality: that it undercuts the value of peculiarity. I explore the extent and significance of this objection in the final section of the article.

Journal

The Journal of Nietzsche StudiesPenn State University Press

Published: Jul 10, 2017

There are no references for this article.