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Doer and Deed: Responses to Acampora and Anderson

Doer and Deed: Responses to Acampora and Anderson Under the press of questions and comments by Christa Davis Acampora and R. Lanier Anderson, I attempt here to clarify the understanding of human agency that I attribute to Nietzsche in my book, <i>Nietzsche, Psychology, and First Philosophy</i>. A central issue concerns what Nietzsche means in <i>Genealogy</i> I:13, in his famous “lightning-flash” metaphor. I argue that the task posed to us by this passage is to understand it in a way that is consistent with Nietzsche’s genealogies and critiques, all of which involve psychological explanations, and so suggest a psychological model of motivated agency, consistent with what appears to be <i>GM</i> I:13’s denial of the basic presupposition of the notion of agency: a distinction between the doer, as instigator of the bodily movement, and the deed. Against objections, I defend the claim that Nietzsche proposes an “expressivist” account that preserves the notion of agency. http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png The Journal of Nietzsche Studies Penn State University Press

Doer and Deed: Responses to Acampora and Anderson

The Journal of Nietzsche Studies , Volume 44 (2) – Aug 15, 2013

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Publisher
Penn State University Press
Copyright
Copyright © The Pennsylvania State University.
ISSN
1538-4594

Abstract

Under the press of questions and comments by Christa Davis Acampora and R. Lanier Anderson, I attempt here to clarify the understanding of human agency that I attribute to Nietzsche in my book, <i>Nietzsche, Psychology, and First Philosophy</i>. A central issue concerns what Nietzsche means in <i>Genealogy</i> I:13, in his famous “lightning-flash” metaphor. I argue that the task posed to us by this passage is to understand it in a way that is consistent with Nietzsche’s genealogies and critiques, all of which involve psychological explanations, and so suggest a psychological model of motivated agency, consistent with what appears to be <i>GM</i> I:13’s denial of the basic presupposition of the notion of agency: a distinction between the doer, as instigator of the bodily movement, and the deed. Against objections, I defend the claim that Nietzsche proposes an “expressivist” account that preserves the notion of agency.

Journal

The Journal of Nietzsche StudiesPenn State University Press

Published: Aug 15, 2013

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