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A Nietzschean Account of Valuing

A Nietzschean Account of Valuing <p>Abstract:</p><p>I give an account of Nietzsche&apos;s conception of valuing that builds on Paul Katsafanas&apos;s account. Katsafanas argues that an agent values <i>x</i> iff the agent (1) has a drive-induced positive affective orientation toward <i>x</i>, and (2) does not disapprove of this affective orientation. I object to condition (2), showing that Nietzsche thinks we can disapprove of our values and still count as holding them. On my view, an agent values the aim of one of their drives when the drive is strong enough to generate an abiding positive affective orientation toward its aim. I argue that my view can address the four objections Katsafanas levels against Richardson&apos;s, Poellner&apos;s, and Clark and Dudrick&apos;s accounts, without neglecting the Nietzschean thought that we can feel intensely conflicted and uneasy about our values.</p> http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png The Journal of Nietzsche Studies Penn State University Press

A Nietzschean Account of Valuing

The Journal of Nietzsche Studies , Volume 51 (2) – Nov 23, 2020

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Publisher
Penn State University Press
Copyright
Copyright © The Pennsylvania State University.
ISSN
1538-4594

Abstract

<p>Abstract:</p><p>I give an account of Nietzsche&apos;s conception of valuing that builds on Paul Katsafanas&apos;s account. Katsafanas argues that an agent values <i>x</i> iff the agent (1) has a drive-induced positive affective orientation toward <i>x</i>, and (2) does not disapprove of this affective orientation. I object to condition (2), showing that Nietzsche thinks we can disapprove of our values and still count as holding them. On my view, an agent values the aim of one of their drives when the drive is strong enough to generate an abiding positive affective orientation toward its aim. I argue that my view can address the four objections Katsafanas levels against Richardson&apos;s, Poellner&apos;s, and Clark and Dudrick&apos;s accounts, without neglecting the Nietzschean thought that we can feel intensely conflicted and uneasy about our values.</p>

Journal

The Journal of Nietzsche StudiesPenn State University Press

Published: Nov 23, 2020

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