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James Joyce (1999)
The Foundations of Causal Decision Theory
Christopher Meacham, J. Weisberg (2003)
Clark and Shackel on the Two‐Envelope ParadoxMind, 112
D. Chalmers (2002)
The St. Petersburg two-envelope paradoxAnalysis, 62
F. O'Reilly (2003)
Two-envelope paradox
In this paper, we present a simple axiomatic justification for indifference before opening, avoiding any expectation reasoning, which is often considered problematic in infinite cases. Although the two-envelope paradox assumes an expectation-maximizing agent, we show that analogous paradoxes arise for agents using difierent decision principles such as maximin and maximax, and that our justification for indifierence before opening applies here too.
Mind – Oxford University Press
Published: Apr 1, 2005
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