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The Semi‐Sovereign State: Belarus and the Russian Neo‐Empire

The Semi‐Sovereign State: Belarus and the Russian Neo‐Empire States sometimes sacrifice sovereignty to other states. What can account for this seemingly irrational behavior? In analyzing Belarus' membership in the Russia neo‐empire, I find that four factors explain President Aleksandyr Lukashenka's decision to sacrifice some sovereignty to Russia. The first and previously most ignored variable is the degree of relation‐specific assets (RSAs), most notably fuel pipelines. While Russian President Vladimir Putin has attempted to ruthlessly force Lukashenka into acquiescing control over Belarus' pipelines, Lukashenka has held firm, using an aggressive attacking campaign against Putin. This article uses process‐tracing to demonstrate how a weak state's leader can use RSAs to his advantage. In addition to the critical and underappreciated role of RSAs, weak nationalism and democratic norms, and Russia's own strong interest in an economic hierarchy play an important role in explaining the current relationship between the two states. By using a rationalist analysis that incorporates norms as independent variables, I join several recent works that integrate rationalist and constructivist approaches. http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png Foreign Policy Analysis Oxford University Press

The Semi‐Sovereign State: Belarus and the Russian Neo‐Empire

HANCOCK, KATHLEEN J.
Foreign Policy Analysis , Volume 2 (2) – Apr 1, 2006
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References (84)

Publisher
Oxford University Press
Copyright
Copyright © 2006 Wiley Subscription Services, Inc., A Wiley Company
ISSN
1743-8586
eISSN
1743-8594
DOI
10.1111/j.1743-8594.2006.00023.x
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

States sometimes sacrifice sovereignty to other states. What can account for this seemingly irrational behavior? In analyzing Belarus' membership in the Russia neo‐empire, I find that four factors explain President Aleksandyr Lukashenka's decision to sacrifice some sovereignty to Russia. The first and previously most ignored variable is the degree of relation‐specific assets (RSAs), most notably fuel pipelines. While Russian President Vladimir Putin has attempted to ruthlessly force Lukashenka into acquiescing control over Belarus' pipelines, Lukashenka has held firm, using an aggressive attacking campaign against Putin. This article uses process‐tracing to demonstrate how a weak state's leader can use RSAs to his advantage. In addition to the critical and underappreciated role of RSAs, weak nationalism and democratic norms, and Russia's own strong interest in an economic hierarchy play an important role in explaining the current relationship between the two states. By using a rationalist analysis that incorporates norms as independent variables, I join several recent works that integrate rationalist and constructivist approaches.

Journal

Foreign Policy Analysis – Oxford University Press

Published: Apr 1, 2006

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