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The democratic paradox: are national elections always good for satisfaction with democracy in Europe?

The democratic paradox: are national elections always good for satisfaction with democracy in... This article challenges the widespread notion that national elections are unequivocally good for people’s satisfaction with democracy. Instead, it argues that elections have enduring and disparate effects on democratic satisfaction, depending on the economic situation in which they take place; that is the election economy. When held during economic upturns, national elections increase subsequent satisfaction with democracy during most of the following electoral term—regardless of election results and economic growth after the election. When held during economic downturns, elections reduce democratic satisfaction until the next election—again, regardless of such post-election developments. An analysis of 29 European democracies in the period 1973–2019 supports these propositions and suggests that the disparate effects of national elections endure during most of the electoral term. These findings are robust to an array of model specifications, including when accounting for several pre-election and post-election developments. http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png Socio-Economic Review Oxford University Press

The democratic paradox: are national elections always good for satisfaction with democracy in Europe?

Krishnarajan, Suthan
Socio-Economic Review , Volume 21 (3): 18 – Jun 17, 2022
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References (64)

Publisher
Oxford University Press
Copyright
© The Author(s) 2022. Published by Oxford University Press and the Society for the Advancement of Socio-Economics. All rights reserved. For permissions, please email: journals.permissions@oup.com
ISSN
1475-1461
eISSN
1475-147X
DOI
10.1093/ser/mwac029
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

This article challenges the widespread notion that national elections are unequivocally good for people’s satisfaction with democracy. Instead, it argues that elections have enduring and disparate effects on democratic satisfaction, depending on the economic situation in which they take place; that is the election economy. When held during economic upturns, national elections increase subsequent satisfaction with democracy during most of the following electoral term—regardless of election results and economic growth after the election. When held during economic downturns, elections reduce democratic satisfaction until the next election—again, regardless of such post-election developments. An analysis of 29 European democracies in the period 1973–2019 supports these propositions and suggests that the disparate effects of national elections endure during most of the electoral term. These findings are robust to an array of model specifications, including when accounting for several pre-election and post-election developments.

Journal

Socio-Economic Review – Oxford University Press

Published: Jun 17, 2022

Keywords: elections; election economy; satisfaction with democracy; H public economics; H11 structure; scope and performance of government

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