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Strategic Delegation, Discretion, and Deference: Explaining the Comparative Law of Administrative Review

Strategic Delegation, Discretion, and Deference: Explaining the Comparative Law of Administrative... AbstractThis paper offers a theory to explain cross-national variation in administrative law doctrines and practices. Administrative law regimes vary along three primary dimensions: the scope of delegation to agencies, agencies' exercise of discretion, and judicial practices of deference to agencies. Working with a principal-agent framework, we show how cross-national differences in institutions' capacities and the environments they face encourage the adoption of divergent strategies that lead to a variety of distinct, stable, equilibrium outcomes. We apply our model to explain patterns of administrative law in the United States, Germany, France, and Commonwealth jurisdictions. http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png American Journal of Comparative Law Oxford University Press

Strategic Delegation, Discretion, and Deference: Explaining the Comparative Law of Administrative Review

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Publisher
Oxford University Press
Copyright
© 2014 by The American Society of Comparative Law, Inc.
ISSN
0002-919X
eISSN
2326-9197
DOI
10.5131/AJCL.2013.0013
Publisher site
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Abstract

AbstractThis paper offers a theory to explain cross-national variation in administrative law doctrines and practices. Administrative law regimes vary along three primary dimensions: the scope of delegation to agencies, agencies' exercise of discretion, and judicial practices of deference to agencies. Working with a principal-agent framework, we show how cross-national differences in institutions' capacities and the environments they face encourage the adoption of divergent strategies that lead to a variety of distinct, stable, equilibrium outcomes. We apply our model to explain patterns of administrative law in the United States, Germany, France, and Commonwealth jurisdictions.

Journal

American Journal of Comparative Law – Oxford University Press

Published: Jan 1, 2014

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