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Stoics and sceptics: a reply to Brueckner

Stoics and sceptics: a reply to Brueckner 264 n.m.l. nathan Parfit, D. 1986. Reasons and Persons. Oxford: Clarendon, rev. ed. Shoemaker, S. 1984. Personal identity: a materialist’s account. In S. Shoemaker and R. Swinburne, Personal Identity, 69–132. Oxford: Blackwell. Swinburne, R. 1984. Personal identity: the dualist’s theory. In S. Shoemaker and R. Swinburne, Personal Identity, 3–66. Oxford: Blackwell. Blackwell Publishing Ltd.Oxford, UK and Malden, USAANALAnalysis0003-26382004 Blackwell Publishing Ltd.July 200464326468ArticlesN.M.L. Nathan N.M.L. Nathan In The Price of Doubt (2001) I suggested that while some sceptical arguments are entirely sound, all sound sceptical arguments have conclu- sions whose truth-value is a matter of indifference. If this is right, there is a stoic remedy for the chronic frustrations of traditional anti-sceptical epistemology. The truth-value of a proposition is a matter of indifference if and only if it is true both that were a normally intelligent person to want its truth, reflection would destroy his attitude, and that were a normally intelligent person to want its falsity, reflection would destroy his attitude. Arguments with conclusions whose truth-value is a matter of indifference are trivial, and in chapter II of the book I tried to show that certain sceptical arguments, which I held to be quite sound, meet one of the http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png Analysis Oxford University Press

Stoics and sceptics: a reply to Brueckner

Analysis , Volume 64 (3) – Jul 1, 2004

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Publisher
Oxford University Press
Copyright
© Published by Oxford University Press.
ISSN
0003-2638
eISSN
1467-8284
DOI
10.1093/analys/64.3.264
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Abstract

264 n.m.l. nathan Parfit, D. 1986. Reasons and Persons. Oxford: Clarendon, rev. ed. Shoemaker, S. 1984. Personal identity: a materialist’s account. In S. Shoemaker and R. Swinburne, Personal Identity, 69–132. Oxford: Blackwell. Swinburne, R. 1984. Personal identity: the dualist’s theory. In S. Shoemaker and R. Swinburne, Personal Identity, 3–66. Oxford: Blackwell. Blackwell Publishing Ltd.Oxford, UK and Malden, USAANALAnalysis0003-26382004 Blackwell Publishing Ltd.July 200464326468ArticlesN.M.L. Nathan N.M.L. Nathan In The Price of Doubt (2001) I suggested that while some sceptical arguments are entirely sound, all sound sceptical arguments have conclu- sions whose truth-value is a matter of indifference. If this is right, there is a stoic remedy for the chronic frustrations of traditional anti-sceptical epistemology. The truth-value of a proposition is a matter of indifference if and only if it is true both that were a normally intelligent person to want its truth, reflection would destroy his attitude, and that were a normally intelligent person to want its falsity, reflection would destroy his attitude. Arguments with conclusions whose truth-value is a matter of indifference are trivial, and in chapter II of the book I tried to show that certain sceptical arguments, which I held to be quite sound, meet one of the

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AnalysisOxford University Press

Published: Jul 1, 2004

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