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264 n.m.l. nathan Parfit, D. 1986. Reasons and Persons. Oxford: Clarendon, rev. ed. Shoemaker, S. 1984. Personal identity: a materialist’s account. In S. Shoemaker and R. Swinburne, Personal Identity, 69–132. Oxford: Blackwell. Swinburne, R. 1984. Personal identity: the dualist’s theory. In S. Shoemaker and R. Swinburne, Personal Identity, 3–66. Oxford: Blackwell. Blackwell Publishing Ltd.Oxford, UK and Malden, USAANALAnalysis0003-26382004 Blackwell Publishing Ltd.July 200464326468ArticlesN.M.L. Nathan N.M.L. Nathan In The Price of Doubt (2001) I suggested that while some sceptical arguments are entirely sound, all sound sceptical arguments have conclu- sions whose truth-value is a matter of indifference. If this is right, there is a stoic remedy for the chronic frustrations of traditional anti-sceptical epistemology. The truth-value of a proposition is a matter of indifference if and only if it is true both that were a normally intelligent person to want its truth, reflection would destroy his attitude, and that were a normally intelligent person to want its falsity, reflection would destroy his attitude. Arguments with conclusions whose truth-value is a matter of indifference are trivial, and in chapter II of the book I tried to show that certain sceptical arguments, which I held to be quite sound, meet one of the
Analysis – Oxford University Press
Published: Jul 1, 2004
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