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Review: The Two Intellectual Worlds of John Locke: Man, Person, and Spirits in the ‘Essay’

Review: The Two Intellectual Worlds of John Locke: Man, Person, and Spirits in the ‘Essay’ Book Reviews 251 tivistic proposals, specifically the proposal to regard the truth-values of propo- sitions, or contents of speech and thought, as relative to some parameter other than possible worlds (see, e.g. J. MacFarlane, ‘Future Contingents and Relative Truth’, Philosophical Quarterly, 53 , 2003 , pp. 1 –36 ; D. Chalmers, ‘On Sense and Intension’, Philosophical Perspectives, 16 , 2200 , pp. 513 – ). A relativism of this sort, however, raises a whole new set of problems. For example, it is unclear whether the ordinary notion of truth is adequately ana- lysed as a relative notion, and if not, whether relativism can then still make room for the possibility of blameless disagreement. No doubt the last word has not yet been said about Cognitive Command. Wright himself explores some new directions in his ‘Realism, Relativism and Rhubarb’ (paper delivered at the ‘Truth and Realism’ conference June 2004 at St Andrews, in Patrick Greenough and Michael P. Lynch (eds), Truth and Realism, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006). One of these directions is relativism, which he sug- gests should be viewed as a ‘theoretical attempt to underwrite’ the pre- theoretical view that some genuine disagreements involve no mistakes. Philosophy Department http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png Mind Oxford University Press

Review: The Two Intellectual Worlds of John Locke: Man, Person, and Spirits in the ‘Essay’

Mind , Volume 116 (461) – Jan 1, 2007

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Publisher
Oxford University Press
Copyright
© Mind Association 2007
ISSN
0026-4423
eISSN
1460-2113
DOI
10.1093/mind/fzm251
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

Book Reviews 251 tivistic proposals, specifically the proposal to regard the truth-values of propo- sitions, or contents of speech and thought, as relative to some parameter other than possible worlds (see, e.g. J. MacFarlane, ‘Future Contingents and Relative Truth’, Philosophical Quarterly, 53 , 2003 , pp. 1 –36 ; D. Chalmers, ‘On Sense and Intension’, Philosophical Perspectives, 16 , 2200 , pp. 513 – ). A relativism of this sort, however, raises a whole new set of problems. For example, it is unclear whether the ordinary notion of truth is adequately ana- lysed as a relative notion, and if not, whether relativism can then still make room for the possibility of blameless disagreement. No doubt the last word has not yet been said about Cognitive Command. Wright himself explores some new directions in his ‘Realism, Relativism and Rhubarb’ (paper delivered at the ‘Truth and Realism’ conference June 2004 at St Andrews, in Patrick Greenough and Michael P. Lynch (eds), Truth and Realism, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006). One of these directions is relativism, which he sug- gests should be viewed as a ‘theoretical attempt to underwrite’ the pre- theoretical view that some genuine disagreements involve no mistakes. Philosophy Department

Journal

MindOxford University Press

Published: Jan 1, 2007

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