Access the full text.
Sign up today, get DeepDyve free for 14 days.
T. Hare, J. O’Doherty, Colin Camerer, W. Schultz, A. Rangel (2008)
Dissociating the Role of the Orbitofrontal Cortex and the Striatum in the Computation of Goal Values and Prediction ErrorsThe Journal of Neuroscience, 28
Moran, J. Moran, Todd, F. Heatherton, W. Kelley, Article Moran, Joseph M, Todd F, Kelley, William M, T. Heatherton
Please Scroll down for Article Social Neuroscience Modulation of Cortical Midline Structures by Implicit and Explicit Self-relevance Evaluation Modulation of Cortical Midline Structures by Implicit and Explicit Self-relevance Evaluation
Jonas (2005)
Giving advice or making decisions in someone else’s place: the influence of impression, defense, and accuracy motivation on the search for new informationPersonality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 31
R. Lippitt (1959)
Dimensions of the Consultant's JobJournal of Social Issues, 15
M. Ly, M. Haynes, Joseph Barter, D. Weinberger, C. Zink (2011)
Subjective Socioeconomic Status Predicts Human Ventral Striatal Responses to Social Status InformationCurrent Biology, 21
Rongjun Yu, D. Mobbs, B. Seymour, A. Calder (2010)
Insula and Striatum Mediate the Default BiasThe Journal of Neuroscience, 30
D. Mobbs, Rongjun Yu, M. Meyer, L. Passamonti, B. Seymour, A. Calder, S. Schweizer, ChrisD Frith, T. Dalgleish (2009)
A Key Role for Similarity in Vicarious RewardScience, 324
R. Baumeister, M. Leary (1995)
The need to belong: desire for interpersonal attachments as a fundamental human motivation.Psychological bulletin, 117 3
R. Mayer, J. Davis, F. Schoorman (1995)
An integrative model of organizational trust, Academy of Management Review, : ., 20
V. Mathur, T. Harada, Trixie Lipke, Joan Chiao (2010)
Neural basis of extraordinary empathy and altruistic motivationNeuroImage, 51
S. Helm, Risto Salminen (2010)
Basking in reflected glory: Using customer reference relationships to build reputation in industrial marketsIndustrial Marketing Management, 39
R. Bénabou, J. Tirole (2006)
Incentives and Prosocial BehaviorIZA Institute of Labor Economics Discussion Paper Series
R. Hoskins, J. Carlson, C. Kennedy, David Acevedo, G. Karpen (2007)
Neural Responses to Taxation and Voluntary Giving Reveal Motives for Charitable Donations
Keise Izuma, D. Saito, N. Sadato (2008)
Processing of Social and Monetary Rewards in the Human StriatumNeuron, 58
C. Davey, N. Allen, B. Harrison, Dominic Dwyer, M. Yücel (2009)
Being liked activates primary reward and midline self‐related brain regionsHuman Brain Mapping, 31
D. Mobbs, D. Hassabis, B. Seymour, Jennifer Marchant, N. Weiskopf, R. Dolan, C. Frith (2009)
Choking on the MoneyPsychological Science, 20
D. Amodio, C. Frith (2006)
Meeting of minds: the medial frontal cortex and social cognitionNature Reviews Neuroscience, 7
Jason Mitchell, C. Macrae, M. Banaji (2006)
Dissociable Medial Prefrontal Contributions to Judgments of Similar and Dissimilar OthersNeuron, 50
B. King-Casas, Damon Tomlin, Cedric Anen, Colin Camerer, S. Quartz, P. Montague (2005)
Getting to Know You: Reputation and Trust in a Two-Person Economic ExchangeScience, 308
R. Mayer, J. Davis, F. Schoorman (1995)
An Integrative Model Of Organizational TrustAcademy of Management Review, 20
Christopher Dawes, J. Fowler, Tim Johnson, R. Mcelreath, Oleg Smirnov (2007)
Egalitarian motives in humansNature, 446
W. Kelley, C. Macrae, C. Wyland, S. Çağlar, S. Inati, T. Heatherton (2002)
Finding the Self? An Event-Related fMRI StudyJournal of Cognitive Neuroscience, 14
Moran (2009)
Modulation of cortical midline structures by explicit and implicit self-relevanceSocial Neuroscience, 4
N. Eisenberger, Shelly Gable, Matthew Lieberman (2007)
Functional magnetic resonance imaging responses relate to differences in real-world social experience.Emotion, 7 4
Keise Izuma (2012)
The social neuroscience of reputationNeuroscience Research, 72
S. Rosen, A. Tesser (1970)
On reluctance to communicate undesirable information: The MUM effect., 33
M. Delgado (2007)
Reward‐Related Responses in the Human StriatumAnnals of the New York Academy of Sciences, 1104
J. Sniezek, Lyn Swol (2001)
Trust, Confidence, and Expertise in a Judge-Advisor System.Organizational behavior and human decision processes, 84 2
G. Lautenschlager, Vicki Flaherty (1990)
Computer administration of questions: More desirable or more social desirability?Journal of Applied Psychology, 75
J. Rilling, D. Gutman, Thorsten Zeh, G. Pagnoni, G. Berns, C. Kilts (2002)
A Neural Basis for Social CooperationNeuron, 35
K. Phan, C. Sripada, Mike Angstadt, K. McCabe (2010)
Reputation for reciprocity engages the brain reward centerProceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 107
P. Fletcher, F. Happé, U. Frith, S. Baker, R. Dolan, Richard Frackowiak, C. Frith (1995)
Other minds in the brain: a functional imaging study of “theory of mind” in story comprehensionCognition, 57
J. Sniezek, T. Buckley (1995)
Cueing and Cognitive Conflict in Judge-Advisor Decision MakingOrganizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 62
A. Ortony, G. Clore, A. Collins (1988)
The Cognitive Structure of Emotions
R. Cialdini, R. Borden, A. Thorne, M. Walker, Stephen Freeman, L. Sloan (1976)
Basking in Reflected Glory: Three (Football) Field StudiesJournal of Personality and Social Psychology, 34
Izuma (2010)
The roles of the medial prefrontal cortex and striatum in reputation processingSocial Neuroscience, 5
J. Moran, C. Macrae, T. Heatherton, C. Wyland, W. Kelley (2006)
Neuroanatomical Evidence for Distinct Cognitive and Affective Components of SelfJournal of Cognitive Neuroscience, 18
M. Nowak, K. Sigmund (1998)
Evolution of indirect reciprocity by image scoringNature, 393
E. Jonas, S. Schulz-Hardt, D. Frey
Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin Accuracy Motivation on the Search for New Information Giving Advice or Making Decisions in Someone Else's Place: the Influence of Impression, Defense, And
Leah Somerville, W. Kelley, T. Heatherton (2010)
Self-esteem modulates medial prefrontal cortical responses to evaluative social feedback.Cerebral cortex, 20 12
Ilan Yaniv, Eli Kleinberger (2000)
Advice Taking in Decision Making: Egocentric Discounting and Reputation Formation.Organizational behavior and human decision processes, 83 2
J. Engelmann, E. Herrmann, M. Tomasello (2012)
Five-Year Olds, but Not Chimpanzees, Attempt to Manage Their ReputationsPLoS ONE, 7
J. O’Doherty (2004)
Reward representations and reward-related learning in the human brain: insights from neuroimagingCurrent Opinion in Neurobiology, 14
Keise Izuma, Daisuke, N. Saito, N. Sadato, D. Saito
Please Scroll down for Article Social Neuroscience the Roles of the Medial Prefrontal Cortex and Striatum in Reputation Processing the Roles of the Medial Prefrontal Cortex and Striatum in Reputation Processing
doi:10.1093/scan/nsv020 SCAN (2015) 10,1323^1328 Reflected glory and failure: the role of the medial prefrontal cortex and ventral striatum in self vs other relevance during advice-giving outcomes 1,2, 1,3, 2,4 5 2,6 Dean Mobbs, * Cindy C. Hagan, * Rongjun Yu, Hidehiko Takahashi, Oriel FeldmanHall, 2 2 Andrew J. Calder, and Tim Dalgleish Columbia University, Department of Psychology, 406 Schermerhorn Hall, 1190 Amsterdam Avenue, New York, NY 10027, USA, 2 3 Medical Research Council Cognition and Brain Sciences Unit, Cambridge, CB2 7EF, UK, Department of Psychiatry, University of Cambridge, 4 5 CB2 0SZ, UK, School of Psychology, National University of Singapore, 117570, Singapore, Department of Psychiatry, Kyoto University Graduate School of Medicine, Kyoto, 606-8507, Japan, and Department of Psychology & Center for Neural Science, New York University, New York, NY 10003, USA Despite the risks, people enjoy giving advice. One explanation is that giving beneficial advice can result in reflected glory, ego boosts or reputation enhancement. However, giving poor advice can be socially harmful (being perceived as incompetent or untrustworthy). In both circumstances, we have a vested interest in the advice followers success or failure, especially when it reflects specifically on us compared with when it is diffused between multiple advisors. We examined these dynamics using an Advisor-Advisee Game, where subjects acted as an Advisor to a confederate Advisee who selected one of the three options when trying to win money: accept the subjects advice, accept the advice of a second confederate Advisor or accept both Advisors advice. Results showed that having ones advice accepted, compared with being rejected, resulted in activity in the ventral striatuma core reward area. Furthermore, the ventral striatum was only active when the subjects advice led to the advisee winning, and not when the advisee won based on the confederates advice. Finally, the medial prefrontal cortex (MPFC) was more active when the Advisee won or lost money based solely on the subjects advice compared with when the second Advisors advice was accepted. One explanation for these findings is that the MPFC monitors self- relevant social information, while the ventral striatum is active when others accept advice and when their success leads to reflected glory. Keywords: advice giving; reward; reflected glory; self-relevance; medial prefrontal cortex INTRODUCTION 2008; Mobbs et al., 2009a,b), social cost-benefit analysis (Izuma, 2012) and complex social interactions including reciprocity and trust build- Advice giving is described as an interaction between an advisor and ing (King-Casas et al., 2005; Phan et al., 2010). Furthermore, the stri- advisee in which the advisor attempts to aid the advisee to find an atum has been shown to respond when others like us (Davey et al., answer for their problem (Lippitt, 1959). Giving advice, however, can 2009) and when perceiving one’s own good reputation (Izuma, 2008) be a risky social and vocational endeavour. Research confirms that or social status (Ly et al., 2011), while activity in the striatum is people prefer to relay positive information to others (Rosen and observed when people perform acts that enhance their reputation Tesser, 1970) and that people weigh their advice more carefully when including giving to charity (Harbaugh et al., 2007), egalitarianism it reflects on them directly rather than through the medium of a third (Dawes et al., 2012) and social co-operation (Rilling et al., 2002). party (Jonas et al., 2005). Furthermore, advice giving may be one at- Although the medial prefrontal cortex (MPFC) is active during reward tempt to manipulate what others think about us (i.e. reputation seeking; states (O’Doherty, 2004), it is also active during tasks that evoke self- Izuma, 2012). If our advice is accepted, we may feel that we have gar- relatedness (Mitchell et al., 2006), including when we deploy self- nered another’s respect and admiration. If the advice provided leads to monitoring (Moran et al., 2009), self-judgements (Kelley et al., 2002), another’s personal success, we may feel a sense of reward through ego self-esteem (Somerville et al., 2010), and self-reflection (Johnson et al., enhancement or reflected glory (Ortony et al., 1990; Cialdina et al., 2006). The MPFC is also active for self-relatedness in exchanges with 1976). Conversely, giving the wrong advice can lead to self-conscious others, for example, when we observe similar others win money emotions (e.g. guilt or embarrassment) often associated with doing (Mobbs et al., 2009a,b), and during impression management or reputa- interpersonal harm (e.g. helping others fail) and a feeling that others tion processing (Izuma et al.,2010).Ithas been suggested thatprocessing may perceive us as incompetent, untrustworthy or spiteful. one’s own reputation requires meta-cognition and the MPFC is a prime Advice giving may be one way in which individuals can gain the candidate for such an operation (Izuma, 2012). Indeed, the MPFC may most basic of social rewards: acceptance and respect (Baumeister and represent future beliefs about how others will negatively perceive us (e.g. Leary, 1995). The hedonic feelings associated with giving advice are social distress and social transgressions; Eisenberger et al.,2007).If this is presumably modulated by brain regions involved in primary reward true, then the MPFC should be active in self-relevant situations such as processes. For example, the dopamine-enriched striatum is a key area when advisors experience an advisees’ positive or negative outcome based activated during the receipt of a reward (Delgado, 2007; Hare et al., on our right or wrong advice. We created an Advisor-Advisee Game to test the hypothesis that Received 3 June 2014; Revised 2 February 2015; Accepted 11 February 2015 Advance Access publication 19 February 2015 activation in the brain’s social reward circuitry will be increased We thank Jason Stretton for his help with data analysis. This work was funded by the UK Medical Research when people accept one’s advice. Specifically, we posited that obser- Council (MC_US_A060_0017). ving an Advisee win will be more rewarding if it is based on one’s own *These authors contributed equally to this work. advice (i.e. Advisor A) compared with another’s advice (i.e. Advisor B). Correspondence should be addressed to Dean Mobbs, Medical Research Council Cognition and Brain Sciences Unit, Cambridge CB2 7EF, UK. E-mail: dmobbs@gmail.com. We further reasoned that the brain regions that underlie the processing The Author (2015). Published by Oxford University Press. For Permissions, please email: journals.permissions@oup.com 1324 SCAN (2015) D. Mobbs et al. of self-relevance and reputation would be more active when one gives the Advisee about which of the two boxes to choose in order to win £5 good advice as a single agent, rather than as a member of a team with (Figure 1). In actuality, all responses by the Advisee and Advisor B were distributed responsibility for the good advice. For example, having our pre-programmed. Once the subject (Advisor A) was separated from the advice accepted, which then leads on to an Advisee winning, should two confederates, it was explained that, while they would be given in- result in an increase in the brain’s reward (ventral striatum) and formation about which box is most likely to win, Advisor B would not be self-monitoring (MPFC) regions when the win and loss are based given any such information and therefore would be guessing about the solely on the subject’s (i.e. Advisor A’s) advice compared with when winning boxes. This step in the experimental rationale provided to the an Advisee accepts the same advice from two Advisors [i.e. the subject subject was important for two reasons. First, unless one advisor was (Advisor A) plus Advisor B (a confederate)]. clearly giving better advice then it would have been too difficult for the Advisee to learn to trust one advisor over another as there would have been no discriminating information. Second, if the subject thought METHODS that Advisor B had been given the same information as the subject/ Participants Advisor A, then we would have to justify why Advisor B was not sug- Twenty-three subjects were scanned in this experiment. Seven subjects gesting the same boxes for selection by the Advisee. were omitted due to doubts over the veracity of the task manipulations, After giving advice, subjects were told that they would be informed leaving with 16 subjects (8 men, age 24.8 4.53). All were right handed, about all the advised information put forward, as well as the selection fluent speakers of English and screened for psychiatric or neurological made by the Advisee. In other words, participants were informed as to problems. All subjects gave informed consent and were remunerated whether the Advisee accepted their advice despite conflicting advice £20 for time, travel and inconvenience. This study was authorized by being provided by Advisor B, rejected their advice in favour of con- the Local Research Ethics Committee for Cambridge, UK. flicting advice from Advisor B or accepted the advice provided by both Advisors when the Advisors were in agreement. Following the accept- ance or rejection of advice, the subject passively observed which of the Task two boxes led to the Advisee winning or losing £5. At the start of each experiment, each subject (Advisor A) was briefly We indicated that if we had not given the subject this privileged introduced to two confederates, the Advisee and the second Advisor information such that both advisors were essentially guessing about the (Advisor B), and told that they were going to play a simple trust game advice to give, then the task for the Advisee would have been impos- where the Advisee had to learn which Advisor was providing the best sibly hard as there would have been no discriminating information. information. Together with the two confederates, subjects were informed The task was nevertheless a challenge for the Advisee, however, as the that for each of a series of trials they were to provide the best advice to Fig. 1 Trial sequence and timing of the Advisor-Advisee Game. The subject (Advisor A), but not the Advisee or Advisor B (both confederates), was initially presented with two boxes on the screen. Each box showed the probability of that box winning if it was later selected. The subject was told that when these probability percentages were replaced with question marks, both the Advisee and Advisor B could now also see the boxes. The subject then gave advice by pressing a left or right button to signal to the Advisee which box was the most likely one to win. Following this, the subject was told that the Advisee could either accept their advice, reject their advice or accept both the subject’s and Advisor B’s advice. After a jittered ITI, the outcome of whether the Advisee won or lost was revealed to the subject. Finally, to ensure the subject was paying attention, she/he had to indicate the win or lose outcome of the Advisee. Reflected glory and failure SCAN (2015) 1325 other advisor (Advisor B) would still, even by chance, be giving the each participant’s voxel-wise activation during ‘Advice Stage’ (i.e. correct advice on around 50% of trials and so it would not be surpris- when the subject’s advice was accepted minus rejected) and the ing that the Advisee did not immediately latch onto the fact that the ‘Outcome Stage’ epochs (i.e. whether the advisee won or lost). Our subject was providing the most useful information. To further reduce first-level regressors included the condition for Advice Stage as follows: the likelihood of suspicion, we made sure that it was clear to partici- (i) accept, (ii) reject, (iii) accept both Advisors. For the Outcome pants that their advice was infallible. For example, it is important to Stage, we modelled wins when (iv) Advisor A was accepted and win point out that the advice was not likely to have been perceived as outcome, (v) Advisor A was rejected and win outcome and (iv) both infallible because participants were not being told that this box will Advisors A and B were accepted and win outcome. For the loss con- definitely win when provided with the insider information. Rather, ditions, (vi) Advisor A was accepted and loss outcome and (vii) they were being given a probability (on some trials as low as 60 : 40) Advisor A was rejected and loss outcome and (ix) both A and B of that box being more likely to win and this formed the basis of accepted with loss outcome. The pre-programmed Advisee did not the advice that they were passing on. For each trial, there was therefore reject both Advisors A and B, therefore no regressors for these con- a10–40% likelihood that their advice would turn out to be wrong trasts were entered into the model. Further to these nine regressors based on the probabilities that they had been shown beforehand. were six head-motion parameters defined by the realignment and Consequently, in order to become suspicious on these grounds, they added to the model as regressors of no interest. Ninety trials were would need to track not only the percentage of times that their advice presented with 15 in each Outcome Stage condition. Multiple linear was incorrect but also to relate it to these varying probabilities. We felt regression was then run to generate parameter estimates for each that this was unlikely but, nevertheless, we took care to exclude the regressor at every voxel. A second-level random effects analysis data from participants where suspicion was reported. (one-sample t-test) was performed to analyse data at a group level. At the end of the experiment, subjects completed a questionnaire A family wise errorþ small volume correction (SVC) was used on a asking them to indicate on a 10-point Likert scale with 1¼ not at all priori regions of interest (ROIs 8 mm), including ventral striatum (Yu and 10¼ very much: (Q1) ‘How rewarding did you find it, when the et al., 2010) and MPFC (Izuma et al., 2010). These ROIs were chosen advisee lost after not taking your advice?’; (Q2) ‘How upsetting was it for based on the idea that the MPFC ROI used by Izuma et al. (2010) you when the advisee rejected your advice?’’ (Q3) ‘How rewarding was it would better reflect a region involved in self-monitoring or reputation for you when you gave the advisee the right advice and they won?’; (Q4) processing, while the ventral striatum ROI would reflect basic reward ‘How responsible did you feel when the advisee won after giving them processes. Activations are reported if they survive P < 0.05 SVC, with a the right advice?’ and (Q5) ‘Do you like to give people advice?’ cluster size k > 30. Image acquisition RESULTS Magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) scanning was conducted at the We tested two core hypotheses: (i) that it would be rewarding to have Medical Research Council Cognition and Brain Sciences Unit on a one’s advice accepted and (ii) it will be rewarding to see the Advisee 3-T Tim Trio Magnetic Resonance Imaging scanner (Siemens, win based on our (Advisor A’s) good advice compared with Advisor Germany) by using a head coil gradient set. Whole-brain data were B’s advice. With these two hypotheses in mind, our analysis focused on acquired with echo planar T2*-weighted imaging (EPI), sensitive to examining neural activity during the Advice (Figure 1, highlighted in blood oxygenation level dependent (BOLD) signal contrast (48 sagit- red) and Outcome Stage (Figure 1, highlighted in purple) of each trial. tal slices, 3 mm thickness; repetition time (TR)¼ 2400 ms, echo time The rationale behind examining the Advice Stage was to see if subjects (TE)¼ 25 ms, flip angle¼ 908, field of view (FOV)¼ 224 mm, voxel found it rewarding to be accepted, while focusing on the Outcomes size¼ 3 x 3 x 3 mm. To provide for equilibration effects, the first Stage allowed us to examine whether outcomes based on one’s advice three3 volumes were discarded. T1 -weighted structural images were will result in the recruitment of brain regions involved in self-referen- acquired at a resolution of 1 x 1 x 1 mm. tial processing, namely the MPFC. Analysis of the Outcome Stage was based on the idea that acceptance or rejection of one’s advice would modulate how people engage with the outcome of the Advisee’s Image pre-processing decision. For example, having one’s advice accepted should lead to SPM5 software (www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm/) was used for data analysis. self-interest in the outcome. The EPI images were sinc interpolated in time for correction of slice timing differences and realignment to the first scan by rigid body Advice stage transformations to correct for head movements. Field maps were esti- mated from the phase difference between the images acquired at the Post-MRI scan questioning revealed that having the Advisee accept short and long TE and unwrapped, employing the FieldMap toolbox. one’s good advice was rewarding (Q3: mean 5.8 2.1). On the other Field map and EPI imaging parameters were used to establish voxel hand, how rewarding or how much they gloated when the Advisee lost displacements in the EPI image. Application of the inverse displace- after rejecting their advice resulted in an average rating (Q1: 3.5 1.8). ment to the EPI images served the correction of distortions. Utilising A direct comparison between these two questions showed that it was linear and non-linear transformations, and smoothing with a Gaussian more rewarding to see the advisee win based on the subject’s advice kernel of full-width-half-maximum 8 mm EPI and structural images compared with seeing them lose after being rejected (t-test: were co-registered and normalized to the T1 standard template in P < 0.0001). Furthermore, having the subject’s advice rejected by the Montreal Neurological Institute space (International Consortium for Advisee did not evoke strong negative feelings of rejection (Q2: mean Brain Mapping). Global changes were removed by high-pass temporal 2.5 1.4). Given the low rating of how upset the subjects felt at being filtering with a cut-off of 128 s to remove low-frequency drifts in rejected, we chose to report only findings for the Advice (when accepted signal. or not) and Outcome (accepted) Stages. Statistical analysis Advice accepted compared with rejected After pre-processing, statistical analysis was performed using the For the Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging (fMRI) analysis, we General Linear Model. A first-level analysis was carried out to establish examined the Advice Stage or the time when the Advisee accepted or 1326 SCAN (2015) D. Mobbs et al. rejected the subject’s advice (Figure 1, highlighted in red). We observed Outcome stage a main effect for the comparison of accepted minus rejected advice, Post-MRI scan questionnaires were administered to assess how much which, as hypothesized, showed increased activity within the the subjects enjoy giving advice in everyday situations (Q5: mean MPFC ([6, 62, 10], Z¼ 3.09, k¼ 141, P < 0.021 SVC; Figure 2A). We 6.4 1.7) and feelings of personal responsibility for Advisee wins found no significant activations associated with rejected minus (Q4: mean 4.6 2.0). Relating these individual differences on these accepted advice. questions revealed that seeing the Advisee win after giving good advice positively correlated with questionnaire measures relating to how much people enjoy giving advice in everyday situations (Pearson’s one-tailed test: r¼ .55, P¼ 0.004), and feelings of personal Subject’s advice uniquely accepted compared with both responsibility for the Advisee’s subsequent wins (r¼ .61, P¼ 0.002). advisors’ advice accepted A comparison of accepted Advisor A’s advice alone (and Advisor B’s advice rejected) vs both Advisor A’s and Advisor B’s advice accepted Advisor A minus Advisor B advice leading to an Advisee win showed increased activity in the MPFC ([12 52 2], Z¼ 3.25, k¼ 109, For the fMRI data, we next examined the outcome conditions (obser- P < 0.009 SVC) and ventral striatum ([10 20 12], Z¼ 3.28, k¼ 143, ving the Advisee win; Figure 1, highlighted in purple) by comparing a P < 0.008 SVC; Figure 2B). It is possible that the activity in these areas win based solely on the Advisee’s advice vs the Advisee taking advice reflected the anticipation of winning. Therefore, we examined whether from Advisor B. Despite having an average (jittered) inter trial interval activity in the striatum and MPFC parametrically varied in accordance (ITI) of 8 s between having one’s advice accepted and the winning with the probability of the Advisee winning (i.e. 60%, 70%, 80% and outcome, we wanted to ensure that this activity was not a direct func- 90% chance of winning upon acceptance of advice). We found no tion of the previous component of the trial. We therefore exclusively significant positive parametric modulation by probability in the masked the outcome neural activity with activity from the accepted MPFC or striatum (P > 0.05). Of course, absence of evidence is not minus rejected advice contrast (Figure 2A). We found significant ac- evidence of absence, but this analysis certainly provides no further tivity in the striatum ([14, 8, 8], Z¼ 3.00, k¼ 170, P < 0.025 SVC) support for the idea that anticipation of winning is the appropriate and MPFC ([10, 54, 6], Z¼ 3.19, k¼ 121, P < 0.026 SVC), suggesting explanation of the data. that the rewarding outcome activity is distinct from the reward regions Fig. 2 fMRI results. (A) Medial PFC (MPFC) activity associated with having advice accepted compared with rejected. (B) Medial PFC (MPFC) and striatal activity associated with having advice accepted compared with when the Advisee accepted the subject (Advisor 1) and Advisor 2. (C) Activity associated with observing the Advisee win after having one’s advice accepted compared with rejected. (D) Neural activity when the Advisee won money after accepting advice from the subject versus the subject plus Advisor B. (E) Activity for the Self loss/win minus Both loss/win comparison. All images are displayed at P < 0.001 . Encircled areas reflect peak co-ordinates. MPFC¼ medial prefrontal cortex; VS¼ ventral striatum. Both the MPFC and VS regions were SVC at P < 0.05 FWE with an 8 mm sphere uncorrected (Izuma et al., 2010; Yu et al., 2010). Reflected glory and failure SCAN (2015) 1327 associated with Acceptance. To further clarify the role of the MPFC, we questionnaire responses in a direction of increasing social desirability examined if the MPFC activation parametrically increased with the (Lautenschlager and Flaherty, 1990) and that people more readily probability of winning. We did not observe a significant increase in express their true feelings when they express their opinions through MPFC activation supporting the notion that this region is not involved the voice of a third party (Jonas et al., 2005). These observations reveal in providing better advice. that before speaking their true feelings, people bear in mind the nature of an audience. Extending upon these observations, the same may hold true in situations of advice giving, where the quality of advice given Advisor A minus Advisor B advice leading to an Advisee lose may be seen as a direct or indirect reflection of the quality of the Similar to the win outcome, we found activity in the MPFC ([8, 54, person giving the advice. In support of this suggestion, increases in 14], Z¼ 3.18, P < 0.015 SVC). For the opposite contrast (Advisor B MPFC and striatal activity were observed during watching the Advisee minus Advisor A, loss outcome), we found significant activity in the win after accepting the subject’s advice in preference to Advisor B’s caudate and visual cortex. advice. This leads to the conclusion that under certain conditions, people may give advice for self-centred reasons, although the rather Advisor A minus (Advisor Aþ Advisor B) advice leading to an controlled nature of the manipulated scenario might limit the degree Advisee win to which one can generalize these findings to more naturalistic scen- We next investigated the differences between seeing the Advisee win arios and situations. Limitations aside, after having given good advice, outcome based on the subject’s (Advisor A’s) advice alone compared we feel most rewarded when we can exclusively, rather than jointly, with when the Advisee won based on correct advice from both take credit for another’s success. Advisors (Advisor A [Advisor Aþ Advisor B]). We again found Further analysis suggests that the MPFC is also involved in process- significant activity in the MPFC ([12, 56, 12], Z¼ 3.16, k¼ 253, ing negative social outcomes that reflect directly on us. For example, P < 0.009 SVC; Figure 2D). comparison between self-relevant win and loss outcomes minus shared win and loss outcomes supports the hypothesis that the MPFC is Advisor A minus (Advisor Aþ Advisor B) advice accepted leading associated with self-relevant processes. The MPFC is known to be to an Advisee lose involved in tasks that evoke self-relevance (Amodio and Frith, 2006). These studies include metacognitive evaluations (Schmitz et al., 2004), We also examined the neural activity associated with outcome loss theory of mind or mentalizing (Fletcher et al., 1995) and trait evalu- associated with Advisor A minus joint advice (the advisee accepting ation tasks (Kelley et al., 2002). Such processes would be critical to both Advisor A and Advisor B and losing). We observed activity in the processing the social consequence of one’s behaviour. It has previously MPFC, albeit at the liberal threshold of P < 0.0005 . For the uncorrected been shown that the MPFC becomes active when thinking about one’s opposite contrast, we did not find any significant voxels. own reputation (Izuma et al., 2008), while the striatum activates during value representations (Hare et al., 2008). The MPFC is also Self loss/win minus both loss/win comparison evoked during positive evaluation by others (e.g. when someone To examine the neural basis of self-relevant vs shared advice, we likes you; Davey et al., 2010) which may reflect meta-cognitive attri- conducted the analysis between Self loss/win minus Both loss/win butions, such as thinking about what others think about us (Amodio (Figure 2E). We again found increased activation in the MPFC and Frith, 2006). In light of these findings, it is intriguing that ([12, 56, 0], Z¼ 2.70, k¼ 182, P < 0.046 SVC) supporting the idea self-relevant social situations (Moran et al., 2006; Mobbs et al., that the MPFC plays a role in self-relevant information. 2009a,b) and enhancements in self-esteem result in increases in MPFC activity (Moran et al., 2006; Mobbs et al., 2009a,b; Somerville DISCUSSION et al., 2010). In the context of this study, we speculate that the MPFC Our results support the hypothesis that the MPFC is more active in may form part of a reputation management network. For example, the social situations that reflect exclusively on oneself. The MPFC was MPFC may detect socially relevant information, particularly when it active when the Advisee exclusively accepted the subject’s advice com- reflects directly on us. Future studies, however, should also try and pared with when the Advisee accepted the advice of the subject and a examine the overlap or the distinct MPFC regions that support second advisor (Advisor B), which fits with its role in self-monitoring, self-relevance, reputation and mentalizing. including thinking about what others think of us (Amodio and Frith, We acknowledge several potential caveats to this study. For example, 2006). Furthermore, we support the supposition that, under certain the relationship between behavioural and neural data is sparse thereby conditions, having one’s advice accepted is socially rewarding. Post- limiting our assumptions about the relationship between behaviour MRI scan questioning suggested that the amount of reward felt when and MPFC and striatal activity. Furthermore, we cannot be certain seeing the Advisee win positively correlated with the subjects’ procliv- that our findings only relate to positive feelings that are associated ity to give advice in everyday situations. Furthermore, having one’s with having one’s advice accepted and do not also encompass the advice accepted results in activity in the brain’s reward circuitry. motivations behind giving advice. Although our findings indicate One possibility, based on the additional recruitment of the striatum that giving good advice may be one method by which we enhance for the acceptance of only Advisor A’s advice vs Advisor A and Advisor our reputation, other explanations do exist. For example, ego-inflation B’s advice, is that it is more rewarding to have one’s advice accepted or increases in self-esteem, and anticipated positive social feedback are alone than to share acceptance of advice with another (Advisor B). equally plausible explanations. Egotism, the high regard for oneself, The recruitment of the ventral striatum, however, was only observed provides a salient mechanism by which advice giving results in self- when the subject’s advice resulted in the Advisee winning and not focus. Presumably, many of these alternative explanations are part and when the subjects shared the glory of seeing the Advisee win. This parcel of processing self-relevant processes in the social context. suggests that it is more rewarding to see another win when we are Navigating the social environment successfully depends on the im- exclusively, rather than jointly, responsible for that win. plementation of several operations including the ability to detect self- Our results lead to the intriguing question of whether or not it is relevant information and act in an appropriate manner. Our results only gratifying to see an Advisee win when it reflects positively on one’s support the idea that the MPFC plays a key role in this process, while self. Studies show that lack of anonymity influences subjects’ the ventral striatum is active when self-relevant information is 1328 SCAN (2015) D. Mobbs et al. Jonas, E., Schulz-Hardt, S., Frey, D. (2005). Giving advice or making decisions in perceived to be positive (e.g. advice acceptance and reflected glory someone else’s place: the influence of impression, defense, and accuracy motiva- Cialdina et al., 1976). More broadly, while advice giving often falls tion on the search for new information. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 31, under the rubric of altruism, the ‘egocentric’ perspective proposes 977–90. that giving advice affords us opportunities for reputation enhancement Kelley, W.M., Macrae, C.N., Wyland, C.L., Caglar, S., Inati, S., Heatherton, T.F. (2002). by having others believe that we are knowledgeable, trustworthy, ben- Finding the self? An event-related fMRI study. Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience, 14, 785–94. evolent and indispensible (Mayer et al., 1995; Sniezek and Buckley, King-Casas, B., Tomlin, D., Anen, C., Camerer, C.F., Quartz, S.R., Montague, P.R. (2005). 1995; Yaniv and Kleinberger, 2000; Helm and Salminen, 2010). This Getting to know you: reputation and trust in a two-person economic exchange. Science, leads to the intriguing speculation that while giving advice is often 308,78–83. relayed in the context of benevolent help, it may also serve more selfish Lautenschlager, G.J., Flaherty, V.L. (1990). Computer administration of questions: more desirable or more social desirability? Journal of Applied Psychology, 75, 310–4. motivations such as increasing our value within a group, which in turn Lippitt, R. (1959). Dimensions of the consultant’s job. Journal of Social Issues, 15,5–12. minimizes the risk of social rejection. Ly, M., Haynes, M.R., Barter, J.W., Weinberger, D.R., Zink, C.F. (2011). Subjective Socioeconomic Status Predicts Human Ventral Striatal Responses to Social Status REFERENCES Information. Current Biology, 21(9), 794–7. Mayer, R.C., Davis, J.H., Schoorman, F.D. (1995). An integrative model of organizational Amodio, D.M., Frith, C.D. (2006). Meeting of minds: the medial frontal cortex and social trust. Academy of Management Review, 20(3), 709–34. cognition. Nature Reviews Neuroscience, 7(4), 268–77. Mitchell, J.P., Macrae, C.N., Banaji, M.R. (2006). Dissociable medial prefrontal contribu- Baumeister, R.F., Leary, M.R. (1995). The need to belong: desire for interpersonal attach- tions to judgments of similar and dissimilar others. Neuron, 50,655–63. ments as a fundamental human motivation. Psychological Bulletin, 117, 497–529. Mobbs, D., Hassabis, D., Seymour, B., et al. (2009a). Choking on the money: incentive- Cialdini, R.B., Borden, R.J., Thorne, A., Walker, M.R., Freeman, S., Sloan, L.R. (1976). induced performance decrements in a reward pursuit task. Psychological Science, 20(8), Basking in reflected glory: three (football) field studies. Journal of Personality and Social 955–62. Psychology, 34, 366–75. Mobbs, D., Yu, R., Meyer, M., et al. (2009b). A key role for similarity in vicarious reward. Davey, C.G.,Allen,N.B., Harrison,B.J., Dwyer, D.B.,Yucel, M. (2009). Being liked activates Science, 324, 900. primary reward and midline self-related brain regions. Human Brain Mapping, 31(4), 660–8. Moran, J.M., Macrae, C.N., Heatherton, T.F., Wyland, C.L., Kelley, W.M. (2006). Dawes, C.T., Fowler, J.H., Johnson, T., McElreath, R., Smirnov, O. (2007). Egalitarian Neuroanatomical evidence for distinct cognitive and affective components of self. motives in humans. Nature, 446, 794–6. Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience, 18, 1586–94. Delgado, M.R. (2007). Reward-related responses in the human striatum. Annals of the New Moran, J.M., Heatherton, T.F., Kelley, W.M. (2009). Modulation of cortical midline struc- York Academy of Science, 1104,70–88. tures by explicit and implicit self-relevance. Social Neuroscience, 4, 197–211. O’Doherty, J. (2004). Reward representations and reward-related learning in the human brain: Ortony, A., Clore, G.L., Collins, A. (1990). The cognitive structure of emotion. University of insights from human neuroimaging. Current Opinion in Neurobiology, 14(6), 769–76. Cambridge Press, Cambridge, UK. Eisenberger, N.I., Gable, S.L., Lieberman, M.D. (2007). fMRI responses relate to differences Phan, K.L., Sripada, C.S., Angstadt, M., McCabe, K. (2010). Reputation for reciprocity in real-world social experience. Emotion, 7, 745–54. engages the brain reward center. Proceedings of the National Academy of Science of the Fletcher, P.C., Happe ´, F., Frith, U., Baker, S.C., Dolan, R.J., Frackowiak, R.S., Frith, C.D. United States of America, 107, 13099–104. (1995). Other minds in the brain: a functional imaging study of “theory of mind” in Rilling, J., Gutman, D., Zeh, T., Pagnoni, G., Berns, G., Kilts, C. (2002). A neural basis for story comprehension. Cognition, 57(2), 109–28. social cooperation. Neuron, 35(2), 395–405. Harbaugh, W.T., Mayr, U., Burghart, D.R. (2007). Neural responses to taxation and vol- Rosen, S., Tesser, A. (1970). On reluctance to communicate undesirable information: the untary giving reveal motives for charitable donations. Science, 316, 1622–5. MUM effect. Sociometry, 33, 253–63. Hare, T.A., O’Doherty, J., Camerer, C.F., Schultz, W., Rangel, A. (2008). Dissociating the Sniezek, J.A., Buckley, T. (1995). Cueing and cognitive conflict in judge-advisor decision role of the orbitofrontal cortex and the striatum in the computation of goal values and making. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 62(2), 159–74. prediction errors. Journal of Neuroscience, 28(22), 5623–30. Somerville, L.H., Kelley, W.M., Heatherton, T.F. (2010). Self-esteem modulates med- Helm, S., Salminen, R. (2010). Basking in reflected glory: using customer reference rela- ial prefrontal cortical responses to evaluative social feedback. Cerebral Cortex, 20, tionships to build reputation in industrial markets. Industrial Marketing Management, 3005–13. 39(5), 737–43. Yaniv, I., Kleinberger, E. (2000). Advice taking in decision making: egocentric discounting Izuma, K., Saito, D.N., Sadato, N. (2008). Processing of social and monetary rewards in the human striatum. Neuron, 58, 284–94. and reputation formation. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 83, Izuma, K., Saito, D.N., Sadato, N. (2010). The roles of the medial prefrontal cortex and 260–81. striatum in reputation processing. Social Neuroscience, 5(2), 133–47. Yu, R., Mobbs, D., Seymour, B., Calder, A.J. (2010). Insula and striatum mediate the Izuma, K. (2012). The social neuroscience of reputation. Neuroscience Research, 72, 283–8. default bias. Journal of Neuroscience, 30(44), 14702–7.
Social Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience – Oxford University Press
Published: Oct 19, 2015
You can share this free article with as many people as you like with the url below! We hope you enjoy this feature!
Read and print from thousands of top scholarly journals.
Already have an account? Log in
Bookmark this article. You can see your Bookmarks on your DeepDyve Library.
To save an article, log in first, or sign up for a DeepDyve account if you don’t already have one.
Copy and paste the desired citation format or use the link below to download a file formatted for EndNote
Access the full text.
Sign up today, get DeepDyve free for 14 days.
All DeepDyve websites use cookies to improve your online experience. They were placed on your computer when you launched this website. You can change your cookie settings through your browser.