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Noordhof on McKinsey-Brown

Noordhof on McKinsey-Brown Blackwell Publishing Ltd.Oxford, UK and Malden, USAANALAnalysis0003-26382005 Blackwell Publishing Ltd.January 20056518688ArticlesAnthony Brueckner Anthony Brueckner Jessica Brown defended the McKinsey-Brown reductio in Brown 2001. According to this argument, if anti-individualism is true, then one can come to know substantive propositions about one’s external environment simply by knowing one’s own thoughts and reflecting on the consequences of anti-individualism. Brown’s defence of her version of the reductio in Brown 2001 depends upon the assumption (A) S can know a priori that there are cases in which S is unsure about whether his non-natural-kind concept c applies and in which c determinately applies/fails to apply (UD cases). If S can know (A) a priori, then he can use his a priori knowledge of the truth of anti-individualism to deduce that he is a member of a linguistic community possessing c. In Brueckner 2002 I raised the following problem for assumption (A). Though S can know a priori that, in this specific case, he is unsure about c’s application, he cannot know a priori that this is a case in which c determinately applies/fails to apply (a UD case). I then considered a counter-move on behalf of Brown: imagine a situation in which S http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png Analysis Oxford University Press

Noordhof on McKinsey-Brown

Analysis , Volume 65 (1) – Jan 1, 2005

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Publisher
Oxford University Press
Copyright
© Published by Oxford University Press.
ISSN
0003-2638
eISSN
1467-8284
DOI
10.1093/analys/65.1.86
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

Blackwell Publishing Ltd.Oxford, UK and Malden, USAANALAnalysis0003-26382005 Blackwell Publishing Ltd.January 20056518688ArticlesAnthony Brueckner Anthony Brueckner Jessica Brown defended the McKinsey-Brown reductio in Brown 2001. According to this argument, if anti-individualism is true, then one can come to know substantive propositions about one’s external environment simply by knowing one’s own thoughts and reflecting on the consequences of anti-individualism. Brown’s defence of her version of the reductio in Brown 2001 depends upon the assumption (A) S can know a priori that there are cases in which S is unsure about whether his non-natural-kind concept c applies and in which c determinately applies/fails to apply (UD cases). If S can know (A) a priori, then he can use his a priori knowledge of the truth of anti-individualism to deduce that he is a member of a linguistic community possessing c. In Brueckner 2002 I raised the following problem for assumption (A). Though S can know a priori that, in this specific case, he is unsure about c’s application, he cannot know a priori that this is a case in which c determinately applies/fails to apply (a UD case). I then considered a counter-move on behalf of Brown: imagine a situation in which S

Journal

AnalysisOxford University Press

Published: Jan 1, 2005

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