Access the full text.
Sign up today, get DeepDyve free for 14 days.
References for this paper are not available at this time. We will be adding them shortly, thank you for your patience.
Blackwell Publishing Ltd.Oxford, UK and Malden, USAANALAnalysis0003-26382005 Blackwell Publishing Ltd.January 20056518688ArticlesAnthony Brueckner Anthony Brueckner Jessica Brown defended the McKinsey-Brown reductio in Brown 2001. According to this argument, if anti-individualism is true, then one can come to know substantive propositions about one’s external environment simply by knowing one’s own thoughts and reflecting on the consequences of anti-individualism. Brown’s defence of her version of the reductio in Brown 2001 depends upon the assumption (A) S can know a priori that there are cases in which S is unsure about whether his non-natural-kind concept c applies and in which c determinately applies/fails to apply (UD cases). If S can know (A) a priori, then he can use his a priori knowledge of the truth of anti-individualism to deduce that he is a member of a linguistic community possessing c. In Brueckner 2002 I raised the following problem for assumption (A). Though S can know a priori that, in this specific case, he is unsure about c’s application, he cannot know a priori that this is a case in which c determinately applies/fails to apply (a UD case). I then considered a counter-move on behalf of Brown: imagine a situation in which S
Analysis – Oxford University Press
Published: Jan 1, 2005
Read and print from thousands of top scholarly journals.
Already have an account? Log in
Bookmark this article. You can see your Bookmarks on your DeepDyve Library.
To save an article, log in first, or sign up for a DeepDyve account if you don’t already have one.
Copy and paste the desired citation format or use the link below to download a file formatted for EndNote
Access the full text.
Sign up today, get DeepDyve free for 14 days.
All DeepDyve websites use cookies to improve your online experience. They were placed on your computer when you launched this website. You can change your cookie settings through your browser.