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Job Market Signaling

Job Market Signaling Abstract 1. Introduction, 355. — 2. Hiring as investment under uncertainty, 356. — 3. Applicant signaling, 358. — 4. Informational feedback and the definition of equilibrium, 359. — 5. Properties of informational equilibria: an example, 361. — 6. The informational impact of indices, 368. — Conclusions, 374. * The essay is based on the author's doctoral dissertation (“Market Signalling: The Informational Structure of Job Markets and Related Phenomena,” Ph.D. thesis, Harvard University, 1972), forthcoming as a book entitled Market Signaling: Information Transfer in Hiring and Related Screening Processes in the Harvard Economic Studies Series, Harvard University Press. The aim here is to present the outline of the signaling model and some of its conclusions. Generalizations of the numerical examples used for expositional purposes here are found in ibid. and elsewhere. I owe many people thanks for help in the course of the current study, too many to mention all. However, I should acknowledge explicitly the magnitude of my debts to Kenneth Arrow and Thomas Schelling for persistently directing my attention to new and interesting problems. This content is only available as a PDF. http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png The Quarterly Journal of Economics Oxford University Press

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References (2)

Publisher
Oxford University Press
ISSN
0033-5533
eISSN
1531-4650
DOI
10.2307/1882010
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

Abstract 1. Introduction, 355. — 2. Hiring as investment under uncertainty, 356. — 3. Applicant signaling, 358. — 4. Informational feedback and the definition of equilibrium, 359. — 5. Properties of informational equilibria: an example, 361. — 6. The informational impact of indices, 368. — Conclusions, 374. * The essay is based on the author's doctoral dissertation (“Market Signalling: The Informational Structure of Job Markets and Related Phenomena,” Ph.D. thesis, Harvard University, 1972), forthcoming as a book entitled Market Signaling: Information Transfer in Hiring and Related Screening Processes in the Harvard Economic Studies Series, Harvard University Press. The aim here is to present the outline of the signaling model and some of its conclusions. Generalizations of the numerical examples used for expositional purposes here are found in ibid. and elsewhere. I owe many people thanks for help in the course of the current study, too many to mention all. However, I should acknowledge explicitly the magnitude of my debts to Kenneth Arrow and Thomas Schelling for persistently directing my attention to new and interesting problems. This content is only available as a PDF.

Journal

The Quarterly Journal of EconomicsOxford University Press

Published: Aug 1, 1973

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