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Intention in Criminal Law

Intention in Criminal Law J. C. SMITH . . even a dog distinguishes between being stumbled over and being kicked," said Oliver Wendell Holmes J. 1 Intentional and negligent wrongs are so different in moral quality and so different in the reaction which they cause in those wronged and in those who see or hear of them, that any system of criminal law is bound to take account of the distinction. Lady Wootton 2 has recently argued that courts should confine themselves to deciding whether the accused person caused the proscribed harm; but she recognises that no action could rationally be taken against the " convicted " person until the " sentence " (though Lady Wootton would not call him that) had determined the state of mind with which he perpetrated the harm. The inquiry would not be avoided but merely postponed and put into other hands. From an early stage 3 of our legal history the law has distinguished between inten- tional and other wrongs, and any rational and civilised criminal law must so distinguish. Whatever the difficulties involved in looking into another person's mind, it is a task which must be undertaken if we are to have a system of criminal http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png Current Legal Problems Oxford University Press

Intention in Criminal Law

Smith, J. C.
Current Legal Problems , Volume 27 (1) – Jan 1, 1974
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Publisher
Oxford University Press
Copyright
© Stevens & Sons 1974
ISSN
0070-1998
eISSN
0070-1998
DOI
10.1093/clp/27.1.93
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

J. C. SMITH . . even a dog distinguishes between being stumbled over and being kicked," said Oliver Wendell Holmes J. 1 Intentional and negligent wrongs are so different in moral quality and so different in the reaction which they cause in those wronged and in those who see or hear of them, that any system of criminal law is bound to take account of the distinction. Lady Wootton 2 has recently argued that courts should confine themselves to deciding whether the accused person caused the proscribed harm; but she recognises that no action could rationally be taken against the " convicted " person until the " sentence " (though Lady Wootton would not call him that) had determined the state of mind with which he perpetrated the harm. The inquiry would not be avoided but merely postponed and put into other hands. From an early stage 3 of our legal history the law has distinguished between inten- tional and other wrongs, and any rational and civilised criminal law must so distinguish. Whatever the difficulties involved in looking into another person's mind, it is a task which must be undertaken if we are to have a system of criminal

Journal

Current Legal Problems – Oxford University Press

Published: Jan 1, 1974

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