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Influence and Deterrence: How Obstetricians Respond to Litigation against Themselves and Their Colleagues

Influence and Deterrence: How Obstetricians Respond to Litigation against Themselves and Their... The willingness of individuals to engage in a harmful act may be influenced by direct personal experiences and the experiences of others, which can inform individuals about the likely consequences of their actions. In this paper, we examine how obstetricians respond to litigation. It is contended that obstetricians respond to increases in litigiousness by performing more cesarean sections. Using micro data, we examine whether physicians perform more cesareans after they or their colleagues have been contacted about a lawsuit. We observe very small, short-lived increases in cesarean section rates. It does not appear that the recent sharp rise in cesarean section rates is in direct response to litigation. http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png American Law and Economics Review Oxford University Press

Influence and Deterrence: How Obstetricians Respond to Litigation against Themselves and Their Colleagues

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References (21)

Publisher
Oxford University Press
Copyright
The Author 2009. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the American Law and Economics Association. All rights reserved. For permissions, please e-mail: journals.permissions@oxfordjournals.org
Subject
Article
ISSN
1465-7252
eISSN
1465-7260
DOI
10.1093/aler/ahp016
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

The willingness of individuals to engage in a harmful act may be influenced by direct personal experiences and the experiences of others, which can inform individuals about the likely consequences of their actions. In this paper, we examine how obstetricians respond to litigation. It is contended that obstetricians respond to increases in litigiousness by performing more cesarean sections. Using micro data, we examine whether physicians perform more cesareans after they or their colleagues have been contacted about a lawsuit. We observe very small, short-lived increases in cesarean section rates. It does not appear that the recent sharp rise in cesarean section rates is in direct response to litigation.

Journal

American Law and Economics ReviewOxford University Press

Published: Oct 28, 2010

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