Get 20M+ Full-Text Papers For Less Than $1.50/day. Start a 14-Day Trial for You or Your Team.

Learn More →

An Extended But-For Test for the Causal Relation in the Law of Obligations

An Extended But-For Test for the Causal Relation in the Law of Obligations This article explores the question of what character relations must have before the orthodox law of obligations will describe them as causal relations. The article does not purport to identify the metaphysical nature of causation. Instead it provides a non-reductive account of what is essential before the law has described the relation between a specific factor and the existence of a particular indivisible phenomenon as causal. Section 1 presents a simple test for this relationan extended but-for testthat can be deployed in a straightforward way without engaging with theoretically complex and often problematic accounts of causation based on the notion of sufficient sets, such as Wrights NESS account. Section 2 demonstrates how important principles relating to the separateness of a legal entity and to legal responsibility can resolve theoretical puzzles and in turn illuminate why the orthodox law of obligations does not choose to describe as causal a relation wider than the one identified in this article. http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png Oxford Journal of Legal Studies Oxford University Press

An Extended But-For Test for the Causal Relation in the Law of Obligations

Stapleton, Jane
Oxford Journal of Legal Studies , Volume 35 (4) – Dec 7, 2015
Download PDF
30 pages

Loading next page...
 
/lp/oxford-university-press/an-extended-but-for-test-for-the-causal-relation-in-the-law-of-EwpzE0aDia

References (0)

References for this paper are not available at this time. We will be adding them shortly, thank you for your patience.

Publisher
Oxford University Press
Copyright
The Author 2015. Published by Oxford University Press. All rights reserved. For permissions, please e-mail: journals.permissions@oup.com
ISSN
0143-6503
eISSN
1464-3820
DOI
10.1093/ojls/gqv005
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

This article explores the question of what character relations must have before the orthodox law of obligations will describe them as causal relations. The article does not purport to identify the metaphysical nature of causation. Instead it provides a non-reductive account of what is essential before the law has described the relation between a specific factor and the existence of a particular indivisible phenomenon as causal. Section 1 presents a simple test for this relationan extended but-for testthat can be deployed in a straightforward way without engaging with theoretically complex and often problematic accounts of causation based on the notion of sufficient sets, such as Wrights NESS account. Section 2 demonstrates how important principles relating to the separateness of a legal entity and to legal responsibility can resolve theoretical puzzles and in turn illuminate why the orthodox law of obligations does not choose to describe as causal a relation wider than the one identified in this article.

Journal

Oxford Journal of Legal Studies – Oxford University Press

Published: Dec 7, 2015

There are no references for this article.