Unequal exchange and absolute cost advantage: evidence from the trade between Greece and Germany

Unequal exchange and absolute cost advantage: evidence from the trade between Greece and Germany Abstract This article investigates the nature and the salient features of international trade between Greece and her major trading partner Germany. The analysis inspired by the classical theory of value and distribution and using input–output data spanning the period 1995–2011 shows that the German economy possesses absolute cost advantage in its trade with Greece which gives rise to unequal exchange in the sense of transfers of labour values from Greece to Germany. 1. Introduction The term ‘unequal exchange’ was particularly popular in the 1970s, when there were efforts to show that the growth of the more developed countries (DC) was to the detriment of the less developed countries (LDC) due to the transfers of value (or labour time) from the latter to the former. The term ‘unequal exchange’ was coined by Emmanuel (1972), who unlike other heterodox economists of his time sought to discover exploitative relations not in the flows of capital or imperialism in general, but rather in ordinary international trade. Emmanuel argued that the tendential equalization of the profit rates across trading countries leads to the formation of international prices of production whose difference from the national labour values give rise to two types of international transfers of labour values and, in a sense, unequal exchange. First, transfers of value that accrue due to different capital–intensities across industries, thereby transferring excess value (or surplus–value) from the labour–intensive to capital–intensive industries and by extension to the countries in which the capital–intensive industries are located. Presumably, interindustry capital–intensities are compared against a kind of relevant international average capital intensity, and in this comparison, the more DC are those with the more capital–intensive industries by virtue of their advanced technologies. This is Emmanuel’s unequal exchange in the ‘broad sense’, whose presence is quite normal, and its quantitative significance in international trade is supposed to be minimal. Second, unequal exchange consequent upon lower wages in the LDC, which combined with the use of the up–to–date technology gives rise to higher rates of surplus–value and create the potential for massive transfers of labour value from the less to the more DC. According to Emmanuel (1972), this type of transfers of labour values, whose size was thought to be substantial, characterizes the unequal exchange ‘in the strict sense’. The great merit of Emmanuel’s theoretical work is to show the possibility of unequal exchange and the resulting exploitation not in the easy case by invoking in his analysis extra–economic forces such as presence of monopoly power and price–setting behaviour, dependency or imperialism of any sort; but rather, in the much harder case of the ordinary commodity international trade. As a consequence, unequal exchange and the resulting transfers of value can be subjected to rigorous economic theorization and also assess their quantitative importance and possible effects on closing or widening the gap between the less and the more DC. This view attracted the critique of both heterodox economists (for the various views, see Brown, 1978) but also orthodox economists (see for example Samuelson, 1975, 1976, 1978). In what follows, we make an effort on the one hand to cast Emmanuel’s thesis in terms of the modern classical theory of value, and on the other hand to give it empirical content in order to assess its quantitative significance in the trade between Germany and Greece, two European Union countries, with common currency, free commodity flows and also with economies at quite different levels of development. The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 places the unequal exchange in the context of the classical theory of value and distribution. Section 3 discusses the extension of the classical theory of value and distribution in international trade and formalizes the precise conditions which give rise to unequal exchange or, what is more, accurate asymmetric and possibly disjunctive trade. Section 4 operationalizes the classical model using input–output and data from the bilateral trade between Greece and Germany. Section 5 presents and critically evaluates the results of the empirical analysis. Finally, Section 6 summarizes and makes some concluding observations. 2. Classical theory of competition and transfers of value Competition in classical economic theory (mainly Adam Smith, David Ricardo and John S. Mill) is a process characterized by flows of capital motivated by profit rate differentials (positive or negative) with respect to the economy–wide average (or normal) rate of profit which accelerate or decelerate capital accumulation eliciting changes in the growth rate of supply. The latter, by changing prices, eliminates over long stretches of time the initial profit rate differences. This cross dual dynamical competitive process is also shared by neoclassical economics; nevertheless, the emphasis is placed on the conditions of entry or exit of firms (not on the acceleration or deceleration of capital accumulation) and the probable obstacles preventing the proper operation of competition, thereby perpetuating and perhaps amplifying the existing profitability differentials (positive or negative). The two alternative approaches also differ in their conceptualization of equilibrium. In particular, the neoclassical approach hypothesizes that the economy is buffeted by externally or internally generated shocks that displace it away from its equilibrium path. The displacement is rather short–run and soon the economy returns to its equilibrium path unless there are further shocks. By contrast, the classical approach envisages equilibrium dynamically, that is, the industry profit rates are attracted to and fluctuate around a centre of gravity (average rate of profit) which is rather ideal, that is, the economy is never in a state of rest. Furthermore, in the classical and especially in Marx’s analysis of competition, there is a clear distinction between the intraindustry and interindustry competition. The salient feature of intraindustry competition is the prevalence of the law of one price (LOP); that is, all firms activated within an industry sell the same type of product, more or less, at the same price. The LOP in the classical analysis of competition is the means through which firms within an industry are categorized and stratified according to their efficiency. The more efficient firms having lower unit value and selling at approximately the same price with their competitors manage to extract excess profits. By contrast, in the neoclassical view, the LOP is a manifestation of similarity between firms; hence the mere presence of excess profits is viewed as prima facie evidence that competition does not work properly. Turning to interindustry competition, whose major feature is the equalization of the profit rates between industries and the establishment of prices of production, that is, equilibrium prices incorporating the economy–wide average rate of profit. The tendential equalization of the interindustry profit rates across countries naturally establishes different prices of production between industries internationally and the LOP prevails also for firms within industries internationally. One wonders if there is any contradiction, in the sense that how is it possible to have the establishment of differential prices of production across industries and, at the same time, the prevalence of the LOP? The answer is that the equalization of profit rates and the establishment of prices of production take place not for all, but only for the so–called regulating capitals which are activated within industries. The regulating capitals in an industry are those where acceleration or deceleration of capital accumulation takes place and therefore these are the type of capitals that in effect participate in the formation of international prices of production. This does not mean that the regulating capitals are the same in the two countries. There are differences between the regulating capitals, some of which might be more efficient than others, and there is no easy way to isolate these particular capitals from the rest in the industry.1 Thus, we are bound to restrict ourselves to the reasonable assumption of the average capital of each and every industry in the two countries as a good proxy of the regulating capital, and in doing so we in effect assume that the average price of production of each industry rules in the bilateral trade in the two countries. It is important to emphasize that the assumption of the average price of production may work against the unequal exchange hypothesis, in the sense that, in most cases, the most efficient from the regulating firms would be those located in the more DC. Emmanuel (1972) argued that the transfer of (surplus) value takes place because the LDC happen to have wages much lower than those of their trading partners while at the same time the flow of capital and commodities makes both more and less DC to share roughly the same technology.2 Assuming away differences in preferences, transportation costs and the like, which are also assumed away in the currently dominating Heckscher–Ohlin model of international trade, it follows that the much lower wage in the LDC and the establishment of an international price of production will lead to a transfer of surplus–value to the more DC. In particular, Emmanuel (1972, p. 64) argued that the wage is institutionally given, which is equivalent to saying that the wage is exogenous to the system and a country is classified as core or peripheral according to the level of wage, apparently evaluated in the same currency, usually dollars. Emmanuel further argued that there is enough mobility in the flows of capital to bring about tendential equalization of profit rates internationally, while the relative immobility of labour is what may preserve sizable wage differences across countries and thus large international differences in the rates of surplus–value, which become the source of transfer of surplus–value from the less to the more DC. Samuelson (1975, 1976, 1978) criticized Emmanuel’s view on the grounds that it is based on circulation (wages differences) and not on production (productivity differences), and that the capital will flow from the more to the LDC in order to take advantage of the lower real wages; the demand for labour in the LDC will raise the real wages by more than the fall in the real wages in the more DC. Consequently, the limit of this process will be reached with the international equalization of both profit rates and real wages. In other words, the equalization of profit rates is an indication that inefficiencies and inequalities tend to be eliminated and not what the unequal exchange argument claims. It may be noticed in passing that Samuelson (1976, p. 96) praises Emmanuel as ‘a serious scholar’ whose research is ‘one of the few attempts to put Marxian analytics to work on a genuine real–world problem’. Emmanuel, in his rather lukewarm response to Samuelson, states that the money, not the real wage, is the key variable in his system and, therefore, Samuelson’s critique is misplaced and misdirected (Emmanuel, 1978). Clearly, with such an answer Emmanuel’s model is open to criticisms because by assuming uniform technology across countries and free mobility of capital in search of profit opportunities, how else could one explain profit rate differentials? Except by assuming real wage differences across countries. Hence, it is important to emphasize that at the time that Emmanuel was writing, certain issues within the classical approach were not sufficiently clear. We now know that, starting with the usual linear model of production of the classical analysis, we could select the money wage as one of the givens and with its aid to determine the absolute prices along with the rate of profit; the real wage could be determined after the formation of the appropriate price index (Leontief, 1985). Alternatively, by assuming as given the real wage and by extension the rate of surplus–value, we can estimate the rate of profit and relative prices. In this article, we follow the second alternative and we find that Emmanuel’s response to Samuelson’s was really a retreat from what appeared to be a promising alternative to the standard neoclassical international trade theory. It seems that Emmanuel was trapped in the neoclassical Heckscher–Ohlin model of international trade and this is the reason why he did not bring his unequal exchange argument to its logical conclusion; that is, the outright rejection of the Ricardian principle of comparative advantage which is shared by neoclassical and many heterodox economists alike as ‘one of the few bits of statical logic that economists of all schools understand and agree with’ (Samuelson, 1976, p. 96). The logical path for Emmanuel would be the replacement of the principle of comparative advantage with the theory of absolute cost advantage, which as Shaikh (1980, 2016, ch. 11) has argued in effect rules international trade and bears responsibility for transfers of value between industries and countries and leads to unequal exchange in the broad sense, at least. In particular, Shaikh (1980) argued that the competitive position of any firm depends on its ability to produce commodities of a given quality with less direct and indirect labor time than its competitors. The firms which are less efficient may stay in business for some time to the extent that they enjoy certain other benefits, such as lower wages, lower taxation, subsidies, proximity to resources or markets, and the like. However, such benefits do not protect forever, and with the progress of time as the gap in direct and indirect labour requirements per unit of output increases, the less efficient firms will suffer losses and eventually will be competed away from the industry. Emmanuel in his book is not always clear about what is assumed as given; however, the assumption of a given real wage is among the fundamental ones in the classical theory of value and distribution in both its old and modern versions. The given rate of surplus–value requires a given real wage, and Emmanuel at some parts of his book seems to acknowledge that. For example, he notes: [r]egardless of any alteration in prices resulting from imperfect competition on the commodity market, unequal exchange is the proportion between equilibrium prices that is established through the equalization of profit between regions in which the rate of surplus value is ‘institutionally’ different–the term ‘institutionally’ meaning that these rates are, for whatever reason, safeguarded from competitive equalization on the factors market and are independent of relative prices. (Emmanuel, 1972, pp. 63–64) For example, Emmanuel (1972, p. 48) claimed that the wage in the peripheral countries is 1/30 of the core countries while labor productivity is at most 1/2 and thus competitiveness in the peripheral countries is about 1/15 of the centre countries. The smaller difference in productivity, given the assumption of the approximately similar technology, must be attributed mainly to the fact that the institutional framework and the workers’ consciousness is more business oriented in the core rather than in the peripheral countries, while the difference in wages must be attributed to institutional factors. It goes without saying that if the wages in the LDC (or more DC) economies increased (or decreased), then the source of unequal exchange in the strict sense would tend to dissipate. The debates among heterodox economists during the 1960s and 1970s were more about conceptual issues which were rarely supported by actual data and estimation of variables. Not surprisingly, Emmanuel did not derive any reliable quantitative estimates of the extent and magnitude of the unequal exchange. And in fact, there are only scant efforts to operationalize the unequal exchange hypothesis by estimating the actual transfers of value from peripheral to centre regions or countries. Among the first efforts is Marelli’s (1980, 1983) who, by using regional input–output tables, estimated the transfers of values between Italian regions. Marelli’s results showed that transfers of value actually take place from the less developed to the more developed regions of Italy, thereby enhancing the regional inequalities in economic development, as a consequence of unequal exchange. However, Marelli’s study, although it is conducted in the framework of transfers of value literature, is not concerned with the unequal exchange ‘in the strict sense’ of the term. There have been two other attempts to estimate the extent unequal exchange in the trade between two pairs of countries; the first by Gibson (1980) who, by using input–output data of the year 1969 for Peru and the USA, showed that Peru suffered a loss of value of about 38% of its exports to the USA. The results in the trade between Philippines and Canada in the year 1961 were also striking. More specifically, Webber and Foot (1984, p. 939) argued that in Canada a given amount of money purchases nearly five times more labour time than the same amount of money spent in the Philippines on Canadian imports. There is no doubt that the empirical estimates of unequal exchange were not easy to carry out for mainly two reasons: first, the necessary data for such calculations were hard to come by for a single year, let alone for a number of years and countries. Under these circumstances, naturally one could not derive any reliable estimates and conclusions. Second, the theoretical concepts were not well developed and their empirical analogues for the theoretical variables had to wait for at least a decade (see for example Shaikh, 2016; Mariolis and Tsoulfidis, 2016, and the literature cited there). Nowadays, we have input–output data collected with the same methodology and also of the same industry detail for a number of countries and years. These data are also cast in the same monetary units (dollars) and so both comparisons across countries and also intertemporally are much easier to carry out. Finally, many theoretical issues in the classical theory of value and distribution have been clarified and the empirical analysis is at a stage that can address the complex issue of unequal exchange in an effective and meaningful way. 3. Modelling transfers of value Emmanuel in his analysis rules out the Ricardian assumption of immobility of capital, and by doing so, he essentially undermines the Ricardian principle of comparative cost. Capital mobility is motivated by profit rate differentials resulting from the much lower wages in the peripheral countries than those in the centre. The reason is that the technology (according to Emmanuel and the usual international trade theory) is nearly the same between the less and the more DC. The inflow of capital is accompanied by lower prices and siphoning off the excess (surplus) value to the DC. In what follows, we make an effort to apply the view of international transfers of value and at the same time to test the realism of the assumptions usually made in the unequal exchange debates by examining the trade between Greece and Germany, two countries at levels of economic development quite apart from each other. Germany is the major trading partner of Greece, and for both countries (as members of the EU and EMU) it is reasonable to assume that there is sufficient mobility of capital and also to test the hypothesis of the general profit rates equalization between the two economies. This mobility of capital might take the form of direct foreign investment, through the purchase of plant and equipment, or indirect through the form of purchase of equity from the domestic stock market and other channels of investment financing. We do not stipulate any assumption as to which direction the flow of capital may take place, we just assume that the mobility of capital will equalize tendentially and, in the long run, the profit rates in the two countries. Furthermore, the real wage in Greece is much lower than that in Germany but the difference in the two average real wages is not abysmal as hypothesized by Emmanuel. More specifically, the average real wage in Germany during the examined 1995–2011 period is approximately twice the Greek (see the data in the Appendix, Table A2, whilst the nomenclature of industries is displayed in Table A1). It is important to point out that the two countries by no means share the same technology and, therefore, labour productivity will differ and thus the rate of surplus–value may not necessarily be higher in Greece than in Germany.3 In fact, the results displayed in the next section show that the German rate of surplus–value, especially in the last years of our analysis, exceeds that of Greece! In our analysis, we use input–output data for the two countries spanning the period 1995–2011. The source of our input–output data is the World Input–Output Database (WIOD); the available tables are of 34 by 34 industry detail, and they are cast in terms of current dollars, which we convert to constant 1995 dollars using the appropriate vector of price deflators in order to carry out inter–temporal comparisons.4 Our analysis is conducted in terms of direct and indirect labour content per million of constant 1995 dollars. This expression is absolutely necessary since the analysis of unequal exchange is conducted in terms of labour values and, for this reason, even the estimated prices of production are only first–step prices of production, that is, modified labour values (see Shaikh, 1977).5 More specifically, for labour values, d, we have the sum of constant capital, c, that is, the labour value of the materials used up in the production process, together, in principle, along with the depreciation of fixed capital stock;6 the variable capital, v , that is, the labour value of the basket of goods normally consumed by workers with their money wage and the surplus–labour time or the surplus–value, s . Competition and the mobility of capital equalize the rates of profit across industries and form an economy–wide average rate of profit which in the case of the circulating capital model will be r=s/(c+v).7 Consequently, prices of production, p, are defined as p=(1+r)(c+v) If we divide the world into LDC and more DC, then the transfer of value is defined as the difference, δ, between prices of production and labour values δi=pi−di, i=A, B Hence, a positive (negative) difference indicates the gain (loss) in the transfer of value to country A(B) from country B(A). By combining the above, we conclude that for the country i we will have δi=r(ci+vi)−si Furthermore, by dividing both numerator and denominator of the rate of profit by variable capital, we express it in terms of the rate of surplus–value, e, and the value composition of capital, k=c/v, thus we get r=sc+v=s/vc/v+v/v=e(1+k) After substitution in the formula for the unequal exchange and with rearrangement, we get8 δi=vi(e1+ki1+k−ei) From the above formula, given the tendential equalization of the profit rates to an average internationally, we derive that the necessary conditions to rule out the case of unequal exchange are the equalities of both the rates of surplus–value and the value compositions of capital to their respective international average ones. Furthermore, even though the rates of surplus–value of the trading countries may be equal to their world average counterparts, differences may arise from the value composition of capital. This latter kind of unequal exchange is quite regular and appears within every economy. This is what Emmanuel calls unequal exchange ‘in the broad sense’, and as such it is expected in both domestic and international trade and not much can be done about it. If, however, the value compositions of capital across trading countries are equal to the international average and the rates of surplus–value differ, then we have Emmanuel’s case of unequal exchange in the ‘strict sense’ of the term. Of course, we cannot rule out possible intermediate cases, which may appear in an empirical analysis, and this is where we lay our focus. 4. Implementation of the model The ideas expressed so far are general enough, and in order to become meaningful they need to be operationalized. For this purpose, we use actual input–output data in order to represent the constant returns, single product and single primary input technology through the use of the matrix of input–output coefficients estimated initially in current prices, Ac. The next step is to deflate (in terms of 1995 prices) this matrix in order to make possible meaningful intertemporal and international comparisons; the latter requires not only constant prices but also prices expressed in the same currency. The deflation method is carried out in the following way: A=⟨p⟩Ac⟨p⟩−1 where <p> is the diagonal matrix whose main diagonal contains the price index of each industry with 1995 as the base year and A is the matrix of technological coefficients obtained at constant prices. The vector of employment coefficients l is derived as the ratio of the total wages of the employed and self–employed population to the product of the real gross output of each industry times the economy’s average deflated wage.9 Hence, the ratio of the real wage of an industry divided by the economy–wide average real wage gives us an approximate estimate of skills and at the same time reduces the complex to simple labour. We say approximate estimate of skills because many other factors may enter in the determination of the wage differentials, but this is the best we can do with the available data. It is important to note that the wage differentials are pretty stable intertemporally, that is to say, the correlation coefficients between any two vectors of the so–estimated wage differentials, even though they may be several years apart from each other, give us a pretty strong and statistically significant relationship. In the case of Germany, the estimated correlation coefficients are usually in the range of 60% from one year to the next, and when we take years quite apart from each other the strength of association remains quite high and always statistically significant. In the case of Greece, the respective correlation coefficients were somewhat lower than those of Germany, usually in the range of 40%, and the cross–correlation of the two countries gave measures of association in the range of 45–65%, all of which were found statistically significant. Subsequently, the labour values of each industry are estimated as d=l[I−A]−1 In this way, we estimate the vector of labour values, d , that is, the direct and indirect labour–years required to produce a million dollars in constant 1995 prices. The next step is to estimate the constituent components of the rate of profit, that is, the rate of surplus–value and the value composition of capital. For the estimation of the rate of surplus–value, we stipulate that the real wage is equal to the average annual deflated money wage allocated over the basket of goods and services normally purchased by workers. Thus, we may write b=(PCEj∑PCEj)w¯ where b is the column vector of the basket of commodities (the real wage) normally purchased by workers with their money wage, and PCE stands for personal consumption of workers from industry j=1, 2, …, 34. Hence, the term in the above parentheses stands for the share of each good in the total workers consumption expenditures. The rate of surplus–value will be e=1−dbdb=d(I−A−bl)xdblx and the economy–wide average rate of profit, r, on circulating capital will be r=d(I−A−bl)xd(A+bl)x In the presence of fixed capital stock, Κ, the respective rate of profit, ρ, will be ρ=d(I−A−bl)xdΚx The matrix of fixed capital stock was estimated by using the product of the column vector of investment shares of each industry times the row vector of real capital stock per unit of real gross output.10 The resulting new matrix of capital stock coefficients Κ possess the properties of the usual capital stock matrices derived and used in the existing empirical studies (see Mariolis and Tsoulfidis, 2016, and the literature cited there), whereby in the absence of a matrix of investment flows we utilize the vector of investment shares and over that we allocate the capital stock per unit of output coefficients.11 Finally, a more appropriate estimation of the value composition of capital requires the use of the concept of vertical integration. Thus, the vertically integrated value compositions of circulating and fixed capital will be respectively VIVCCC=d(A+bl)[I−A]−1xdbl[I−A]−1x and VIVCCF=dK[I−A]−1xdbl[I−A]−1x It goes without saying that in case we want to estimate the industry data, we eliminate the vector of real gross output x from both numerator and denominator of the above weighted by output average variables and then perform an element–by–element (dot) division of the remaining vectors. The international rate of profit is assumed to be equal to the average of the two countries’ profit rates while the prices of production (in the more relevant fixed capital case) for each country will be p=d(bl+A)+ρdK The international price of production will be approximated by the average of the two domestic prices of production. Hence, the prices of production are in accordance to Emmanuel’s (and Samuelson’s, 1975 and 1976) numerical examples which are literally Marx’s first–step prices of production of Capital III, and they are pretty close to the fully transformed prices of production, as Shaikh (1977) has shown. The rapidity with which the first–step prices attain the fully transformed prices of production depends inversely on the size of the difference between the first and the second eigenvalue of the system (see also Mariolis and Tsoulfidis, 2016, ch. 4, and the literature cited there). In our case, the difference between the dominant and subdominant eigenvalues is at maximum and so the difference between the above first–step price from the fully transformed price of production must be negligible. The unequal exchange could be estimated as the difference between the international price of production of an industry j=1,…34 estimated in terms of labour values and the country’s i=A, B domestic labour values.12 As a result, the deviation, δ, of price of production of industry j from the domestic labour value of the same industry from country i will be δi=pj*−di,j In order to estimate the magnitude of transfers and their net result for each trading country, we need to estimate the transfer, positive or negative, for each exported and imported commodity. Let us now focus on one country, whose total transfers in exports uez will be estimated from uez=(p*−d)×zdz where the numerator in the above fraction is an element–by–element (or dot) multiplication of the differences between the row vectors of international prices of production and domestic labour values times the respective column vector of exports, z; the denominator presents the value contained in the total exports. In similar fashion, the transfers of value through imports, uem, will be uem=(p*−d)×mdm where m stands for the column vector of imports.13 Furthermore, we can estimate the gain or loss in value as a share of the total economy’s gross output by dividing the numerators of the above fractions by the product of labour values times the gross output, dx. It is important to point out that unlike Emmanuel’s claim and the usual neoclassical assumption that the trading economies share the same technology, which in our case is described by the input–output matrix A and the employment coefficients , we actually estimate the technology matrix l and the employment coefficients A for each country using their respective actual input–output and employment data. As expected, both the technology (described by the matrix l and the vector A) and the real wage l turn out to be quite different in the two countries. 5. Estimation and discussion of the results Central to our analysis is the estimation of each country’s industry labour values over the period 1995–2011. Over this seventeen–year period, we can evaluate the nature of trade and the gains or losses for both countries. We also get a more precise idea of the kind of net transfers whether these describe what was characterised as unequal exchange, meaning that the LDC countries systematically transfer value to the more DC. For this purpose, the labour values estimated for the average of the 34 industries are displayed in Figure 1. It is important to point out that not all commodities are traded internationally, and from those, we collated data for only 16 industries. We compared the average values of the 16 with those of the 34 industries and we found only negligible differences in the averages, and so we decided to display the overall average in Figure 1 below for each of the 17 years of our study. The interested reader may find the labour values for each country, individual industry and year in the Appendix (Tables A3 and A4) of the article. Fig. 1. View largeDownload slide Labour values, 1995–2011, Greece and Germany Fig. 1. View largeDownload slide Labour values, 1995–2011, Greece and Germany In Figure 1, we observe that Germany’s average labour values are almost always much lower than those of the Greek economy, about one–half, and this difference persists over the years. It is interesting to note that in both economies the labour values display moderate fluctuations but overall display falling tendency reflecting technological change, which reduces the labour content and, therefore, the unit cost of commodities. This is a result that has been well documented in the input–output literature starting with the work of Carter (1970) and continuing to more recent studies (see for example Miller and Blair, 2009; Seretis and Tsaliki, 2016). The labour values are important in their own right especially because they are comprehensive indexes of the competitiveness of an economy; the lower the labour values, the higher the competitiveness of an economy. From Figure 1 and also the detailed results displayed in Tables A3 and A4, we conclude that the German economy is more efficient in the production of all traded goods. In other words, the German economy in its trade with the Greek economy possesses an absolute cost advantage as measured by the unit labour values; that is, the labour–years contained in the production of a million dollars’ worth of output measured in constant 1995 prices are displayed in Figure 1. The visual inspection of Figure 1 furthermore shows that the absolute cost advantage of Germany over Greece persists throughout the years of our analysis. Figure 2 below depicts the economy–wide rates of profit (or, more accurately, profit margins on costs) estimated on circulating capital of the two countries. A visual inspection of the graph shows that the two rates of profit are attracted to a more or less common long–run average. In order to test this hypothesis, we subtract from both rates of profit on circulating capital their common long–run average rate of profit and test whether or not they have a unit root. The idea is that if they have a unit root, it follows that the two variables drift further and further away from each other. The econometric analysis with panel data shows that the differences from the common average of the rates of profit on circulating capital of the two countries rejects the zero hypothesis of a unit root (see Table 1 below) and accepts the alternative. This is equivalent to saying that, with the passage of time, the two rates of profit are attracted towards their common average. In short, there is tendential equalization of profit rates according to the classical analysis of competition.14 The more detailed picture at 34 industry detail is presented in the Appendix and in Tables A5 and A6. Table 1. Unit root tests, panel data Unit Root Test Breitung–value Economy–wide Rate of Profit (Circulating Capital) < 0.001 Economy–wide Rate of Profit (Fixed Capital) < 0.001 Value Composition of (Circulating) Capital 0.242 Value Composition of (Fixed) Capital 0.841 Rate of Surplus–Value 0.491 Correlation coefficients Pearson Spearman Kendall’s Rate of Profit (Circulating Capital) 0.690 0.698 0.509 *** Rate of Profit (Fixed Capital) 0.188 0.578 0.267 *** Unit Root Test Breitung–value Economy–wide Rate of Profit (Circulating Capital) < 0.001 Economy–wide Rate of Profit (Fixed Capital) < 0.001 Value Composition of (Circulating) Capital 0.242 Value Composition of (Fixed) Capital 0.841 Rate of Surplus–Value 0.491 Correlation coefficients Pearson Spearman Kendall’s Rate of Profit (Circulating Capital) 0.690 0.698 0.509 *** Rate of Profit (Fixed Capital) 0.188 0.578 0.267 *** Note: ***statistically significant results for α = 1%. View Large Table 1. Unit root tests, panel data Unit Root Test Breitung–value Economy–wide Rate of Profit (Circulating Capital) < 0.001 Economy–wide Rate of Profit (Fixed Capital) < 0.001 Value Composition of (Circulating) Capital 0.242 Value Composition of (Fixed) Capital 0.841 Rate of Surplus–Value 0.491 Correlation coefficients Pearson Spearman Kendall’s Rate of Profit (Circulating Capital) 0.690 0.698 0.509 *** Rate of Profit (Fixed Capital) 0.188 0.578 0.267 *** Unit Root Test Breitung–value Economy–wide Rate of Profit (Circulating Capital) < 0.001 Economy–wide Rate of Profit (Fixed Capital) < 0.001 Value Composition of (Circulating) Capital 0.242 Value Composition of (Fixed) Capital 0.841 Rate of Surplus–Value 0.491 Correlation coefficients Pearson Spearman Kendall’s Rate of Profit (Circulating Capital) 0.690 0.698 0.509 *** Rate of Profit (Fixed Capital) 0.188 0.578 0.267 *** Note: ***statistically significant results for α = 1%. View Large Fig. 2. View largeDownload slide Average rates of profit (circulating capital), 1995–2011 Fig. 2. View largeDownload slide Average rates of profit (circulating capital), 1995–2011 The rate of profit on circulating capital is used only for theoretical reasons and in accordance to the usual presentation of the unequal exchange argument which is carried out in terms of a circulating capital model. We know though that in practice, the rate of profit on circulating capital is not the most representative index of profitability because firms estimate profits on their total invested capital and in this capital the most expensive item that shadows all the rest is the fixed capital stock. It goes without saying that entrepreneurs include in their total capital the stock of intermediate goods and money put aside for the payment of wages. However, the inclusion of these last two variables would require the use of their respective turnover times, and such data are not readily available. Furthermore, the stock of circulating capital and the money stock for payments of wages (the so–called wage fund) are really very small relative to fixed capital stock and therefore are not expected to affect our results in any significant way. Figure 3 below depicts the average rates of profit on fixed capital stock in the two countries. These profit rates tendentially equalize to an international average one, and on the basis of this average rate of profit we can estimate the international prices of production, i.e. the average of the national prices of production for tradable commodities. It is important to stress that the equalization of profit rates does not mean that there is a single rate of profit which once attained remains still throughout the whole of the investigated period.15 Once again, the economy–wide rates of profit on fixed capital stock in both countries do not display any statistically significant differences; they both tend to the same long–run average (the statistical results from panel data are displayed in Table 1). This holds true also for the individual industries which are displayed in the Appendix and, in particular, in Tables A7 and A8, and make up the whole of the two trading economies.16 Furthermore, the correlation coefficient (see Table 1) of the interindustry profit rates between the two countries in every year is positive, indicating continuity of their trends. Fig. 3. View largeDownload slide Average rate of profit (fixed capital stock), 1995–2011 Fig. 3. View largeDownload slide Average rate of profit (fixed capital stock), 1995–2011 As for the rate of surplus–value, one of the key variables in the unequal exchange debates, our results show that the rates of surplus value in the countries point in altogether different directions (see Figure 4 below).17 Not surprisingly, the statistical analysis displayed in Table 1 lends support to the hypothesis that the two variables are characterized by a unit root, a result somewhat supportive to Emmanuel’s unequal exchange in the strict sense’ of the term. In effect, Emmanuel’s unequal exchange is possible especially in specific goods (non–competitive imports) which may be produced in the LDC with a state–of–the–art technology and extremely low wages. These sectors no doubt produce a lot of surplus value which is transferred to the more DC through the establishment of international prices of production. Fig. 4. View largeDownload slide Rates of surplus–value, 1995–2011, Greece–Germany Fig. 4. View largeDownload slide Rates of surplus–value, 1995–2011, Greece–Germany In most years of our study, the rate of surplus value in Greece is higher than that of Germany (with the exception of the years 2006, 2007 and 2009). Given that the real wage in Germany is approximately twice as high as that of Greece (see Table A2), it follows that the wage gap between the two countries is more than fully compensated by the much higher German relative to Greek labour productivity. This may come as a surprise to those expecting that the lower real wages in a country would give rise to a higher rate of surplus value; implicit in such expectation is the assumption of uniform technology across countries established through commodity trade, which apparently is not true in the case of the two countries under study. This assumption is stipulated in both the neoclassical Heckscher–Ohlin international trade model and in Emmanuel’s radical unequal exchange explanation of underdevelopment. It is important to note that the estimated ‘rate of surplus–value’ in this study is more like the gross operating surplus–wage ratio and not the rate of surplus–value proper, whose estimation would require the distinction between productive and unproductive labour. However, most of the empirical studies have shown that the labour values are not affected by such distinction.18 Figure 5 depicts the value compositions of circulating capital for both countries. A visual inspection of the trajectories of the two variables reveals that they do not display any equalization tendency; to the contrary, they display differences which persist over the years.19 Fig. 5. View largeDownload slide Value compositions of circulating capital, VIVCCC (1995–2011) Fig. 5. View largeDownload slide Value compositions of circulating capital, VIVCCC (1995–2011) Turning now to the more relevant to our analysis value composition of fixed capital stock for both countries (see Figure 6), we observe quite different trajectories. The value composition of fixed capital of Germany is consistently higher than that of Greece not only with respect to the overall average of the two countries but also in an industry by industry comparison. This is an indication that the German economy invested more in fixed capital, and by doing so it reduced the unit national labour values and undercut the international prices, rendering possible the transfers of value giving rise to the unequal exchange in the broad sense. Fig. 6. View largeDownload slide Value composition of fixed capital (VIVCCf), 1995–2011 Fig. 6. View largeDownload slide Value composition of fixed capital (VIVCCf), 1995–2011 In Table 1, we display the variables under examination and we test whether or not the null hypothesis is statistically significant. For the two rates of profit, the null hypothesis is that they have a common unit root; the estimated critical value rules out the null hypothesis. The same is not true, though, with the rates of surplus–value; we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the two variables have a unit root. In examining the value compositions of capital of the two countries, we reject the null hypothesis of the two variables sharing the same average and so the value compositions of capital in the two countries drift further and further away from each other with the passage of time. As regards the correlation of the rate of profit between Germany and Greece in terms of circulating and fixed capital stock, we use Kendall’s tau coefficient, in order to establish whether the two variables present statistically significant dependence. The null hypothesis that the rates of profit in Greece and Germany move independently of each other must be ruled out since the probability value, p, is lower than the given significance level, as shown in Table 1. The estimated tau statistics for both (circulating and fixed capital stock) rates of profit take on the values 0.509 and 0.267, respectively, indicating statistical significance, albeit of low positive dependence in profit rates between the two countries. Furthermore, both Spearman’s and Pearson’s correlation coefficients in Table 1 show statistical significance but of moderate association between the two economy–wide rates of profits. Figure 7 displays the total gains of Germany and the total losses of Greece resulting from transfers of value in the trade between the two countries. The aggregate results are derived by the indexes uex and uem, for each year of our study, while the results for the individual industries over the period 1995–2011 are displayed in the Appendix (Table A15). We observe that over the 17 years of our analysis the order of magnitude of the transfers of value in the traded goods between the two countries is not too different and always is in favour of Germany. Thus, the transfer of values from Greece to Germany in 1995 was of the order of 53.86% of their total bilateral trade whilst in 2001 (the year of entrance of Greece to the EMU) the proportion of transfers in the total trade was 55.07%, and in 2011, the proportion of transfers to the total bilateral trade between the two countries reached the level of 75.61%. Fig. 7. View largeDownload slide Aggregate effect of unequal exchange as proportion of total bilateral trade, 1995–2011 Fig. 7. View largeDownload slide Aggregate effect of unequal exchange as proportion of total bilateral trade, 1995–2011 Figure 7 shows that the bilateral trade between Greece and Germany during the seventeen years of our analysis implies significant transfers of labour values. The German economy gains in transfers at the expense of the Greek economy. It is important to emphasize that these transfers of values are particularly important for Greece as a percentage in the value of the total output produced and relatively small for Germany given the size of its economy as measured by the value of total output produced (see Figure 8). Fig. 8. View largeDownload slide Aggregate effect of bilateral unequal exchange as a proportion of each country’s total gross output, 1995–2011 Fig. 8. View largeDownload slide Aggregate effect of bilateral unequal exchange as a proportion of each country’s total gross output, 1995–2011 The more detailed interindustry picture of transfers is displayed in the Appendix (Table A16), where we observe that the industries with the higher transfers of value are Textiles and Textile Products in the years 1995 to 2004, while in 2006 and 2008 the industry Agriculture, Hunting, Forestry and Fishing is the one with the highest transfer of value. From the years 2009 to 2011, the sector Chemicals and Chemical Products is the one with the top transfer of value, with a percentage loss of 0.0625 of the total gross output in 2010. It is important to note that the above Greek industries are those with the lowest, relative to the international mean, value composition of capital. In our effort to show in an analytical and, at the same time, practical way the extent and the significance of these transfers for the German and Greek economies, we take a typical year, such as for example the year 2003, on the basis of which we form Table 2, where we display the transfers of value for each of the 16 industries producing tradable commodities. Starting with Germany, whose labour values for each of the 16 tradable goods industries are displayed in column 1, while in column 2 are displayed the imported goods evaluated in thousand dollars; column 3 is the product of columns 1 and 2, which gives us the total labour content of imports. Summing columns 2 and 3 and dividing the total imports evaluated in thousand dollars by the total labour–years per million dollars, we derive the labour commanded, that is to say, the average cost of a labour year in Germany, which is estimated as 51.14 thousand dollars. By contrast, a labour year in Greece is worth only 26.19 thousand dollars. Alternatively, each dollar spent on imported commodities from Germany fetches 0.0196 German worker–years; for the same worker–year, a dollar spent from Germany on imports from Greece fetches only 0.0371 worker–years. Clearly, a German worker–year (or hour) is 1.893 times higher than the same Greek worker–year (or hour). Table 2. Results for Greece and Germany, 2003 Germany Greece 2003 Labour Values (worker years) (1) Imports (millions $) (2) Vm=d*m Worker– Hours Exported (3) = (1)*(2) Labour Values (worker– years) Exports (millions $) Vz=d*z Worker– Hours exported Agriculture, Hunting, Forestry and Fishing 0.024 81.623 1.951 0.046 139.5678 6.422 Mining and Quarrying 0.026 5.856 0.153 0.030 9.561 0.289 Food, Beverages and Tobacco 0.020 509.147 9.994 0.039 261.356 10.185 Textiles and Textile Products 0.019 208.77 4.017 0.036 464.598 16.624 Leather, Leather and Footwear 0.018 32.021 0.585 0.034 13.490 0.543 Wood and Products of Wood and Cork 0.021 38.679 0.815 0.039 1.051 0.041 Pulp, Paper, Paper, Printing and Publishing 0.018 305.149 5.341 0.033 10.036 0.334 Coke, Refined Petroleum and Nuclear Fuel 0.012 15.692 0.195 0.021 0.380 0.008 Chemicals and Chemical Products 0.018 823.614 14.701 0.032 149.147 4.814 Rubber and Plastics 0.019 182.472 3.417 0.028 20.690 0.576 Other Non– Metallic Mineral 0.021 61.614 1.284 0.027 7.525 0.204 Basic Metals and Fabricated Metal 0.020 263.931 5.300 0.038 124.898 4.724 Machinery, Nec 0.020 1605.141 31.887 0.039 41.775 1.645 Electrical and Optical Equipment 0.021 1003.431 21.283 0.031 19.568 0.605 Transport Equipment 0.019 1105.278 21.143 0.041 74.062 3.032 Manufacturing, Nec; Recycling 0.020 95.283 1.872 0.045 10.896 0.489 Total 6337.709 123.94 1348.599 50.451 Labour commanded in 1000$ 51.14 26.99 Germany Greece 2003 Labour Values (worker years) (1) Imports (millions $) (2) Vm=d*m Worker– Hours Exported (3) = (1)*(2) Labour Values (worker– years) Exports (millions $) Vz=d*z Worker– Hours exported Agriculture, Hunting, Forestry and Fishing 0.024 81.623 1.951 0.046 139.5678 6.422 Mining and Quarrying 0.026 5.856 0.153 0.030 9.561 0.289 Food, Beverages and Tobacco 0.020 509.147 9.994 0.039 261.356 10.185 Textiles and Textile Products 0.019 208.77 4.017 0.036 464.598 16.624 Leather, Leather and Footwear 0.018 32.021 0.585 0.034 13.490 0.543 Wood and Products of Wood and Cork 0.021 38.679 0.815 0.039 1.051 0.041 Pulp, Paper, Paper, Printing and Publishing 0.018 305.149 5.341 0.033 10.036 0.334 Coke, Refined Petroleum and Nuclear Fuel 0.012 15.692 0.195 0.021 0.380 0.008 Chemicals and Chemical Products 0.018 823.614 14.701 0.032 149.147 4.814 Rubber and Plastics 0.019 182.472 3.417 0.028 20.690 0.576 Other Non– Metallic Mineral 0.021 61.614 1.284 0.027 7.525 0.204 Basic Metals and Fabricated Metal 0.020 263.931 5.300 0.038 124.898 4.724 Machinery, Nec 0.020 1605.141 31.887 0.039 41.775 1.645 Electrical and Optical Equipment 0.021 1003.431 21.283 0.031 19.568 0.605 Transport Equipment 0.019 1105.278 21.143 0.041 74.062 3.032 Manufacturing, Nec; Recycling 0.020 95.283 1.872 0.045 10.896 0.489 Total 6337.709 123.94 1348.599 50.451 Labour commanded in 1000$ 51.14 26.99 View Large Table 2. Results for Greece and Germany, 2003 Germany Greece 2003 Labour Values (worker years) (1) Imports (millions $) (2) Vm=d*m Worker– Hours Exported (3) = (1)*(2) Labour Values (worker– years) Exports (millions $) Vz=d*z Worker– Hours exported Agriculture, Hunting, Forestry and Fishing 0.024 81.623 1.951 0.046 139.5678 6.422 Mining and Quarrying 0.026 5.856 0.153 0.030 9.561 0.289 Food, Beverages and Tobacco 0.020 509.147 9.994 0.039 261.356 10.185 Textiles and Textile Products 0.019 208.77 4.017 0.036 464.598 16.624 Leather, Leather and Footwear 0.018 32.021 0.585 0.034 13.490 0.543 Wood and Products of Wood and Cork 0.021 38.679 0.815 0.039 1.051 0.041 Pulp, Paper, Paper, Printing and Publishing 0.018 305.149 5.341 0.033 10.036 0.334 Coke, Refined Petroleum and Nuclear Fuel 0.012 15.692 0.195 0.021 0.380 0.008 Chemicals and Chemical Products 0.018 823.614 14.701 0.032 149.147 4.814 Rubber and Plastics 0.019 182.472 3.417 0.028 20.690 0.576 Other Non– Metallic Mineral 0.021 61.614 1.284 0.027 7.525 0.204 Basic Metals and Fabricated Metal 0.020 263.931 5.300 0.038 124.898 4.724 Machinery, Nec 0.020 1605.141 31.887 0.039 41.775 1.645 Electrical and Optical Equipment 0.021 1003.431 21.283 0.031 19.568 0.605 Transport Equipment 0.019 1105.278 21.143 0.041 74.062 3.032 Manufacturing, Nec; Recycling 0.020 95.283 1.872 0.045 10.896 0.489 Total 6337.709 123.94 1348.599 50.451 Labour commanded in 1000$ 51.14 26.99 Germany Greece 2003 Labour Values (worker years) (1) Imports (millions $) (2) Vm=d*m Worker– Hours Exported (3) = (1)*(2) Labour Values (worker– years) Exports (millions $) Vz=d*z Worker– Hours exported Agriculture, Hunting, Forestry and Fishing 0.024 81.623 1.951 0.046 139.5678 6.422 Mining and Quarrying 0.026 5.856 0.153 0.030 9.561 0.289 Food, Beverages and Tobacco 0.020 509.147 9.994 0.039 261.356 10.185 Textiles and Textile Products 0.019 208.77 4.017 0.036 464.598 16.624 Leather, Leather and Footwear 0.018 32.021 0.585 0.034 13.490 0.543 Wood and Products of Wood and Cork 0.021 38.679 0.815 0.039 1.051 0.041 Pulp, Paper, Paper, Printing and Publishing 0.018 305.149 5.341 0.033 10.036 0.334 Coke, Refined Petroleum and Nuclear Fuel 0.012 15.692 0.195 0.021 0.380 0.008 Chemicals and Chemical Products 0.018 823.614 14.701 0.032 149.147 4.814 Rubber and Plastics 0.019 182.472 3.417 0.028 20.690 0.576 Other Non– Metallic Mineral 0.021 61.614 1.284 0.027 7.525 0.204 Basic Metals and Fabricated Metal 0.020 263.931 5.300 0.038 124.898 4.724 Machinery, Nec 0.020 1605.141 31.887 0.039 41.775 1.645 Electrical and Optical Equipment 0.021 1003.431 21.283 0.031 19.568 0.605 Transport Equipment 0.019 1105.278 21.143 0.041 74.062 3.032 Manufacturing, Nec; Recycling 0.020 95.283 1.872 0.045 10.896 0.489 Total 6337.709 123.94 1348.599 50.451 Labour commanded in 1000$ 51.14 26.99 View Large The process was repeated for each of the seventeen years of our study, and the results are summarized in Table 3 below. Germany, with the same amount of money, i.e. one dollar, extracts nearly twice as many labour–years as Greece. The ratio of purchasing power of Germany to Greece is displayed in the last column of Table 3. In the last years of our analysis, the situation remains the same if not worse for Greece despite the implementation of austerity programmes. Table 3. Equivalence 1 dollar to worker–year Year Germany (dollar to worker–year equivalence) Greece (dollar to worker– year equivalence) Greece/Germany 1995 0.017 0.031 1.833 1996 0.023 0.045 1.974 1997 0.021 0.036 1.698 1998 0.021 0.037 1.810 1999 0.022 0.038 1.776 2000 0.025 0.046 1.828 2001 0.026 0.046 1.797 2002 0.024 0.044 1.845 2003 0.020 0.037 1.893 2004 0.017 0.033 1.903 2005 0.017 0.034 2.024 2006 0.016 0.031 1.963 2007 0.014 0.031 2.147 2008 0.014 0.028 1.895 2009 0.016 0.030 1.881 2010 0.015 0.031 1.955 2011 0.014 0.029 1.993 Year Germany (dollar to worker–year equivalence) Greece (dollar to worker– year equivalence) Greece/Germany 1995 0.017 0.031 1.833 1996 0.023 0.045 1.974 1997 0.021 0.036 1.698 1998 0.021 0.037 1.810 1999 0.022 0.038 1.776 2000 0.025 0.046 1.828 2001 0.026 0.046 1.797 2002 0.024 0.044 1.845 2003 0.020 0.037 1.893 2004 0.017 0.033 1.903 2005 0.017 0.034 2.024 2006 0.016 0.031 1.963 2007 0.014 0.031 2.147 2008 0.014 0.028 1.895 2009 0.016 0.030 1.881 2010 0.015 0.031 1.955 2011 0.014 0.029 1.993 View Large Table 3. Equivalence 1 dollar to worker–year Year Germany (dollar to worker–year equivalence) Greece (dollar to worker– year equivalence) Greece/Germany 1995 0.017 0.031 1.833 1996 0.023 0.045 1.974 1997 0.021 0.036 1.698 1998 0.021 0.037 1.810 1999 0.022 0.038 1.776 2000 0.025 0.046 1.828 2001 0.026 0.046 1.797 2002 0.024 0.044 1.845 2003 0.020 0.037 1.893 2004 0.017 0.033 1.903 2005 0.017 0.034 2.024 2006 0.016 0.031 1.963 2007 0.014 0.031 2.147 2008 0.014 0.028 1.895 2009 0.016 0.030 1.881 2010 0.015 0.031 1.955 2011 0.014 0.029 1.993 Year Germany (dollar to worker–year equivalence) Greece (dollar to worker– year equivalence) Greece/Germany 1995 0.017 0.031 1.833 1996 0.023 0.045 1.974 1997 0.021 0.036 1.698 1998 0.021 0.037 1.810 1999 0.022 0.038 1.776 2000 0.025 0.046 1.828 2001 0.026 0.046 1.797 2002 0.024 0.044 1.845 2003 0.020 0.037 1.893 2004 0.017 0.033 1.903 2005 0.017 0.034 2.024 2006 0.016 0.031 1.963 2007 0.014 0.031 2.147 2008 0.014 0.028 1.895 2009 0.016 0.030 1.881 2010 0.015 0.031 1.955 2011 0.014 0.029 1.993 View Large 6. Summary and conclusions In this paper, we showed that the classical analysis of value and distribution is applicable to international trade. More specifically, we used input–output and bilateral trade data of Greece and Germany, two countries at quite different levels of development. The results showed that the ‘unequal exchange’ in the strict sense does not necessarily hold true in the trade between Greece and Germany. Thus, although we found long–run turbulent equalization of profit rates, we did not find any such significant and persistent differences in the rates of surplus–value between the two countries, as the unequal exchange ‘in the strict sense’ would require. Furthermore, the results ruled out the assumption of uniform technology as both the unequal exchange argument and the neoclassical theory of international trade would require; in effect, the value composition of capital, measuring the capital intensity in the two countries, was much higher in Germany than in Greece. The higher value composition of fixed capital is what makes unit labour values in Germany in all tradable commodities lower than those of Greece over the period under examination. The lower wages in Greece do not necessarily give rise to higher rates of surplus–value because German productivity greatly exceeds the Greek productivity and more than compensates for the wage differentials. This difference in productivity results mainly from the higher capital intensity in Germany combined with a more ‘disciplined’ labour force and possibly from differences in the product mix. If Germany exports unique machines that can be sold for high prices, that would show up in the statistics as high productivity in Germany. Our analysis showed that once the LOP holds in the international exchange, German and Greek industries both expect to gain from trade; that is why they are trading partners, but the aggregate gains of Germany are much higher than those of Greece and they are the result of transfer of labour values. Trade in other words is asymmetric in the sense that one of the partners benefits more than the other. In particular, the transfer of values from Greece to Germany certainly is of a small magnitude given the large size of the German economy, but of great significance to the Greek economy given its relatively smaller size. The transfers of labour values from Greece to Germany in and of themselves do not necessarily mean or imply exploitative relations between the two countries and respective class alliances, but rather indicate the difference in the level of development in the two countries, a difference that increased rather than decreased over the years of our study. The transfers of labour values (to the extent that they are a general phenomenon and occur to a number of LDC in their trade with the more DC) dictate economic policies that have to do mainly with the direction of investment in the effort to equalize technologies and productivities across countries and less with the depression of wages in the LDC in such a way as to increase their competitiveness. Marx had anticipated these arguments a long time ago and had a very good grasp of the gains and losses resulting from international trade. The following quotation is particularly revealing of his deep understanding of what was underneath the surface of seemingly equal international exchanges: Loss and gain within a single country cancel each other out. But not so with trade between different countries [...] three days of labour of one country can be exchanged against one of another country [...]. Here the law of value undergoes essential modification [...]. The relationship between labour days of different countries may be similar to that existing between skilled, complex labour and unskilled simple labour within a country. In this case, the richer country exploits the poorer one, even where the latter gains by the exchange. (Marx, [1861–1863] 1972, pp. 105–6) The transfer of value is the mechanism through which acceleration or deceleration of capital accumulation takes place, aggravating trading countries’ inequalities in the value composition capital and thus in technology. These inequalities are responsible for the lower unit labour values and international prices, which further enhance transfers of value and so forth. Thus we come to a full cycle, a vicious cycle for the LDC and a virtuous cycle for the more DC feeding upon itself over time. However, past a point for the cycle to continue needs considerable borrowing from the part of the LDC which usually end up accumulating debt. Summing up, we may, therefore, say that on the surface, the prevalence of the LOP, the tendential equalization of the economy–wide rates of profit and possibly the rates of surplus–value give the impression of complete equality in exchange. However, underneath these seemingly equal relations there are significant and systematically arising inequalities consequent upon differences in the labour values of the tradable commodities which are fully consistent with differences in real wages and also unequal development. We thank John Sarich and Anwar Shaikh for their insightful comments in an earlier version of this paper presented at the Eastern Economic Association Conference (URPE sessions) in New York February 2017. We also thank the three referees of this journal for their helpful comments and suggestions. The usual disclaimer applies. Names are randomly ordered. Bibliography Breitung , J . 2001 . 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Industry levels nomenclature 1 Agriculture, Hunting, Forestry and Fishing 2 Mining and Quarrying 3 Food, Beverages and Tobacco 4 Textiles and Textile Products 5 Leather, Leather and Footwear 6 Wood and Products of Wood and Cork 7 Pulp, Paper, Paper, Printing and Publishing 8 Coke, Refined Petroleum and Nuclear Fuel 9 Chemicals and Chemical Products 10 Rubber and Plastics 11 Other Non–Metallic Mineral 12 Basic Metals and Fabricated Metal 13 Machinery, Nec 14 Electrical and Optical Equipment 15 Transport Equipment 16 Manufacturing, Nec; Recycling 17 Electricity, Gas and Water Supply 18 Construction 19 Sale, Maintenance and Repair of Motor Vehicles and Motorcycles; Retail Sale of Fuel 20 Wholesale Trade and Commission Trade, Except of Motor Vehicles and Motorcycles 21 Retail Trade, Except of Motor Vehicles and Motorcycles; Repair of Household Goods 22 Hotels and Restaurants 23 Inland Transport 24 Water Transport 25 Air Transport 26 Other Supporting and Auxiliary Transport Activities; Activities of Travel Agencies 27 Post and Telecommunications 28 Financial Intermediation 29 Real Estate Activities 30 Renting of M&Eq and Other Business Activities 31 Public Admin and Defence; Compulsory Social Security 32 Education 33 Health and Social Work 34 Other Community, Social and Personal Services 1 Agriculture, Hunting, Forestry and Fishing 2 Mining and Quarrying 3 Food, Beverages and Tobacco 4 Textiles and Textile Products 5 Leather, Leather and Footwear 6 Wood and Products of Wood and Cork 7 Pulp, Paper, Paper, Printing and Publishing 8 Coke, Refined Petroleum and Nuclear Fuel 9 Chemicals and Chemical Products 10 Rubber and Plastics 11 Other Non–Metallic Mineral 12 Basic Metals and Fabricated Metal 13 Machinery, Nec 14 Electrical and Optical Equipment 15 Transport Equipment 16 Manufacturing, Nec; Recycling 17 Electricity, Gas and Water Supply 18 Construction 19 Sale, Maintenance and Repair of Motor Vehicles and Motorcycles; Retail Sale of Fuel 20 Wholesale Trade and Commission Trade, Except of Motor Vehicles and Motorcycles 21 Retail Trade, Except of Motor Vehicles and Motorcycles; Repair of Household Goods 22 Hotels and Restaurants 23 Inland Transport 24 Water Transport 25 Air Transport 26 Other Supporting and Auxiliary Transport Activities; Activities of Travel Agencies 27 Post and Telecommunications 28 Financial Intermediation 29 Real Estate Activities 30 Renting of M&Eq and Other Business Activities 31 Public Admin and Defence; Compulsory Social Security 32 Education 33 Health and Social Work 34 Other Community, Social and Personal Services View Large Table A1. Industry levels nomenclature 1 Agriculture, Hunting, Forestry and Fishing 2 Mining and Quarrying 3 Food, Beverages and Tobacco 4 Textiles and Textile Products 5 Leather, Leather and Footwear 6 Wood and Products of Wood and Cork 7 Pulp, Paper, Paper, Printing and Publishing 8 Coke, Refined Petroleum and Nuclear Fuel 9 Chemicals and Chemical Products 10 Rubber and Plastics 11 Other Non–Metallic Mineral 12 Basic Metals and Fabricated Metal 13 Machinery, Nec 14 Electrical and Optical Equipment 15 Transport Equipment 16 Manufacturing, Nec; Recycling 17 Electricity, Gas and Water Supply 18 Construction 19 Sale, Maintenance and Repair of Motor Vehicles and Motorcycles; Retail Sale of Fuel 20 Wholesale Trade and Commission Trade, Except of Motor Vehicles and Motorcycles 21 Retail Trade, Except of Motor Vehicles and Motorcycles; Repair of Household Goods 22 Hotels and Restaurants 23 Inland Transport 24 Water Transport 25 Air Transport 26 Other Supporting and Auxiliary Transport Activities; Activities of Travel Agencies 27 Post and Telecommunications 28 Financial Intermediation 29 Real Estate Activities 30 Renting of M&Eq and Other Business Activities 31 Public Admin and Defence; Compulsory Social Security 32 Education 33 Health and Social Work 34 Other Community, Social and Personal Services 1 Agriculture, Hunting, Forestry and Fishing 2 Mining and Quarrying 3 Food, Beverages and Tobacco 4 Textiles and Textile Products 5 Leather, Leather and Footwear 6 Wood and Products of Wood and Cork 7 Pulp, Paper, Paper, Printing and Publishing 8 Coke, Refined Petroleum and Nuclear Fuel 9 Chemicals and Chemical Products 10 Rubber and Plastics 11 Other Non–Metallic Mineral 12 Basic Metals and Fabricated Metal 13 Machinery, Nec 14 Electrical and Optical Equipment 15 Transport Equipment 16 Manufacturing, Nec; Recycling 17 Electricity, Gas and Water Supply 18 Construction 19 Sale, Maintenance and Repair of Motor Vehicles and Motorcycles; Retail Sale of Fuel 20 Wholesale Trade and Commission Trade, Except of Motor Vehicles and Motorcycles 21 Retail Trade, Except of Motor Vehicles and Motorcycles; Repair of Household Goods 22 Hotels and Restaurants 23 Inland Transport 24 Water Transport 25 Air Transport 26 Other Supporting and Auxiliary Transport Activities; Activities of Travel Agencies 27 Post and Telecommunications 28 Financial Intermediation 29 Real Estate Activities 30 Renting of M&Eq and Other Business Activities 31 Public Admin and Defence; Compulsory Social Security 32 Education 33 Health and Social Work 34 Other Community, Social and Personal Services View Large Table A2. Average real wage of tradables in Germany and Greece Germany 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 1 25.42 18.97 21.34 21.06 21.86 18.55 25.74 27.53 19.75 25.20 26.43 25.94 38.95 23.59 30.76 45.40 33.07 2 57.57 49.31 59.46 55.47 52.18 46.83 48.31 54.56 58.16 74.00 70.42 65.04 71.07 71.11 75.27 58.50 46.13 3 34.04 25.07 27.85 27.56 27.67 23.77 23.89 25.35 26.53 31.96 31.86 30.87 31.60 33.18 28.05 27.09 20.43 4 33.17 25.57 29.65 29.78 29.00 25.82 25.47 27.25 29.46 37.24 38.48 36.37 44.01 44.74 40.89 37.31 27.58 5 32.99 24.34 27.78 28.01 26.48 23.23 22.35 22.44 24.54 30.15 32.63 35.31 35.82 38.73 35.27 41.68 31.44 6 40.24 30.41 34.36 33.20 33.26 28.49 32.72 34.61 32.03 40.07 39.11 35.59 39.62 39.23 35.34 37.51 27.61 7 38.60 28.88 33.72 33.22 30.75 26.25 24.17 25.97 28.63 36.47 36.12 24.94 40.41 43.25 35.40 56.38 43.21 8 71.59 59.75 69.00 73.50 68.24 45.52 28.26 42.28 54.98 67.07 60.90 94.22 31.28 48.79 55.42 53.20 40.13 9 66.89 50.03 56.19 58.79 57.64 51.24 49.02 52.21 56.94 71.33 71.39 73.00 71.44 83.50 76.56 75.63 56.16 10 44.20 33.40 38.45 38.60 37.42 32.61 32.24 34.13 36.09 45.71 44.55 46.06 46.99 52.35 46.92 32.39 23.73 11 46.53 35.28 40.72 40.96 39.81 35.23 37.19 39.44 40.27 48.95 50.87 47.81 52.33 53.64 46.47 46.79 34.83 12 47.83 36.07 40.91 40.40 40.08 34.11 35.09 36.65 37.41 43.80 42.01 46.76 34.19 43.88 46.71 57.75 41.88 13 53.50 39.81 45.04 45.53 43.99 39.07 36.85 38.57 43.53 55.60 53.92 54.75 53.21 65.11 64.01 70.41 51.65 14 53.71 40.33 46.20 46.59 46.92 43.04 43.45 50.34 52.09 68.00 70.63 79.55 112.05 100.52 95.77 124.58 91.08 15 61.57 46.07 53.17 53.07 51.73 46.51 44.69 46.91 53.41 68.11 67.41 76.10 71.98 85.25 88.26 79.20 58.63 16 39.76 28.95 32.98 32.73 31.54 27.32 26.01 26.71 28.88 37.20 37.16 51.96 39.78 46.87 37.95 15.42 11.42 Average Real Wage 40.27 29.82 33.63 33.46 32.42 28.39 27.64 29.40 35.47 38.76 38.19 38.56 42.02 45.39 46.26 42.00 45.94 Greece 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 1 6.87 4.90 5.81 5.35 6.17 8.21 5.99 7.35 10.30 7.97 13.36 13.93 17.41 19.52 19.89 21.25 13.71 2 25.43 16.12 21.84 21.99 21.00 13.22 16.28 22.27 24.38 20.60 29.13 25.88 31.55 31.01 35.46 20.39 35.15 3 17.71 12.25 16.70 15.87 15.43 14.48 13.11 14.21 17.65 16.67 21.73 16.83 26.23 29.73 26.08 22.81 29.47 4 14.59 10.63 14.30 13.40 11.33 10.30 7.62 10.88 12.96 10.08 13.50 8.37 16.70 18.96 21.61 15.75 18.95 5 15.25 10.64 14.84 13.88 11.68 8.52 9.85 11.82 14.84 12.62 21.72 18.74 22.48 14.97 17.74 14.95 35.29 6 14.46 9.99 13.46 12.32 11.63 10.86 9.01 7.55 9.99 11.84 12.35 11.68 13.13 12.18 11.07 8.58 9.66 7 18.33 12.41 16.69 14.62 14.07 12.68 11.70 13.15 16.82 15.39 19.71 10.82 22.02 25.38 21.18 26.30 36.54 8 49.03 30.96 37.93 37.80 23.43 6.53 5.67 18.32 25.87 7.23 20.78 55.55 26.63 27.22 49.89 11.41 27.91 9 24.81 17.58 23.10 20.79 20.12 16.79 15.74 17.95 23.32 21.30 24.31 15.90 27.39 32.52 37.55 12.64 18.06 10 17.32 12.67 16.01 14.67 13.40 9.22 10.06 11.12 14.40 13.33 13.79 12.35 20.31 20.13 25.27 27.55 24.69 11 20.77 14.60 18.80 17.58 17.18 11.53 12.45 14.95 18.62 16.24 20.20 23.55 22.82 21.19 20.32 11.48 29.31 12 18.94 13.55 17.72 15.74 15.75 13.72 12.44 14.50 19.63 16.60 23.55 21.24 25.02 29.13 34.61 19.66 26.48 13 16.72 12.02 16.19 14.36 15.17 13.49 12.60 15.51 19.26 17.05 19.94 22.72 23.11 36.79 38.77 45.59 62.60 14 19.86 13.36 18.81 17.69 18.36 13.42 15.19 15.23 17.60 19.06 21.10 20.06 19.26 21.55 18.53 9.97 20.47 15 25.46 19.77 25.77 23.00 19.89 17.55 14.45 21.42 23.23 19.01 25.99 20.23 28.89 40.43 33.16 49.15 73.55 16 12.41 8.86 11.35 10.40 10.56 10.66 9.05 8.37 11.82 11.71 12.77 11.44 13.89 18.51 13.73 22.58 25.45 Average Real Wage 17.46 12.03 16.22 15.18 15.14 12.92 12.48 14.34 17.61 19.60 19.91 20.23 22.69 25.10 26.38 23.22 24.82 Ratio 2.31 2.48 2.07 2.20 2.14 2.20 2.22 2.05 2.01 1.98 1.92 1.91 1.85 1.81 1.75 1.81 1.85 Germany 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 1 25.42 18.97 21.34 21.06 21.86 18.55 25.74 27.53 19.75 25.20 26.43 25.94 38.95 23.59 30.76 45.40 33.07 2 57.57 49.31 59.46 55.47 52.18 46.83 48.31 54.56 58.16 74.00 70.42 65.04 71.07 71.11 75.27 58.50 46.13 3 34.04 25.07 27.85 27.56 27.67 23.77 23.89 25.35 26.53 31.96 31.86 30.87 31.60 33.18 28.05 27.09 20.43 4 33.17 25.57 29.65 29.78 29.00 25.82 25.47 27.25 29.46 37.24 38.48 36.37 44.01 44.74 40.89 37.31 27.58 5 32.99 24.34 27.78 28.01 26.48 23.23 22.35 22.44 24.54 30.15 32.63 35.31 35.82 38.73 35.27 41.68 31.44 6 40.24 30.41 34.36 33.20 33.26 28.49 32.72 34.61 32.03 40.07 39.11 35.59 39.62 39.23 35.34 37.51 27.61 7 38.60 28.88 33.72 33.22 30.75 26.25 24.17 25.97 28.63 36.47 36.12 24.94 40.41 43.25 35.40 56.38 43.21 8 71.59 59.75 69.00 73.50 68.24 45.52 28.26 42.28 54.98 67.07 60.90 94.22 31.28 48.79 55.42 53.20 40.13 9 66.89 50.03 56.19 58.79 57.64 51.24 49.02 52.21 56.94 71.33 71.39 73.00 71.44 83.50 76.56 75.63 56.16 10 44.20 33.40 38.45 38.60 37.42 32.61 32.24 34.13 36.09 45.71 44.55 46.06 46.99 52.35 46.92 32.39 23.73 11 46.53 35.28 40.72 40.96 39.81 35.23 37.19 39.44 40.27 48.95 50.87 47.81 52.33 53.64 46.47 46.79 34.83 12 47.83 36.07 40.91 40.40 40.08 34.11 35.09 36.65 37.41 43.80 42.01 46.76 34.19 43.88 46.71 57.75 41.88 13 53.50 39.81 45.04 45.53 43.99 39.07 36.85 38.57 43.53 55.60 53.92 54.75 53.21 65.11 64.01 70.41 51.65 14 53.71 40.33 46.20 46.59 46.92 43.04 43.45 50.34 52.09 68.00 70.63 79.55 112.05 100.52 95.77 124.58 91.08 15 61.57 46.07 53.17 53.07 51.73 46.51 44.69 46.91 53.41 68.11 67.41 76.10 71.98 85.25 88.26 79.20 58.63 16 39.76 28.95 32.98 32.73 31.54 27.32 26.01 26.71 28.88 37.20 37.16 51.96 39.78 46.87 37.95 15.42 11.42 Average Real Wage 40.27 29.82 33.63 33.46 32.42 28.39 27.64 29.40 35.47 38.76 38.19 38.56 42.02 45.39 46.26 42.00 45.94 Greece 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 1 6.87 4.90 5.81 5.35 6.17 8.21 5.99 7.35 10.30 7.97 13.36 13.93 17.41 19.52 19.89 21.25 13.71 2 25.43 16.12 21.84 21.99 21.00 13.22 16.28 22.27 24.38 20.60 29.13 25.88 31.55 31.01 35.46 20.39 35.15 3 17.71 12.25 16.70 15.87 15.43 14.48 13.11 14.21 17.65 16.67 21.73 16.83 26.23 29.73 26.08 22.81 29.47 4 14.59 10.63 14.30 13.40 11.33 10.30 7.62 10.88 12.96 10.08 13.50 8.37 16.70 18.96 21.61 15.75 18.95 5 15.25 10.64 14.84 13.88 11.68 8.52 9.85 11.82 14.84 12.62 21.72 18.74 22.48 14.97 17.74 14.95 35.29 6 14.46 9.99 13.46 12.32 11.63 10.86 9.01 7.55 9.99 11.84 12.35 11.68 13.13 12.18 11.07 8.58 9.66 7 18.33 12.41 16.69 14.62 14.07 12.68 11.70 13.15 16.82 15.39 19.71 10.82 22.02 25.38 21.18 26.30 36.54 8 49.03 30.96 37.93 37.80 23.43 6.53 5.67 18.32 25.87 7.23 20.78 55.55 26.63 27.22 49.89 11.41 27.91 9 24.81 17.58 23.10 20.79 20.12 16.79 15.74 17.95 23.32 21.30 24.31 15.90 27.39 32.52 37.55 12.64 18.06 10 17.32 12.67 16.01 14.67 13.40 9.22 10.06 11.12 14.40 13.33 13.79 12.35 20.31 20.13 25.27 27.55 24.69 11 20.77 14.60 18.80 17.58 17.18 11.53 12.45 14.95 18.62 16.24 20.20 23.55 22.82 21.19 20.32 11.48 29.31 12 18.94 13.55 17.72 15.74 15.75 13.72 12.44 14.50 19.63 16.60 23.55 21.24 25.02 29.13 34.61 19.66 26.48 13 16.72 12.02 16.19 14.36 15.17 13.49 12.60 15.51 19.26 17.05 19.94 22.72 23.11 36.79 38.77 45.59 62.60 14 19.86 13.36 18.81 17.69 18.36 13.42 15.19 15.23 17.60 19.06 21.10 20.06 19.26 21.55 18.53 9.97 20.47 15 25.46 19.77 25.77 23.00 19.89 17.55 14.45 21.42 23.23 19.01 25.99 20.23 28.89 40.43 33.16 49.15 73.55 16 12.41 8.86 11.35 10.40 10.56 10.66 9.05 8.37 11.82 11.71 12.77 11.44 13.89 18.51 13.73 22.58 25.45 Average Real Wage 17.46 12.03 16.22 15.18 15.14 12.92 12.48 14.34 17.61 19.60 19.91 20.23 22.69 25.10 26.38 23.22 24.82 Ratio 2.31 2.48 2.07 2.20 2.14 2.20 2.22 2.05 2.01 1.98 1.92 1.91 1.85 1.81 1.75 1.81 1.85 Source: Timmer et al. (2015). View Large Table A2. Average real wage of tradables in Germany and Greece Germany 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 1 25.42 18.97 21.34 21.06 21.86 18.55 25.74 27.53 19.75 25.20 26.43 25.94 38.95 23.59 30.76 45.40 33.07 2 57.57 49.31 59.46 55.47 52.18 46.83 48.31 54.56 58.16 74.00 70.42 65.04 71.07 71.11 75.27 58.50 46.13 3 34.04 25.07 27.85 27.56 27.67 23.77 23.89 25.35 26.53 31.96 31.86 30.87 31.60 33.18 28.05 27.09 20.43 4 33.17 25.57 29.65 29.78 29.00 25.82 25.47 27.25 29.46 37.24 38.48 36.37 44.01 44.74 40.89 37.31 27.58 5 32.99 24.34 27.78 28.01 26.48 23.23 22.35 22.44 24.54 30.15 32.63 35.31 35.82 38.73 35.27 41.68 31.44 6 40.24 30.41 34.36 33.20 33.26 28.49 32.72 34.61 32.03 40.07 39.11 35.59 39.62 39.23 35.34 37.51 27.61 7 38.60 28.88 33.72 33.22 30.75 26.25 24.17 25.97 28.63 36.47 36.12 24.94 40.41 43.25 35.40 56.38 43.21 8 71.59 59.75 69.00 73.50 68.24 45.52 28.26 42.28 54.98 67.07 60.90 94.22 31.28 48.79 55.42 53.20 40.13 9 66.89 50.03 56.19 58.79 57.64 51.24 49.02 52.21 56.94 71.33 71.39 73.00 71.44 83.50 76.56 75.63 56.16 10 44.20 33.40 38.45 38.60 37.42 32.61 32.24 34.13 36.09 45.71 44.55 46.06 46.99 52.35 46.92 32.39 23.73 11 46.53 35.28 40.72 40.96 39.81 35.23 37.19 39.44 40.27 48.95 50.87 47.81 52.33 53.64 46.47 46.79 34.83 12 47.83 36.07 40.91 40.40 40.08 34.11 35.09 36.65 37.41 43.80 42.01 46.76 34.19 43.88 46.71 57.75 41.88 13 53.50 39.81 45.04 45.53 43.99 39.07 36.85 38.57 43.53 55.60 53.92 54.75 53.21 65.11 64.01 70.41 51.65 14 53.71 40.33 46.20 46.59 46.92 43.04 43.45 50.34 52.09 68.00 70.63 79.55 112.05 100.52 95.77 124.58 91.08 15 61.57 46.07 53.17 53.07 51.73 46.51 44.69 46.91 53.41 68.11 67.41 76.10 71.98 85.25 88.26 79.20 58.63 16 39.76 28.95 32.98 32.73 31.54 27.32 26.01 26.71 28.88 37.20 37.16 51.96 39.78 46.87 37.95 15.42 11.42 Average Real Wage 40.27 29.82 33.63 33.46 32.42 28.39 27.64 29.40 35.47 38.76 38.19 38.56 42.02 45.39 46.26 42.00 45.94 Greece 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 1 6.87 4.90 5.81 5.35 6.17 8.21 5.99 7.35 10.30 7.97 13.36 13.93 17.41 19.52 19.89 21.25 13.71 2 25.43 16.12 21.84 21.99 21.00 13.22 16.28 22.27 24.38 20.60 29.13 25.88 31.55 31.01 35.46 20.39 35.15 3 17.71 12.25 16.70 15.87 15.43 14.48 13.11 14.21 17.65 16.67 21.73 16.83 26.23 29.73 26.08 22.81 29.47 4 14.59 10.63 14.30 13.40 11.33 10.30 7.62 10.88 12.96 10.08 13.50 8.37 16.70 18.96 21.61 15.75 18.95 5 15.25 10.64 14.84 13.88 11.68 8.52 9.85 11.82 14.84 12.62 21.72 18.74 22.48 14.97 17.74 14.95 35.29 6 14.46 9.99 13.46 12.32 11.63 10.86 9.01 7.55 9.99 11.84 12.35 11.68 13.13 12.18 11.07 8.58 9.66 7 18.33 12.41 16.69 14.62 14.07 12.68 11.70 13.15 16.82 15.39 19.71 10.82 22.02 25.38 21.18 26.30 36.54 8 49.03 30.96 37.93 37.80 23.43 6.53 5.67 18.32 25.87 7.23 20.78 55.55 26.63 27.22 49.89 11.41 27.91 9 24.81 17.58 23.10 20.79 20.12 16.79 15.74 17.95 23.32 21.30 24.31 15.90 27.39 32.52 37.55 12.64 18.06 10 17.32 12.67 16.01 14.67 13.40 9.22 10.06 11.12 14.40 13.33 13.79 12.35 20.31 20.13 25.27 27.55 24.69 11 20.77 14.60 18.80 17.58 17.18 11.53 12.45 14.95 18.62 16.24 20.20 23.55 22.82 21.19 20.32 11.48 29.31 12 18.94 13.55 17.72 15.74 15.75 13.72 12.44 14.50 19.63 16.60 23.55 21.24 25.02 29.13 34.61 19.66 26.48 13 16.72 12.02 16.19 14.36 15.17 13.49 12.60 15.51 19.26 17.05 19.94 22.72 23.11 36.79 38.77 45.59 62.60 14 19.86 13.36 18.81 17.69 18.36 13.42 15.19 15.23 17.60 19.06 21.10 20.06 19.26 21.55 18.53 9.97 20.47 15 25.46 19.77 25.77 23.00 19.89 17.55 14.45 21.42 23.23 19.01 25.99 20.23 28.89 40.43 33.16 49.15 73.55 16 12.41 8.86 11.35 10.40 10.56 10.66 9.05 8.37 11.82 11.71 12.77 11.44 13.89 18.51 13.73 22.58 25.45 Average Real Wage 17.46 12.03 16.22 15.18 15.14 12.92 12.48 14.34 17.61 19.60 19.91 20.23 22.69 25.10 26.38 23.22 24.82 Ratio 2.31 2.48 2.07 2.20 2.14 2.20 2.22 2.05 2.01 1.98 1.92 1.91 1.85 1.81 1.75 1.81 1.85 Germany 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 1 25.42 18.97 21.34 21.06 21.86 18.55 25.74 27.53 19.75 25.20 26.43 25.94 38.95 23.59 30.76 45.40 33.07 2 57.57 49.31 59.46 55.47 52.18 46.83 48.31 54.56 58.16 74.00 70.42 65.04 71.07 71.11 75.27 58.50 46.13 3 34.04 25.07 27.85 27.56 27.67 23.77 23.89 25.35 26.53 31.96 31.86 30.87 31.60 33.18 28.05 27.09 20.43 4 33.17 25.57 29.65 29.78 29.00 25.82 25.47 27.25 29.46 37.24 38.48 36.37 44.01 44.74 40.89 37.31 27.58 5 32.99 24.34 27.78 28.01 26.48 23.23 22.35 22.44 24.54 30.15 32.63 35.31 35.82 38.73 35.27 41.68 31.44 6 40.24 30.41 34.36 33.20 33.26 28.49 32.72 34.61 32.03 40.07 39.11 35.59 39.62 39.23 35.34 37.51 27.61 7 38.60 28.88 33.72 33.22 30.75 26.25 24.17 25.97 28.63 36.47 36.12 24.94 40.41 43.25 35.40 56.38 43.21 8 71.59 59.75 69.00 73.50 68.24 45.52 28.26 42.28 54.98 67.07 60.90 94.22 31.28 48.79 55.42 53.20 40.13 9 66.89 50.03 56.19 58.79 57.64 51.24 49.02 52.21 56.94 71.33 71.39 73.00 71.44 83.50 76.56 75.63 56.16 10 44.20 33.40 38.45 38.60 37.42 32.61 32.24 34.13 36.09 45.71 44.55 46.06 46.99 52.35 46.92 32.39 23.73 11 46.53 35.28 40.72 40.96 39.81 35.23 37.19 39.44 40.27 48.95 50.87 47.81 52.33 53.64 46.47 46.79 34.83 12 47.83 36.07 40.91 40.40 40.08 34.11 35.09 36.65 37.41 43.80 42.01 46.76 34.19 43.88 46.71 57.75 41.88 13 53.50 39.81 45.04 45.53 43.99 39.07 36.85 38.57 43.53 55.60 53.92 54.75 53.21 65.11 64.01 70.41 51.65 14 53.71 40.33 46.20 46.59 46.92 43.04 43.45 50.34 52.09 68.00 70.63 79.55 112.05 100.52 95.77 124.58 91.08 15 61.57 46.07 53.17 53.07 51.73 46.51 44.69 46.91 53.41 68.11 67.41 76.10 71.98 85.25 88.26 79.20 58.63 16 39.76 28.95 32.98 32.73 31.54 27.32 26.01 26.71 28.88 37.20 37.16 51.96 39.78 46.87 37.95 15.42 11.42 Average Real Wage 40.27 29.82 33.63 33.46 32.42 28.39 27.64 29.40 35.47 38.76 38.19 38.56 42.02 45.39 46.26 42.00 45.94 Greece 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 1 6.87 4.90 5.81 5.35 6.17 8.21 5.99 7.35 10.30 7.97 13.36 13.93 17.41 19.52 19.89 21.25 13.71 2 25.43 16.12 21.84 21.99 21.00 13.22 16.28 22.27 24.38 20.60 29.13 25.88 31.55 31.01 35.46 20.39 35.15 3 17.71 12.25 16.70 15.87 15.43 14.48 13.11 14.21 17.65 16.67 21.73 16.83 26.23 29.73 26.08 22.81 29.47 4 14.59 10.63 14.30 13.40 11.33 10.30 7.62 10.88 12.96 10.08 13.50 8.37 16.70 18.96 21.61 15.75 18.95 5 15.25 10.64 14.84 13.88 11.68 8.52 9.85 11.82 14.84 12.62 21.72 18.74 22.48 14.97 17.74 14.95 35.29 6 14.46 9.99 13.46 12.32 11.63 10.86 9.01 7.55 9.99 11.84 12.35 11.68 13.13 12.18 11.07 8.58 9.66 7 18.33 12.41 16.69 14.62 14.07 12.68 11.70 13.15 16.82 15.39 19.71 10.82 22.02 25.38 21.18 26.30 36.54 8 49.03 30.96 37.93 37.80 23.43 6.53 5.67 18.32 25.87 7.23 20.78 55.55 26.63 27.22 49.89 11.41 27.91 9 24.81 17.58 23.10 20.79 20.12 16.79 15.74 17.95 23.32 21.30 24.31 15.90 27.39 32.52 37.55 12.64 18.06 10 17.32 12.67 16.01 14.67 13.40 9.22 10.06 11.12 14.40 13.33 13.79 12.35 20.31 20.13 25.27 27.55 24.69 11 20.77 14.60 18.80 17.58 17.18 11.53 12.45 14.95 18.62 16.24 20.20 23.55 22.82 21.19 20.32 11.48 29.31 12 18.94 13.55 17.72 15.74 15.75 13.72 12.44 14.50 19.63 16.60 23.55 21.24 25.02 29.13 34.61 19.66 26.48 13 16.72 12.02 16.19 14.36 15.17 13.49 12.60 15.51 19.26 17.05 19.94 22.72 23.11 36.79 38.77 45.59 62.60 14 19.86 13.36 18.81 17.69 18.36 13.42 15.19 15.23 17.60 19.06 21.10 20.06 19.26 21.55 18.53 9.97 20.47 15 25.46 19.77 25.77 23.00 19.89 17.55 14.45 21.42 23.23 19.01 25.99 20.23 28.89 40.43 33.16 49.15 73.55 16 12.41 8.86 11.35 10.40 10.56 10.66 9.05 8.37 11.82 11.71 12.77 11.44 13.89 18.51 13.73 22.58 25.45 Average Real Wage 17.46 12.03 16.22 15.18 15.14 12.92 12.48 14.34 17.61 19.60 19.91 20.23 22.69 25.10 26.38 23.22 24.82 Ratio 2.31 2.48 2.07 2.20 2.14 2.20 2.22 2.05 2.01 1.98 1.92 1.91 1.85 1.81 1.75 1.81 1.85 Source: Timmer et al. (2015). View Large Table A3. Labour values, Germany Germany 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 1 0.021 0.027 0.024 0.025 0.026 0.029 0.027 0.027 0.024 0.020 0.023 0.021 0.017 0.016 0.020 0.019 0.02 2 0.017 0.030 0.030 0.029 0.030 0.032 0.033 0.030 0.026 0.023 0.022 0.018 0.017 0.014 0.017 0.019 0.016 3 0.017 0.023 0.021 0.021 0.022 0.025 0.025 0.023 0.020 0.017 0.017 0.016 0.014 0.013 0.014 0.017 0.013 4 0.017 0.023 0.021 0.021 0.021 0.025 0.025 0.023 0.019 0.017 0.017 0.016 0.014 0.014 0.015 0.014 0.014 5 0.017 0.023 0.021 0.021 0.021 0.025 0.024 0.021 0.018 0.016 0.016 0.016 0.014 0.014 0.015 0.015 0.013 6 0.019 0.026 0.023 0.022 0.023 0.026 0.027 0.026 0.021 0.019 0.018 0.016 0.014 0.014 0.015 0.015 0.014 7 0.016 0.022 0.020 0.020 0.019 0.021 0.022 0.021 0.018 0.016 0.015 0.012 0.013 0.012 0.013 0.014 0.013 8 0.014 0.018 0.018 0.016 0.019 0.015 0.015 0.016 0.012 0.011 0.010 0.014 0.008 0.007 0.008 0.014 0.008 9 0.016 0.021 0.019 0.019 0.021 0.023 0.023 0.021 0.018 0.016 0.015 0.014 0.012 0.012 0.013 0.010 0.012 10 0.016 0.022 0.020 0.020 0.021 0.024 0.025 0.023 0.019 0.017 0.016 0.015 0.014 0.014 0.015 0.015 0.014 11 0.016 0.022 0.021 0.021 0.022 0.026 0.027 0.025 0.021 0.018 0.018 0.016 0.014 0.014 0.015 0.016 0.014 12 0.018 0.025 0.023 0.022 0.023 0.026 0.027 0.025 0.020 0.017 0.016 0.015 0.013 0.012 0.015 0.016 0.014 13 0.018 0.024 0.022 0.021 0.022 0.025 0.026 0.024 0.020 0.018 0.017 0.016 0.014 0.014 0.016 0.015 0.014 14 0.018 0.024 0.022 0.022 0.022 0.025 0.028 0.026 0.021 0.019 0.019 0.018 0.017 0.018 0.020 0.015 0.018 15 0.017 0.024 0.021 0.021 0.022 0.026 0.026 0.024 0.019 0.017 0.017 0.016 0.014 0.014 0.016 0.019 0.014 16 0.019 0.025 0.023 0.022 0.023 0.026 0.026 0.024 0.020 0.018 0.017 0.019 0.015 0.014 0.014 0.016 0.013 17 0.013 0.017 0.016 0.016 0.018 0.022 0.023 0.020 0.016 0.013 0.012 0.011 0.010 0.009 0.009 0.010 0.009 18 0.017 0.023 0.066 0.065 0.070 0.084 0.078 0.069 0.059 0.048 0.018 0.017 0.015 0.039 0.015 0.043 0.038 19 0.018 0.025 0.022 0.022 0.023 0.028 0.027 0.025 0.022 0.019 0.018 0.019 0.018 0.017 0.018 0.019 0.017 20 0.016 0.022 0.020 0.019 0.021 0.026 0.027 0.026 0.022 0.020 0.019 0.016 0.016 0.015 0.017 0.016 0.015 21 0.020 0.027 0.025 0.025 0.025 0.028 0.028 0.027 0.022 0.020 0.020 0.019 0.017 0.017 0.018 0.020 0.017 22 0.021 0.027 0.025 0.025 0.025 0.029 0.029 0.028 0.023 0.020 0.020 0.019 0.017 0.017 0.018 0.020 0.018 23 0.020 0.028 0.025 0.025 0.025 0.028 0.027 0.026 0.021 0.019 0.019 0.018 0.016 0.016 0.017 0.018 0.017 24 0.013 0.018 0.016 0.016 0.017 0.016 0.016 0.018 0.015 0.013 0.012 0.010 0.012 0.012 0.012 0.011 0.012 25 0.013 0.018 0.015 0.015 0.017 0.020 0.021 0.020 0.017 0.015 0.014 0.013 0.012 0.012 0.013 0.015 0.012 26 0.017 0.023 0.021 0.021 0.022 0.026 0.026 0.023 0.019 0.017 0.016 0.018 0.014 0.014 0.015 0.016 0.014 27 0.013 0.019 0.017 0.016 0.019 0.021 0.022 0.019 0.015 0.012 0.013 0.011 0.012 0.012 0.012 0.012 0.013 28 0.016 0.020 0.018 0.020 0.018 0.026 0.026 0.024 0.018 0.015 0.016 0.015 0.015 0.016 0.015 0.017 0.015 29 0.005 0.007 0.009 0.009 0.010 0.011 0.010 0.008 0.007 0.006 0.005 0.004 0.003 0.004 0.003 0.006 0.005 30 0.012 0.017 0.016 0.016 0.017 0.020 0.021 0.020 0.016 0.015 0.015 0.015 0.013 0.013 0.014 0.016 0.015 31 0.019 0.026 0.024 0.024 0.025 0.029 0.029 0.027 0.022 0.020 0.020 0.019 0.017 0.017 0.017 0.018 0.017 32 0.022 0.030 0.028 0.028 0.029 0.033 0.034 0.031 0.026 0.023 0.023 0.023 0.021 0.019 0.020 0.022 0.020 33 0.018 0.024 0.023 0.023 0.024 0.027 0.028 0.026 0.021 0.019 0.019 0.017 0.016 0.016 0.016 0.016 0.016 34 0.016 0.022 0.021 0.021 0.021 0.025 0.026 0.024 0.019 0.017 0.016 0.015 0.009 0.015 0.011 0.016 0.014 Average 0.017 0.023 0.022 0.022 0.023 0.026 0.027 0.025 0.020 0.018 0.017 0.016 0.014 0.015 0.015 0.016 0.015 Germany 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 1 0.021 0.027 0.024 0.025 0.026 0.029 0.027 0.027 0.024 0.020 0.023 0.021 0.017 0.016 0.020 0.019 0.02 2 0.017 0.030 0.030 0.029 0.030 0.032 0.033 0.030 0.026 0.023 0.022 0.018 0.017 0.014 0.017 0.019 0.016 3 0.017 0.023 0.021 0.021 0.022 0.025 0.025 0.023 0.020 0.017 0.017 0.016 0.014 0.013 0.014 0.017 0.013 4 0.017 0.023 0.021 0.021 0.021 0.025 0.025 0.023 0.019 0.017 0.017 0.016 0.014 0.014 0.015 0.014 0.014 5 0.017 0.023 0.021 0.021 0.021 0.025 0.024 0.021 0.018 0.016 0.016 0.016 0.014 0.014 0.015 0.015 0.013 6 0.019 0.026 0.023 0.022 0.023 0.026 0.027 0.026 0.021 0.019 0.018 0.016 0.014 0.014 0.015 0.015 0.014 7 0.016 0.022 0.020 0.020 0.019 0.021 0.022 0.021 0.018 0.016 0.015 0.012 0.013 0.012 0.013 0.014 0.013 8 0.014 0.018 0.018 0.016 0.019 0.015 0.015 0.016 0.012 0.011 0.010 0.014 0.008 0.007 0.008 0.014 0.008 9 0.016 0.021 0.019 0.019 0.021 0.023 0.023 0.021 0.018 0.016 0.015 0.014 0.012 0.012 0.013 0.010 0.012 10 0.016 0.022 0.020 0.020 0.021 0.024 0.025 0.023 0.019 0.017 0.016 0.015 0.014 0.014 0.015 0.015 0.014 11 0.016 0.022 0.021 0.021 0.022 0.026 0.027 0.025 0.021 0.018 0.018 0.016 0.014 0.014 0.015 0.016 0.014 12 0.018 0.025 0.023 0.022 0.023 0.026 0.027 0.025 0.020 0.017 0.016 0.015 0.013 0.012 0.015 0.016 0.014 13 0.018 0.024 0.022 0.021 0.022 0.025 0.026 0.024 0.020 0.018 0.017 0.016 0.014 0.014 0.016 0.015 0.014 14 0.018 0.024 0.022 0.022 0.022 0.025 0.028 0.026 0.021 0.019 0.019 0.018 0.017 0.018 0.020 0.015 0.018 15 0.017 0.024 0.021 0.021 0.022 0.026 0.026 0.024 0.019 0.017 0.017 0.016 0.014 0.014 0.016 0.019 0.014 16 0.019 0.025 0.023 0.022 0.023 0.026 0.026 0.024 0.020 0.018 0.017 0.019 0.015 0.014 0.014 0.016 0.013 17 0.013 0.017 0.016 0.016 0.018 0.022 0.023 0.020 0.016 0.013 0.012 0.011 0.010 0.009 0.009 0.010 0.009 18 0.017 0.023 0.066 0.065 0.070 0.084 0.078 0.069 0.059 0.048 0.018 0.017 0.015 0.039 0.015 0.043 0.038 19 0.018 0.025 0.022 0.022 0.023 0.028 0.027 0.025 0.022 0.019 0.018 0.019 0.018 0.017 0.018 0.019 0.017 20 0.016 0.022 0.020 0.019 0.021 0.026 0.027 0.026 0.022 0.020 0.019 0.016 0.016 0.015 0.017 0.016 0.015 21 0.020 0.027 0.025 0.025 0.025 0.028 0.028 0.027 0.022 0.020 0.020 0.019 0.017 0.017 0.018 0.020 0.017 22 0.021 0.027 0.025 0.025 0.025 0.029 0.029 0.028 0.023 0.020 0.020 0.019 0.017 0.017 0.018 0.020 0.018 23 0.020 0.028 0.025 0.025 0.025 0.028 0.027 0.026 0.021 0.019 0.019 0.018 0.016 0.016 0.017 0.018 0.017 24 0.013 0.018 0.016 0.016 0.017 0.016 0.016 0.018 0.015 0.013 0.012 0.010 0.012 0.012 0.012 0.011 0.012 25 0.013 0.018 0.015 0.015 0.017 0.020 0.021 0.020 0.017 0.015 0.014 0.013 0.012 0.012 0.013 0.015 0.012 26 0.017 0.023 0.021 0.021 0.022 0.026 0.026 0.023 0.019 0.017 0.016 0.018 0.014 0.014 0.015 0.016 0.014 27 0.013 0.019 0.017 0.016 0.019 0.021 0.022 0.019 0.015 0.012 0.013 0.011 0.012 0.012 0.012 0.012 0.013 28 0.016 0.020 0.018 0.020 0.018 0.026 0.026 0.024 0.018 0.015 0.016 0.015 0.015 0.016 0.015 0.017 0.015 29 0.005 0.007 0.009 0.009 0.010 0.011 0.010 0.008 0.007 0.006 0.005 0.004 0.003 0.004 0.003 0.006 0.005 30 0.012 0.017 0.016 0.016 0.017 0.020 0.021 0.020 0.016 0.015 0.015 0.015 0.013 0.013 0.014 0.016 0.015 31 0.019 0.026 0.024 0.024 0.025 0.029 0.029 0.027 0.022 0.020 0.020 0.019 0.017 0.017 0.017 0.018 0.017 32 0.022 0.030 0.028 0.028 0.029 0.033 0.034 0.031 0.026 0.023 0.023 0.023 0.021 0.019 0.020 0.022 0.020 33 0.018 0.024 0.023 0.023 0.024 0.027 0.028 0.026 0.021 0.019 0.019 0.017 0.016 0.016 0.016 0.016 0.016 34 0.016 0.022 0.021 0.021 0.021 0.025 0.026 0.024 0.019 0.017 0.016 0.015 0.009 0.015 0.011 0.016 0.014 Average 0.017 0.023 0.022 0.022 0.023 0.026 0.027 0.025 0.020 0.018 0.017 0.016 0.014 0.015 0.015 0.016 0.015 View Large Table A3. Labour values, Germany Germany 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 1 0.021 0.027 0.024 0.025 0.026 0.029 0.027 0.027 0.024 0.020 0.023 0.021 0.017 0.016 0.020 0.019 0.02 2 0.017 0.030 0.030 0.029 0.030 0.032 0.033 0.030 0.026 0.023 0.022 0.018 0.017 0.014 0.017 0.019 0.016 3 0.017 0.023 0.021 0.021 0.022 0.025 0.025 0.023 0.020 0.017 0.017 0.016 0.014 0.013 0.014 0.017 0.013 4 0.017 0.023 0.021 0.021 0.021 0.025 0.025 0.023 0.019 0.017 0.017 0.016 0.014 0.014 0.015 0.014 0.014 5 0.017 0.023 0.021 0.021 0.021 0.025 0.024 0.021 0.018 0.016 0.016 0.016 0.014 0.014 0.015 0.015 0.013 6 0.019 0.026 0.023 0.022 0.023 0.026 0.027 0.026 0.021 0.019 0.018 0.016 0.014 0.014 0.015 0.015 0.014 7 0.016 0.022 0.020 0.020 0.019 0.021 0.022 0.021 0.018 0.016 0.015 0.012 0.013 0.012 0.013 0.014 0.013 8 0.014 0.018 0.018 0.016 0.019 0.015 0.015 0.016 0.012 0.011 0.010 0.014 0.008 0.007 0.008 0.014 0.008 9 0.016 0.021 0.019 0.019 0.021 0.023 0.023 0.021 0.018 0.016 0.015 0.014 0.012 0.012 0.013 0.010 0.012 10 0.016 0.022 0.020 0.020 0.021 0.024 0.025 0.023 0.019 0.017 0.016 0.015 0.014 0.014 0.015 0.015 0.014 11 0.016 0.022 0.021 0.021 0.022 0.026 0.027 0.025 0.021 0.018 0.018 0.016 0.014 0.014 0.015 0.016 0.014 12 0.018 0.025 0.023 0.022 0.023 0.026 0.027 0.025 0.020 0.017 0.016 0.015 0.013 0.012 0.015 0.016 0.014 13 0.018 0.024 0.022 0.021 0.022 0.025 0.026 0.024 0.020 0.018 0.017 0.016 0.014 0.014 0.016 0.015 0.014 14 0.018 0.024 0.022 0.022 0.022 0.025 0.028 0.026 0.021 0.019 0.019 0.018 0.017 0.018 0.020 0.015 0.018 15 0.017 0.024 0.021 0.021 0.022 0.026 0.026 0.024 0.019 0.017 0.017 0.016 0.014 0.014 0.016 0.019 0.014 16 0.019 0.025 0.023 0.022 0.023 0.026 0.026 0.024 0.020 0.018 0.017 0.019 0.015 0.014 0.014 0.016 0.013 17 0.013 0.017 0.016 0.016 0.018 0.022 0.023 0.020 0.016 0.013 0.012 0.011 0.010 0.009 0.009 0.010 0.009 18 0.017 0.023 0.066 0.065 0.070 0.084 0.078 0.069 0.059 0.048 0.018 0.017 0.015 0.039 0.015 0.043 0.038 19 0.018 0.025 0.022 0.022 0.023 0.028 0.027 0.025 0.022 0.019 0.018 0.019 0.018 0.017 0.018 0.019 0.017 20 0.016 0.022 0.020 0.019 0.021 0.026 0.027 0.026 0.022 0.020 0.019 0.016 0.016 0.015 0.017 0.016 0.015 21 0.020 0.027 0.025 0.025 0.025 0.028 0.028 0.027 0.022 0.020 0.020 0.019 0.017 0.017 0.018 0.020 0.017 22 0.021 0.027 0.025 0.025 0.025 0.029 0.029 0.028 0.023 0.020 0.020 0.019 0.017 0.017 0.018 0.020 0.018 23 0.020 0.028 0.025 0.025 0.025 0.028 0.027 0.026 0.021 0.019 0.019 0.018 0.016 0.016 0.017 0.018 0.017 24 0.013 0.018 0.016 0.016 0.017 0.016 0.016 0.018 0.015 0.013 0.012 0.010 0.012 0.012 0.012 0.011 0.012 25 0.013 0.018 0.015 0.015 0.017 0.020 0.021 0.020 0.017 0.015 0.014 0.013 0.012 0.012 0.013 0.015 0.012 26 0.017 0.023 0.021 0.021 0.022 0.026 0.026 0.023 0.019 0.017 0.016 0.018 0.014 0.014 0.015 0.016 0.014 27 0.013 0.019 0.017 0.016 0.019 0.021 0.022 0.019 0.015 0.012 0.013 0.011 0.012 0.012 0.012 0.012 0.013 28 0.016 0.020 0.018 0.020 0.018 0.026 0.026 0.024 0.018 0.015 0.016 0.015 0.015 0.016 0.015 0.017 0.015 29 0.005 0.007 0.009 0.009 0.010 0.011 0.010 0.008 0.007 0.006 0.005 0.004 0.003 0.004 0.003 0.006 0.005 30 0.012 0.017 0.016 0.016 0.017 0.020 0.021 0.020 0.016 0.015 0.015 0.015 0.013 0.013 0.014 0.016 0.015 31 0.019 0.026 0.024 0.024 0.025 0.029 0.029 0.027 0.022 0.020 0.020 0.019 0.017 0.017 0.017 0.018 0.017 32 0.022 0.030 0.028 0.028 0.029 0.033 0.034 0.031 0.026 0.023 0.023 0.023 0.021 0.019 0.020 0.022 0.020 33 0.018 0.024 0.023 0.023 0.024 0.027 0.028 0.026 0.021 0.019 0.019 0.017 0.016 0.016 0.016 0.016 0.016 34 0.016 0.022 0.021 0.021 0.021 0.025 0.026 0.024 0.019 0.017 0.016 0.015 0.009 0.015 0.011 0.016 0.014 Average 0.017 0.023 0.022 0.022 0.023 0.026 0.027 0.025 0.020 0.018 0.017 0.016 0.014 0.015 0.015 0.016 0.015 Germany 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 1 0.021 0.027 0.024 0.025 0.026 0.029 0.027 0.027 0.024 0.020 0.023 0.021 0.017 0.016 0.020 0.019 0.02 2 0.017 0.030 0.030 0.029 0.030 0.032 0.033 0.030 0.026 0.023 0.022 0.018 0.017 0.014 0.017 0.019 0.016 3 0.017 0.023 0.021 0.021 0.022 0.025 0.025 0.023 0.020 0.017 0.017 0.016 0.014 0.013 0.014 0.017 0.013 4 0.017 0.023 0.021 0.021 0.021 0.025 0.025 0.023 0.019 0.017 0.017 0.016 0.014 0.014 0.015 0.014 0.014 5 0.017 0.023 0.021 0.021 0.021 0.025 0.024 0.021 0.018 0.016 0.016 0.016 0.014 0.014 0.015 0.015 0.013 6 0.019 0.026 0.023 0.022 0.023 0.026 0.027 0.026 0.021 0.019 0.018 0.016 0.014 0.014 0.015 0.015 0.014 7 0.016 0.022 0.020 0.020 0.019 0.021 0.022 0.021 0.018 0.016 0.015 0.012 0.013 0.012 0.013 0.014 0.013 8 0.014 0.018 0.018 0.016 0.019 0.015 0.015 0.016 0.012 0.011 0.010 0.014 0.008 0.007 0.008 0.014 0.008 9 0.016 0.021 0.019 0.019 0.021 0.023 0.023 0.021 0.018 0.016 0.015 0.014 0.012 0.012 0.013 0.010 0.012 10 0.016 0.022 0.020 0.020 0.021 0.024 0.025 0.023 0.019 0.017 0.016 0.015 0.014 0.014 0.015 0.015 0.014 11 0.016 0.022 0.021 0.021 0.022 0.026 0.027 0.025 0.021 0.018 0.018 0.016 0.014 0.014 0.015 0.016 0.014 12 0.018 0.025 0.023 0.022 0.023 0.026 0.027 0.025 0.020 0.017 0.016 0.015 0.013 0.012 0.015 0.016 0.014 13 0.018 0.024 0.022 0.021 0.022 0.025 0.026 0.024 0.020 0.018 0.017 0.016 0.014 0.014 0.016 0.015 0.014 14 0.018 0.024 0.022 0.022 0.022 0.025 0.028 0.026 0.021 0.019 0.019 0.018 0.017 0.018 0.020 0.015 0.018 15 0.017 0.024 0.021 0.021 0.022 0.026 0.026 0.024 0.019 0.017 0.017 0.016 0.014 0.014 0.016 0.019 0.014 16 0.019 0.025 0.023 0.022 0.023 0.026 0.026 0.024 0.020 0.018 0.017 0.019 0.015 0.014 0.014 0.016 0.013 17 0.013 0.017 0.016 0.016 0.018 0.022 0.023 0.020 0.016 0.013 0.012 0.011 0.010 0.009 0.009 0.010 0.009 18 0.017 0.023 0.066 0.065 0.070 0.084 0.078 0.069 0.059 0.048 0.018 0.017 0.015 0.039 0.015 0.043 0.038 19 0.018 0.025 0.022 0.022 0.023 0.028 0.027 0.025 0.022 0.019 0.018 0.019 0.018 0.017 0.018 0.019 0.017 20 0.016 0.022 0.020 0.019 0.021 0.026 0.027 0.026 0.022 0.020 0.019 0.016 0.016 0.015 0.017 0.016 0.015 21 0.020 0.027 0.025 0.025 0.025 0.028 0.028 0.027 0.022 0.020 0.020 0.019 0.017 0.017 0.018 0.020 0.017 22 0.021 0.027 0.025 0.025 0.025 0.029 0.029 0.028 0.023 0.020 0.020 0.019 0.017 0.017 0.018 0.020 0.018 23 0.020 0.028 0.025 0.025 0.025 0.028 0.027 0.026 0.021 0.019 0.019 0.018 0.016 0.016 0.017 0.018 0.017 24 0.013 0.018 0.016 0.016 0.017 0.016 0.016 0.018 0.015 0.013 0.012 0.010 0.012 0.012 0.012 0.011 0.012 25 0.013 0.018 0.015 0.015 0.017 0.020 0.021 0.020 0.017 0.015 0.014 0.013 0.012 0.012 0.013 0.015 0.012 26 0.017 0.023 0.021 0.021 0.022 0.026 0.026 0.023 0.019 0.017 0.016 0.018 0.014 0.014 0.015 0.016 0.014 27 0.013 0.019 0.017 0.016 0.019 0.021 0.022 0.019 0.015 0.012 0.013 0.011 0.012 0.012 0.012 0.012 0.013 28 0.016 0.020 0.018 0.020 0.018 0.026 0.026 0.024 0.018 0.015 0.016 0.015 0.015 0.016 0.015 0.017 0.015 29 0.005 0.007 0.009 0.009 0.010 0.011 0.010 0.008 0.007 0.006 0.005 0.004 0.003 0.004 0.003 0.006 0.005 30 0.012 0.017 0.016 0.016 0.017 0.020 0.021 0.020 0.016 0.015 0.015 0.015 0.013 0.013 0.014 0.016 0.015 31 0.019 0.026 0.024 0.024 0.025 0.029 0.029 0.027 0.022 0.020 0.020 0.019 0.017 0.017 0.017 0.018 0.017 32 0.022 0.030 0.028 0.028 0.029 0.033 0.034 0.031 0.026 0.023 0.023 0.023 0.021 0.019 0.020 0.022 0.020 33 0.018 0.024 0.023 0.023 0.024 0.027 0.028 0.026 0.021 0.019 0.019 0.017 0.016 0.016 0.016 0.016 0.016 34 0.016 0.022 0.021 0.021 0.021 0.025 0.026 0.024 0.019 0.017 0.016 0.015 0.009 0.015 0.011 0.016 0.014 Average 0.017 0.023 0.022 0.022 0.023 0.026 0.027 0.025 0.020 0.018 0.017 0.016 0.014 0.015 0.015 0.016 0.015 View Large Table A4. Labour values, Greece Greece 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 1 0.029 0.045 0.031 0.033 0.037 0.045 0.049 0.050 0.046 0.042 0.041 0.049 0.045 0.043 0.044 0.046 0.042 2 0.029 0.042 0.032 0.035 0.036 0.038 0.040 0.035 0.030 0.027 0.027 0.025 0.023 0.020 0.023 0.025 0.023 3 0.031 0.043 0.033 0.035 0.037 0.046 0.047 0.045 0.039 0.034 0.035 0.028 0.030 0.026 0.024 0.026 0.025 4 0.032 0.046 0.037 0.039 0.039 0.048 0.044 0.044 0.036 0.031 0.030 0.028 0.031 0.027 0.027 0.028 0.028 5 0.034 0.049 0.038 0.041 0.041 0.047 0.046 0.041 0.034 0.036 0.039 0.035 0.029 0.026 0.027 0.029 0.029 6 0.034 0.050 0.041 0.044 0.044 0.051 0.055 0.048 0.039 0.035 0.037 0.033 0.028 0.025 0.027 0.029 0.024 7 0.030 0.042 0.035 0.036 0.039 0.043 0.044 0.039 0.033 0.032 0.032 0.027 0.031 0.027 0.024 0.028 0.025 8 0.028 0.039 0.028 0.034 0.026 0.020 0.024 0.024 0.021 0.017 0.013 0.031 0.011 0.008 0.013 0.014 0.013 9 0.028 0.041 0.033 0.035 0.036 0.042 0.042 0.040 0.032 0.029 0.033 0.026 0.030 0.027 0.030 0.031 0.030 10 0.027 0.040 0.032 0.035 0.035 0.036 0.040 0.034 0.028 0.025 0.023 0.022 0.021 0.020 0.023 0.028 0.023 11 0.033 0.046 0.034 0.035 0.034 0.038 0.037 0.035 0.027 0.026 0.026 0.026 0.023 0.021 0.023 0.023 0.025 12 0.030 0.045 0.035 0.037 0.038 0.040 0.046 0.044 0.038 0.031 0.029 0.025 0.025 0.025 0.027 0.028 0.027 13 0.033 0.047 0.039 0.041 0.045 0.048 0.052 0.045 0.039 0.035 0.034 0.033 0.029 0.032 0.038 0.042 0.047 14 0.029 0.045 0.036 0.038 0.038 0.039 0.042 0.038 0.031 0.029 0.030 0.028 0.024 0.021 0.024 0.025 0.022 15 0.043 0.062 0.047 0.045 0.047 0.054 0.054 0.049 0.041 0.035 0.037 0.031 0.032 0.032 0.031 0.035 0.036 16 0.030 0.045 0.036 0.039 0.039 0.045 0.053 0.048 0.045 0.033 0.035 0.031 0.030 0.025 0.024 0.031 0.029 17 0.017 0.028 0.022 0.024 0.025 0.030 0.036 0.029 0.024 0.020 0.019 0.016 0.017 0.015 0.016 0.016 0.014 18 0.026 0.038 0.028 0.030 0.031 0.036 0.034 0.036 0.030 0.026 0.027 0.023 0.023 0.022 0.026 0.031 0.030 19 0.019 0.029 0.023 0.028 0.029 0.031 0.033 0.028 0.025 0.021 0.024 0.021 0.022 0.022 0.022 0.024 0.022 20 0.026 0.035 0.026 0.032 0.036 0.047 0.036 0.034 0.028 0.025 0.026 0.032 0.022 0.021 0.023 0.027 0.026 21 0.033 0.046 0.037 0.042 0.050 0.059 0.066 0.051 0.032 0.032 0.035 0.035 0.033 0.032 0.037 0.043 0.036 22 0.023 0.032 0.023 0.025 0.028 0.033 0.031 0.029 0.024 0.022 0.022 0.020 0.019 0.017 0.015 0.016 0.014 23 0.053 0.080 0.069 0.073 0.088 0.105 0.094 0.088 0.069 0.059 0.051 0.049 0.043 0.036 0.040 0.052 0.046 24 0.047 0.066 0.042 0.042 0.027 0.032 0.029 0.030 0.022 0.019 0.016 0.010 0.013 0.012 0.013 0.013 0.011 25 0.031 0.050 0.050 0.046 0.051 0.061 0.061 0.040 0.028 0.016 0.017 0.019 0.016 0.017 0.018 0.018 0.016 26 0.048 0.071 0.049 0.053 0.048 0.049 0.051 0.046 0.038 0.033 0.033 0.037 0.027 0.026 0.038 0.040 0.032 27 0.029 0.042 0.028 0.030 0.024 0.030 0.032 0.024 0.022 0.019 0.016 0.014 0.015 0.013 0.012 0.014 0.013 28 0.033 0.049 0.037 0.036 0.035 0.039 0.044 0.038 0.032 0.025 0.027 0.025 0.024 0.022 0.023 0.025 0.023 29 0.003 0.005 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.006 0.004 0.004 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.002 30 0.029 0.045 0.034 0.038 0.042 0.049 0.055 0.052 0.053 0.048 0.051 0.054 0.044 0.041 0.039 0.048 0.049 31 0.039 0.058 0.043 0.046 0.046 0.051 0.053 0.046 0.038 0.035 0.035 0.033 0.030 0.028 0.027 0.029 0.027 32 0.039 0.057 0.045 0.048 0.051 0.060 0.067 0.056 0.043 0.039 0.039 0.043 0.035 0.031 0.030 0.032 0.030 33 0.031 0.045 0.036 0.039 0.040 0.046 0.046 0.043 0.033 0.032 0.031 0.030 0.025 0.021 0.021 0.023 0.022 34 0.027 0.039 0.030 0.033 0.033 0.038 0.042 0.038 0.033 0.030 0.030 0.027 0.027 0.027 0.026 0.028 0.026 Average 0.031 0.045 0.035 0.037 0.038 0.044 0.045 0.040 0.033 0.029 0.029 0.029 0.026 0.024 0.025 0.028 0.026 Greece 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 1 0.029 0.045 0.031 0.033 0.037 0.045 0.049 0.050 0.046 0.042 0.041 0.049 0.045 0.043 0.044 0.046 0.042 2 0.029 0.042 0.032 0.035 0.036 0.038 0.040 0.035 0.030 0.027 0.027 0.025 0.023 0.020 0.023 0.025 0.023 3 0.031 0.043 0.033 0.035 0.037 0.046 0.047 0.045 0.039 0.034 0.035 0.028 0.030 0.026 0.024 0.026 0.025 4 0.032 0.046 0.037 0.039 0.039 0.048 0.044 0.044 0.036 0.031 0.030 0.028 0.031 0.027 0.027 0.028 0.028 5 0.034 0.049 0.038 0.041 0.041 0.047 0.046 0.041 0.034 0.036 0.039 0.035 0.029 0.026 0.027 0.029 0.029 6 0.034 0.050 0.041 0.044 0.044 0.051 0.055 0.048 0.039 0.035 0.037 0.033 0.028 0.025 0.027 0.029 0.024 7 0.030 0.042 0.035 0.036 0.039 0.043 0.044 0.039 0.033 0.032 0.032 0.027 0.031 0.027 0.024 0.028 0.025 8 0.028 0.039 0.028 0.034 0.026 0.020 0.024 0.024 0.021 0.017 0.013 0.031 0.011 0.008 0.013 0.014 0.013 9 0.028 0.041 0.033 0.035 0.036 0.042 0.042 0.040 0.032 0.029 0.033 0.026 0.030 0.027 0.030 0.031 0.030 10 0.027 0.040 0.032 0.035 0.035 0.036 0.040 0.034 0.028 0.025 0.023 0.022 0.021 0.020 0.023 0.028 0.023 11 0.033 0.046 0.034 0.035 0.034 0.038 0.037 0.035 0.027 0.026 0.026 0.026 0.023 0.021 0.023 0.023 0.025 12 0.030 0.045 0.035 0.037 0.038 0.040 0.046 0.044 0.038 0.031 0.029 0.025 0.025 0.025 0.027 0.028 0.027 13 0.033 0.047 0.039 0.041 0.045 0.048 0.052 0.045 0.039 0.035 0.034 0.033 0.029 0.032 0.038 0.042 0.047 14 0.029 0.045 0.036 0.038 0.038 0.039 0.042 0.038 0.031 0.029 0.030 0.028 0.024 0.021 0.024 0.025 0.022 15 0.043 0.062 0.047 0.045 0.047 0.054 0.054 0.049 0.041 0.035 0.037 0.031 0.032 0.032 0.031 0.035 0.036 16 0.030 0.045 0.036 0.039 0.039 0.045 0.053 0.048 0.045 0.033 0.035 0.031 0.030 0.025 0.024 0.031 0.029 17 0.017 0.028 0.022 0.024 0.025 0.030 0.036 0.029 0.024 0.020 0.019 0.016 0.017 0.015 0.016 0.016 0.014 18 0.026 0.038 0.028 0.030 0.031 0.036 0.034 0.036 0.030 0.026 0.027 0.023 0.023 0.022 0.026 0.031 0.030 19 0.019 0.029 0.023 0.028 0.029 0.031 0.033 0.028 0.025 0.021 0.024 0.021 0.022 0.022 0.022 0.024 0.022 20 0.026 0.035 0.026 0.032 0.036 0.047 0.036 0.034 0.028 0.025 0.026 0.032 0.022 0.021 0.023 0.027 0.026 21 0.033 0.046 0.037 0.042 0.050 0.059 0.066 0.051 0.032 0.032 0.035 0.035 0.033 0.032 0.037 0.043 0.036 22 0.023 0.032 0.023 0.025 0.028 0.033 0.031 0.029 0.024 0.022 0.022 0.020 0.019 0.017 0.015 0.016 0.014 23 0.053 0.080 0.069 0.073 0.088 0.105 0.094 0.088 0.069 0.059 0.051 0.049 0.043 0.036 0.040 0.052 0.046 24 0.047 0.066 0.042 0.042 0.027 0.032 0.029 0.030 0.022 0.019 0.016 0.010 0.013 0.012 0.013 0.013 0.011 25 0.031 0.050 0.050 0.046 0.051 0.061 0.061 0.040 0.028 0.016 0.017 0.019 0.016 0.017 0.018 0.018 0.016 26 0.048 0.071 0.049 0.053 0.048 0.049 0.051 0.046 0.038 0.033 0.033 0.037 0.027 0.026 0.038 0.040 0.032 27 0.029 0.042 0.028 0.030 0.024 0.030 0.032 0.024 0.022 0.019 0.016 0.014 0.015 0.013 0.012 0.014 0.013 28 0.033 0.049 0.037 0.036 0.035 0.039 0.044 0.038 0.032 0.025 0.027 0.025 0.024 0.022 0.023 0.025 0.023 29 0.003 0.005 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.006 0.004 0.004 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.002 30 0.029 0.045 0.034 0.038 0.042 0.049 0.055 0.052 0.053 0.048 0.051 0.054 0.044 0.041 0.039 0.048 0.049 31 0.039 0.058 0.043 0.046 0.046 0.051 0.053 0.046 0.038 0.035 0.035 0.033 0.030 0.028 0.027 0.029 0.027 32 0.039 0.057 0.045 0.048 0.051 0.060 0.067 0.056 0.043 0.039 0.039 0.043 0.035 0.031 0.030 0.032 0.030 33 0.031 0.045 0.036 0.039 0.040 0.046 0.046 0.043 0.033 0.032 0.031 0.030 0.025 0.021 0.021 0.023 0.022 34 0.027 0.039 0.030 0.033 0.033 0.038 0.042 0.038 0.033 0.030 0.030 0.027 0.027 0.027 0.026 0.028 0.026 Average 0.031 0.045 0.035 0.037 0.038 0.044 0.045 0.040 0.033 0.029 0.029 0.029 0.026 0.024 0.025 0.028 0.026 View Large Table A4. Labour values, Greece Greece 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 1 0.029 0.045 0.031 0.033 0.037 0.045 0.049 0.050 0.046 0.042 0.041 0.049 0.045 0.043 0.044 0.046 0.042 2 0.029 0.042 0.032 0.035 0.036 0.038 0.040 0.035 0.030 0.027 0.027 0.025 0.023 0.020 0.023 0.025 0.023 3 0.031 0.043 0.033 0.035 0.037 0.046 0.047 0.045 0.039 0.034 0.035 0.028 0.030 0.026 0.024 0.026 0.025 4 0.032 0.046 0.037 0.039 0.039 0.048 0.044 0.044 0.036 0.031 0.030 0.028 0.031 0.027 0.027 0.028 0.028 5 0.034 0.049 0.038 0.041 0.041 0.047 0.046 0.041 0.034 0.036 0.039 0.035 0.029 0.026 0.027 0.029 0.029 6 0.034 0.050 0.041 0.044 0.044 0.051 0.055 0.048 0.039 0.035 0.037 0.033 0.028 0.025 0.027 0.029 0.024 7 0.030 0.042 0.035 0.036 0.039 0.043 0.044 0.039 0.033 0.032 0.032 0.027 0.031 0.027 0.024 0.028 0.025 8 0.028 0.039 0.028 0.034 0.026 0.020 0.024 0.024 0.021 0.017 0.013 0.031 0.011 0.008 0.013 0.014 0.013 9 0.028 0.041 0.033 0.035 0.036 0.042 0.042 0.040 0.032 0.029 0.033 0.026 0.030 0.027 0.030 0.031 0.030 10 0.027 0.040 0.032 0.035 0.035 0.036 0.040 0.034 0.028 0.025 0.023 0.022 0.021 0.020 0.023 0.028 0.023 11 0.033 0.046 0.034 0.035 0.034 0.038 0.037 0.035 0.027 0.026 0.026 0.026 0.023 0.021 0.023 0.023 0.025 12 0.030 0.045 0.035 0.037 0.038 0.040 0.046 0.044 0.038 0.031 0.029 0.025 0.025 0.025 0.027 0.028 0.027 13 0.033 0.047 0.039 0.041 0.045 0.048 0.052 0.045 0.039 0.035 0.034 0.033 0.029 0.032 0.038 0.042 0.047 14 0.029 0.045 0.036 0.038 0.038 0.039 0.042 0.038 0.031 0.029 0.030 0.028 0.024 0.021 0.024 0.025 0.022 15 0.043 0.062 0.047 0.045 0.047 0.054 0.054 0.049 0.041 0.035 0.037 0.031 0.032 0.032 0.031 0.035 0.036 16 0.030 0.045 0.036 0.039 0.039 0.045 0.053 0.048 0.045 0.033 0.035 0.031 0.030 0.025 0.024 0.031 0.029 17 0.017 0.028 0.022 0.024 0.025 0.030 0.036 0.029 0.024 0.020 0.019 0.016 0.017 0.015 0.016 0.016 0.014 18 0.026 0.038 0.028 0.030 0.031 0.036 0.034 0.036 0.030 0.026 0.027 0.023 0.023 0.022 0.026 0.031 0.030 19 0.019 0.029 0.023 0.028 0.029 0.031 0.033 0.028 0.025 0.021 0.024 0.021 0.022 0.022 0.022 0.024 0.022 20 0.026 0.035 0.026 0.032 0.036 0.047 0.036 0.034 0.028 0.025 0.026 0.032 0.022 0.021 0.023 0.027 0.026 21 0.033 0.046 0.037 0.042 0.050 0.059 0.066 0.051 0.032 0.032 0.035 0.035 0.033 0.032 0.037 0.043 0.036 22 0.023 0.032 0.023 0.025 0.028 0.033 0.031 0.029 0.024 0.022 0.022 0.020 0.019 0.017 0.015 0.016 0.014 23 0.053 0.080 0.069 0.073 0.088 0.105 0.094 0.088 0.069 0.059 0.051 0.049 0.043 0.036 0.040 0.052 0.046 24 0.047 0.066 0.042 0.042 0.027 0.032 0.029 0.030 0.022 0.019 0.016 0.010 0.013 0.012 0.013 0.013 0.011 25 0.031 0.050 0.050 0.046 0.051 0.061 0.061 0.040 0.028 0.016 0.017 0.019 0.016 0.017 0.018 0.018 0.016 26 0.048 0.071 0.049 0.053 0.048 0.049 0.051 0.046 0.038 0.033 0.033 0.037 0.027 0.026 0.038 0.040 0.032 27 0.029 0.042 0.028 0.030 0.024 0.030 0.032 0.024 0.022 0.019 0.016 0.014 0.015 0.013 0.012 0.014 0.013 28 0.033 0.049 0.037 0.036 0.035 0.039 0.044 0.038 0.032 0.025 0.027 0.025 0.024 0.022 0.023 0.025 0.023 29 0.003 0.005 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.006 0.004 0.004 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.002 30 0.029 0.045 0.034 0.038 0.042 0.049 0.055 0.052 0.053 0.048 0.051 0.054 0.044 0.041 0.039 0.048 0.049 31 0.039 0.058 0.043 0.046 0.046 0.051 0.053 0.046 0.038 0.035 0.035 0.033 0.030 0.028 0.027 0.029 0.027 32 0.039 0.057 0.045 0.048 0.051 0.060 0.067 0.056 0.043 0.039 0.039 0.043 0.035 0.031 0.030 0.032 0.030 33 0.031 0.045 0.036 0.039 0.040 0.046 0.046 0.043 0.033 0.032 0.031 0.030 0.025 0.021 0.021 0.023 0.022 34 0.027 0.039 0.030 0.033 0.033 0.038 0.042 0.038 0.033 0.030 0.030 0.027 0.027 0.027 0.026 0.028 0.026 Average 0.031 0.045 0.035 0.037 0.038 0.044 0.045 0.040 0.033 0.029 0.029 0.029 0.026 0.024 0.025 0.028 0.026 Greece 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 1 0.029 0.045 0.031 0.033 0.037 0.045 0.049 0.050 0.046 0.042 0.041 0.049 0.045 0.043 0.044 0.046 0.042 2 0.029 0.042 0.032 0.035 0.036 0.038 0.040 0.035 0.030 0.027 0.027 0.025 0.023 0.020 0.023 0.025 0.023 3 0.031 0.043 0.033 0.035 0.037 0.046 0.047 0.045 0.039 0.034 0.035 0.028 0.030 0.026 0.024 0.026 0.025 4 0.032 0.046 0.037 0.039 0.039 0.048 0.044 0.044 0.036 0.031 0.030 0.028 0.031 0.027 0.027 0.028 0.028 5 0.034 0.049 0.038 0.041 0.041 0.047 0.046 0.041 0.034 0.036 0.039 0.035 0.029 0.026 0.027 0.029 0.029 6 0.034 0.050 0.041 0.044 0.044 0.051 0.055 0.048 0.039 0.035 0.037 0.033 0.028 0.025 0.027 0.029 0.024 7 0.030 0.042 0.035 0.036 0.039 0.043 0.044 0.039 0.033 0.032 0.032 0.027 0.031 0.027 0.024 0.028 0.025 8 0.028 0.039 0.028 0.034 0.026 0.020 0.024 0.024 0.021 0.017 0.013 0.031 0.011 0.008 0.013 0.014 0.013 9 0.028 0.041 0.033 0.035 0.036 0.042 0.042 0.040 0.032 0.029 0.033 0.026 0.030 0.027 0.030 0.031 0.030 10 0.027 0.040 0.032 0.035 0.035 0.036 0.040 0.034 0.028 0.025 0.023 0.022 0.021 0.020 0.023 0.028 0.023 11 0.033 0.046 0.034 0.035 0.034 0.038 0.037 0.035 0.027 0.026 0.026 0.026 0.023 0.021 0.023 0.023 0.025 12 0.030 0.045 0.035 0.037 0.038 0.040 0.046 0.044 0.038 0.031 0.029 0.025 0.025 0.025 0.027 0.028 0.027 13 0.033 0.047 0.039 0.041 0.045 0.048 0.052 0.045 0.039 0.035 0.034 0.033 0.029 0.032 0.038 0.042 0.047 14 0.029 0.045 0.036 0.038 0.038 0.039 0.042 0.038 0.031 0.029 0.030 0.028 0.024 0.021 0.024 0.025 0.022 15 0.043 0.062 0.047 0.045 0.047 0.054 0.054 0.049 0.041 0.035 0.037 0.031 0.032 0.032 0.031 0.035 0.036 16 0.030 0.045 0.036 0.039 0.039 0.045 0.053 0.048 0.045 0.033 0.035 0.031 0.030 0.025 0.024 0.031 0.029 17 0.017 0.028 0.022 0.024 0.025 0.030 0.036 0.029 0.024 0.020 0.019 0.016 0.017 0.015 0.016 0.016 0.014 18 0.026 0.038 0.028 0.030 0.031 0.036 0.034 0.036 0.030 0.026 0.027 0.023 0.023 0.022 0.026 0.031 0.030 19 0.019 0.029 0.023 0.028 0.029 0.031 0.033 0.028 0.025 0.021 0.024 0.021 0.022 0.022 0.022 0.024 0.022 20 0.026 0.035 0.026 0.032 0.036 0.047 0.036 0.034 0.028 0.025 0.026 0.032 0.022 0.021 0.023 0.027 0.026 21 0.033 0.046 0.037 0.042 0.050 0.059 0.066 0.051 0.032 0.032 0.035 0.035 0.033 0.032 0.037 0.043 0.036 22 0.023 0.032 0.023 0.025 0.028 0.033 0.031 0.029 0.024 0.022 0.022 0.020 0.019 0.017 0.015 0.016 0.014 23 0.053 0.080 0.069 0.073 0.088 0.105 0.094 0.088 0.069 0.059 0.051 0.049 0.043 0.036 0.040 0.052 0.046 24 0.047 0.066 0.042 0.042 0.027 0.032 0.029 0.030 0.022 0.019 0.016 0.010 0.013 0.012 0.013 0.013 0.011 25 0.031 0.050 0.050 0.046 0.051 0.061 0.061 0.040 0.028 0.016 0.017 0.019 0.016 0.017 0.018 0.018 0.016 26 0.048 0.071 0.049 0.053 0.048 0.049 0.051 0.046 0.038 0.033 0.033 0.037 0.027 0.026 0.038 0.040 0.032 27 0.029 0.042 0.028 0.030 0.024 0.030 0.032 0.024 0.022 0.019 0.016 0.014 0.015 0.013 0.012 0.014 0.013 28 0.033 0.049 0.037 0.036 0.035 0.039 0.044 0.038 0.032 0.025 0.027 0.025 0.024 0.022 0.023 0.025 0.023 29 0.003 0.005 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.006 0.004 0.004 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.002 30 0.029 0.045 0.034 0.038 0.042 0.049 0.055 0.052 0.053 0.048 0.051 0.054 0.044 0.041 0.039 0.048 0.049 31 0.039 0.058 0.043 0.046 0.046 0.051 0.053 0.046 0.038 0.035 0.035 0.033 0.030 0.028 0.027 0.029 0.027 32 0.039 0.057 0.045 0.048 0.051 0.060 0.067 0.056 0.043 0.039 0.039 0.043 0.035 0.031 0.030 0.032 0.030 33 0.031 0.045 0.036 0.039 0.040 0.046 0.046 0.043 0.033 0.032 0.031 0.030 0.025 0.021 0.021 0.023 0.022 34 0.027 0.039 0.030 0.033 0.033 0.038 0.042 0.038 0.033 0.030 0.030 0.027 0.027 0.027 0.026 0.028 0.026 Average 0.031 0.045 0.035 0.037 0.038 0.044 0.045 0.040 0.033 0.029 0.029 0.029 0.026 0.024 0.025 0.028 0.026 View Large Table A5. Rate of profit, circulating capital, Germany 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 Average 1 34% 33% 26% 27% 26% 25% 27% 27% 26% 28% 30% 33% 34% 24% 25% 27% 22% 28% 2 28% 27% 20% 21% 22% 23% 23% 23% 19% 22% 27% 31% 30% 28% 27% 23% 21% 24% 3 13% 13% 11% 12% 12% 11% 12% 13% 13% 14% 16% 17% 17% 14% 14% 10% 13% 13% 4 20% 20% 16% 17% 16% 15% 16% 17% 18% 19% 21% 23% 23% 19% 20% 19% 18% 19% 5 20% 20% 16% 17% 15% 15% 14% 15% 17% 17% 20% 20% 21% 21% 23% 19% 20% 18% 6 23% 24% 18% 19% 18% 17% 18% 17% 18% 20% 20% 22% 21% 17% 16% 15% 14% 18% 7 24% 24% 19% 20% 17% 16% 17% 18% 19% 20% 22% 28% 23% 18% 16% 15% 15% 19% 8 4% 5% 4% 4% 4% 4% 4% 4% 4% 4% 4% 2% 4% 3% 3% 1% 2% 4% 9 21% 21% 16% 16% 15% 14% 15% 16% 16% 17% 20% 21% 21% 17% 18% 21% 15% 18% 10 22% 23% 18% 19% 18% 17% 19% 19% 20% 21% 23% 23% 25% 20% 21% 19% 19% 20% 11 23% 24% 18% 19% 18% 17% 18% 19% 19% 20% 23% 26% 25% 20% 21% 18% 18% 20% 12 22% 23% 18% 19% 19% 17% 18% 19% 19% 20% 23% 23% 24% 19% 20% 16% 18% 20% 13 24% 24% 20% 20% 20% 19% 20% 22% 22% 24% 25% 27% 27% 22% 25% 22% 21% 22% 14 25% 25% 20% 20% 19% 17% 17% 20% 20% 21% 23% 23% 22% 19% 20% 22% 17% 21% 15 18% 18% 14% 14% 13% 12% 13% 14% 14% 15% 16% 18% 18% 14% 16% 9% 12% 15% 16 26% 27% 21% 22% 21% 19% 20% 21% 22% 23% 25% 21% 27% 22% 23% 19% 20% 22% 17 23% 24% 18% 18% 16% 15% 16% 16% 16% 17% 19% 21% 21% 17% 19% 17% 18% 18% 18 28% 29% 6% 7% 6% 6% 7% 8% 8% 9% 32% 36% 36% 9% 29% 8% 8% 16% 19 47% 45% 38% 39% 37% 37% 40% 40% 39% 45% 58% 55% 63% 52% 50% 46% 48% 46% 20 37% 37% 29% 31% 29% 27% 29% 32% 32% 33% 38% 48% 43% 36% 36% 32% 31% 34% 21 45% 46% 36% 37% 36% 34% 36% 39% 40% 44% 50% 56% 58% 48% 46% 37% 41% 43% 22 33% 33% 26% 28% 28% 27% 29% 33% 34% 38% 44% 47% 53% 43% 45% 38% 40% 36% 23 37% 36% 28% 30% 26% 25% 27% 30% 31% 34% 37% 40% 42% 35% 36% 32% 32% 33% 24 12% 12% 9% 9% 8% 7% 7% 6% 6% 6% 7% 8% 5% 4% 5% 5% 4% 7% 25 14% 15% 12% 13% 12% 11% 13% 13% 14% 15% 16% 18% 18% 11% 13% 10% 11% 13% 26 18% 18% 14% 15% 16% 15% 16% 18% 19% 20% 23% 21% 26% 21% 23% 19% 20% 19% 27 44% 41% 29% 29% 21% 17% 16% 16% 17% 19% 20% 30% 25% 21% 21% 22% 18% 24% 28 33% 33% 25% 24% 23% 20% 21% 22% 23% 26% 28% 30% 29% 22% 23% 19% 21% 25% 29 9% 9% 5% 6% 6% 6% 7% 8% 8% 9% 13% 15% 17% 10% 14% 8% 9% 9% 30 34% 35% 28% 29% 29% 28% 30% 33% 35% 39% 44% 45% 52% 43% 43% 37% 40% 37% 31 46% 47% 37% 38% 36% 35% 37% 39% 41% 45% 52% 59% 61% 47% 46% 41% 41% 44% 32 56% 57% 44% 46% 45% 43% 46% 48% 49% 54% 62% 69% 70% 55% 55% 47% 51% 53% 33 43% 43% 33% 35% 33% 32% 35% 38% 39% 44% 52% 58% 59% 46% 47% 44% 42% 42% 34 32% 32% 25% 27% 26% 25% 27% 29% 32% 36% 41% 46% 36% 32% 34% 32% 35% 32% Average 28% 28% 21% 22% 21% 20% 21% 22% 23% 25% 29% 31% 32% 25% 26% 23% 23% 28% 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 Average 1 34% 33% 26% 27% 26% 25% 27% 27% 26% 28% 30% 33% 34% 24% 25% 27% 22% 28% 2 28% 27% 20% 21% 22% 23% 23% 23% 19% 22% 27% 31% 30% 28% 27% 23% 21% 24% 3 13% 13% 11% 12% 12% 11% 12% 13% 13% 14% 16% 17% 17% 14% 14% 10% 13% 13% 4 20% 20% 16% 17% 16% 15% 16% 17% 18% 19% 21% 23% 23% 19% 20% 19% 18% 19% 5 20% 20% 16% 17% 15% 15% 14% 15% 17% 17% 20% 20% 21% 21% 23% 19% 20% 18% 6 23% 24% 18% 19% 18% 17% 18% 17% 18% 20% 20% 22% 21% 17% 16% 15% 14% 18% 7 24% 24% 19% 20% 17% 16% 17% 18% 19% 20% 22% 28% 23% 18% 16% 15% 15% 19% 8 4% 5% 4% 4% 4% 4% 4% 4% 4% 4% 4% 2% 4% 3% 3% 1% 2% 4% 9 21% 21% 16% 16% 15% 14% 15% 16% 16% 17% 20% 21% 21% 17% 18% 21% 15% 18% 10 22% 23% 18% 19% 18% 17% 19% 19% 20% 21% 23% 23% 25% 20% 21% 19% 19% 20% 11 23% 24% 18% 19% 18% 17% 18% 19% 19% 20% 23% 26% 25% 20% 21% 18% 18% 20% 12 22% 23% 18% 19% 19% 17% 18% 19% 19% 20% 23% 23% 24% 19% 20% 16% 18% 20% 13 24% 24% 20% 20% 20% 19% 20% 22% 22% 24% 25% 27% 27% 22% 25% 22% 21% 22% 14 25% 25% 20% 20% 19% 17% 17% 20% 20% 21% 23% 23% 22% 19% 20% 22% 17% 21% 15 18% 18% 14% 14% 13% 12% 13% 14% 14% 15% 16% 18% 18% 14% 16% 9% 12% 15% 16 26% 27% 21% 22% 21% 19% 20% 21% 22% 23% 25% 21% 27% 22% 23% 19% 20% 22% 17 23% 24% 18% 18% 16% 15% 16% 16% 16% 17% 19% 21% 21% 17% 19% 17% 18% 18% 18 28% 29% 6% 7% 6% 6% 7% 8% 8% 9% 32% 36% 36% 9% 29% 8% 8% 16% 19 47% 45% 38% 39% 37% 37% 40% 40% 39% 45% 58% 55% 63% 52% 50% 46% 48% 46% 20 37% 37% 29% 31% 29% 27% 29% 32% 32% 33% 38% 48% 43% 36% 36% 32% 31% 34% 21 45% 46% 36% 37% 36% 34% 36% 39% 40% 44% 50% 56% 58% 48% 46% 37% 41% 43% 22 33% 33% 26% 28% 28% 27% 29% 33% 34% 38% 44% 47% 53% 43% 45% 38% 40% 36% 23 37% 36% 28% 30% 26% 25% 27% 30% 31% 34% 37% 40% 42% 35% 36% 32% 32% 33% 24 12% 12% 9% 9% 8% 7% 7% 6% 6% 6% 7% 8% 5% 4% 5% 5% 4% 7% 25 14% 15% 12% 13% 12% 11% 13% 13% 14% 15% 16% 18% 18% 11% 13% 10% 11% 13% 26 18% 18% 14% 15% 16% 15% 16% 18% 19% 20% 23% 21% 26% 21% 23% 19% 20% 19% 27 44% 41% 29% 29% 21% 17% 16% 16% 17% 19% 20% 30% 25% 21% 21% 22% 18% 24% 28 33% 33% 25% 24% 23% 20% 21% 22% 23% 26% 28% 30% 29% 22% 23% 19% 21% 25% 29 9% 9% 5% 6% 6% 6% 7% 8% 8% 9% 13% 15% 17% 10% 14% 8% 9% 9% 30 34% 35% 28% 29% 29% 28% 30% 33% 35% 39% 44% 45% 52% 43% 43% 37% 40% 37% 31 46% 47% 37% 38% 36% 35% 37% 39% 41% 45% 52% 59% 61% 47% 46% 41% 41% 44% 32 56% 57% 44% 46% 45% 43% 46% 48% 49% 54% 62% 69% 70% 55% 55% 47% 51% 53% 33 43% 43% 33% 35% 33% 32% 35% 38% 39% 44% 52% 58% 59% 46% 47% 44% 42% 42% 34 32% 32% 25% 27% 26% 25% 27% 29% 32% 36% 41% 46% 36% 32% 34% 32% 35% 32% Average 28% 28% 21% 22% 21% 20% 21% 22% 23% 25% 29% 31% 32% 25% 26% 23% 23% 28% View Large Table A5. Rate of profit, circulating capital, Germany 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 Average 1 34% 33% 26% 27% 26% 25% 27% 27% 26% 28% 30% 33% 34% 24% 25% 27% 22% 28% 2 28% 27% 20% 21% 22% 23% 23% 23% 19% 22% 27% 31% 30% 28% 27% 23% 21% 24% 3 13% 13% 11% 12% 12% 11% 12% 13% 13% 14% 16% 17% 17% 14% 14% 10% 13% 13% 4 20% 20% 16% 17% 16% 15% 16% 17% 18% 19% 21% 23% 23% 19% 20% 19% 18% 19% 5 20% 20% 16% 17% 15% 15% 14% 15% 17% 17% 20% 20% 21% 21% 23% 19% 20% 18% 6 23% 24% 18% 19% 18% 17% 18% 17% 18% 20% 20% 22% 21% 17% 16% 15% 14% 18% 7 24% 24% 19% 20% 17% 16% 17% 18% 19% 20% 22% 28% 23% 18% 16% 15% 15% 19% 8 4% 5% 4% 4% 4% 4% 4% 4% 4% 4% 4% 2% 4% 3% 3% 1% 2% 4% 9 21% 21% 16% 16% 15% 14% 15% 16% 16% 17% 20% 21% 21% 17% 18% 21% 15% 18% 10 22% 23% 18% 19% 18% 17% 19% 19% 20% 21% 23% 23% 25% 20% 21% 19% 19% 20% 11 23% 24% 18% 19% 18% 17% 18% 19% 19% 20% 23% 26% 25% 20% 21% 18% 18% 20% 12 22% 23% 18% 19% 19% 17% 18% 19% 19% 20% 23% 23% 24% 19% 20% 16% 18% 20% 13 24% 24% 20% 20% 20% 19% 20% 22% 22% 24% 25% 27% 27% 22% 25% 22% 21% 22% 14 25% 25% 20% 20% 19% 17% 17% 20% 20% 21% 23% 23% 22% 19% 20% 22% 17% 21% 15 18% 18% 14% 14% 13% 12% 13% 14% 14% 15% 16% 18% 18% 14% 16% 9% 12% 15% 16 26% 27% 21% 22% 21% 19% 20% 21% 22% 23% 25% 21% 27% 22% 23% 19% 20% 22% 17 23% 24% 18% 18% 16% 15% 16% 16% 16% 17% 19% 21% 21% 17% 19% 17% 18% 18% 18 28% 29% 6% 7% 6% 6% 7% 8% 8% 9% 32% 36% 36% 9% 29% 8% 8% 16% 19 47% 45% 38% 39% 37% 37% 40% 40% 39% 45% 58% 55% 63% 52% 50% 46% 48% 46% 20 37% 37% 29% 31% 29% 27% 29% 32% 32% 33% 38% 48% 43% 36% 36% 32% 31% 34% 21 45% 46% 36% 37% 36% 34% 36% 39% 40% 44% 50% 56% 58% 48% 46% 37% 41% 43% 22 33% 33% 26% 28% 28% 27% 29% 33% 34% 38% 44% 47% 53% 43% 45% 38% 40% 36% 23 37% 36% 28% 30% 26% 25% 27% 30% 31% 34% 37% 40% 42% 35% 36% 32% 32% 33% 24 12% 12% 9% 9% 8% 7% 7% 6% 6% 6% 7% 8% 5% 4% 5% 5% 4% 7% 25 14% 15% 12% 13% 12% 11% 13% 13% 14% 15% 16% 18% 18% 11% 13% 10% 11% 13% 26 18% 18% 14% 15% 16% 15% 16% 18% 19% 20% 23% 21% 26% 21% 23% 19% 20% 19% 27 44% 41% 29% 29% 21% 17% 16% 16% 17% 19% 20% 30% 25% 21% 21% 22% 18% 24% 28 33% 33% 25% 24% 23% 20% 21% 22% 23% 26% 28% 30% 29% 22% 23% 19% 21% 25% 29 9% 9% 5% 6% 6% 6% 7% 8% 8% 9% 13% 15% 17% 10% 14% 8% 9% 9% 30 34% 35% 28% 29% 29% 28% 30% 33% 35% 39% 44% 45% 52% 43% 43% 37% 40% 37% 31 46% 47% 37% 38% 36% 35% 37% 39% 41% 45% 52% 59% 61% 47% 46% 41% 41% 44% 32 56% 57% 44% 46% 45% 43% 46% 48% 49% 54% 62% 69% 70% 55% 55% 47% 51% 53% 33 43% 43% 33% 35% 33% 32% 35% 38% 39% 44% 52% 58% 59% 46% 47% 44% 42% 42% 34 32% 32% 25% 27% 26% 25% 27% 29% 32% 36% 41% 46% 36% 32% 34% 32% 35% 32% Average 28% 28% 21% 22% 21% 20% 21% 22% 23% 25% 29% 31% 32% 25% 26% 23% 23% 28% 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 Average 1 34% 33% 26% 27% 26% 25% 27% 27% 26% 28% 30% 33% 34% 24% 25% 27% 22% 28% 2 28% 27% 20% 21% 22% 23% 23% 23% 19% 22% 27% 31% 30% 28% 27% 23% 21% 24% 3 13% 13% 11% 12% 12% 11% 12% 13% 13% 14% 16% 17% 17% 14% 14% 10% 13% 13% 4 20% 20% 16% 17% 16% 15% 16% 17% 18% 19% 21% 23% 23% 19% 20% 19% 18% 19% 5 20% 20% 16% 17% 15% 15% 14% 15% 17% 17% 20% 20% 21% 21% 23% 19% 20% 18% 6 23% 24% 18% 19% 18% 17% 18% 17% 18% 20% 20% 22% 21% 17% 16% 15% 14% 18% 7 24% 24% 19% 20% 17% 16% 17% 18% 19% 20% 22% 28% 23% 18% 16% 15% 15% 19% 8 4% 5% 4% 4% 4% 4% 4% 4% 4% 4% 4% 2% 4% 3% 3% 1% 2% 4% 9 21% 21% 16% 16% 15% 14% 15% 16% 16% 17% 20% 21% 21% 17% 18% 21% 15% 18% 10 22% 23% 18% 19% 18% 17% 19% 19% 20% 21% 23% 23% 25% 20% 21% 19% 19% 20% 11 23% 24% 18% 19% 18% 17% 18% 19% 19% 20% 23% 26% 25% 20% 21% 18% 18% 20% 12 22% 23% 18% 19% 19% 17% 18% 19% 19% 20% 23% 23% 24% 19% 20% 16% 18% 20% 13 24% 24% 20% 20% 20% 19% 20% 22% 22% 24% 25% 27% 27% 22% 25% 22% 21% 22% 14 25% 25% 20% 20% 19% 17% 17% 20% 20% 21% 23% 23% 22% 19% 20% 22% 17% 21% 15 18% 18% 14% 14% 13% 12% 13% 14% 14% 15% 16% 18% 18% 14% 16% 9% 12% 15% 16 26% 27% 21% 22% 21% 19% 20% 21% 22% 23% 25% 21% 27% 22% 23% 19% 20% 22% 17 23% 24% 18% 18% 16% 15% 16% 16% 16% 17% 19% 21% 21% 17% 19% 17% 18% 18% 18 28% 29% 6% 7% 6% 6% 7% 8% 8% 9% 32% 36% 36% 9% 29% 8% 8% 16% 19 47% 45% 38% 39% 37% 37% 40% 40% 39% 45% 58% 55% 63% 52% 50% 46% 48% 46% 20 37% 37% 29% 31% 29% 27% 29% 32% 32% 33% 38% 48% 43% 36% 36% 32% 31% 34% 21 45% 46% 36% 37% 36% 34% 36% 39% 40% 44% 50% 56% 58% 48% 46% 37% 41% 43% 22 33% 33% 26% 28% 28% 27% 29% 33% 34% 38% 44% 47% 53% 43% 45% 38% 40% 36% 23 37% 36% 28% 30% 26% 25% 27% 30% 31% 34% 37% 40% 42% 35% 36% 32% 32% 33% 24 12% 12% 9% 9% 8% 7% 7% 6% 6% 6% 7% 8% 5% 4% 5% 5% 4% 7% 25 14% 15% 12% 13% 12% 11% 13% 13% 14% 15% 16% 18% 18% 11% 13% 10% 11% 13% 26 18% 18% 14% 15% 16% 15% 16% 18% 19% 20% 23% 21% 26% 21% 23% 19% 20% 19% 27 44% 41% 29% 29% 21% 17% 16% 16% 17% 19% 20% 30% 25% 21% 21% 22% 18% 24% 28 33% 33% 25% 24% 23% 20% 21% 22% 23% 26% 28% 30% 29% 22% 23% 19% 21% 25% 29 9% 9% 5% 6% 6% 6% 7% 8% 8% 9% 13% 15% 17% 10% 14% 8% 9% 9% 30 34% 35% 28% 29% 29% 28% 30% 33% 35% 39% 44% 45% 52% 43% 43% 37% 40% 37% 31 46% 47% 37% 38% 36% 35% 37% 39% 41% 45% 52% 59% 61% 47% 46% 41% 41% 44% 32 56% 57% 44% 46% 45% 43% 46% 48% 49% 54% 62% 69% 70% 55% 55% 47% 51% 53% 33 43% 43% 33% 35% 33% 32% 35% 38% 39% 44% 52% 58% 59% 46% 47% 44% 42% 42% 34 32% 32% 25% 27% 26% 25% 27% 29% 32% 36% 41% 46% 36% 32% 34% 32% 35% 32% Average 28% 28% 21% 22% 21% 20% 21% 22% 23% 25% 29% 31% 32% 25% 26% 23% 23% 28% View Large Table A6. Rate of profit, circulating capital, Greece 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 Average 1 51% 53% 49% 49% 47% 49% 52% 48% 52% 51% 47% 48% 43% 40% 35% 37% 37% 46% 2 62% 64% 60% 57% 50% 53% 51% 47% 46% 45% 39% 39% 39% 34% 33% 34% 35% 46% 3 13% 13% 14% 14% 13% 14% 13% 12% 11% 12% 13% 17% 14% 13% 12% 13% 13% 13% 4 36% 37% 34% 33% 29% 31% 24% 26% 26% 30% 26% 38% 29% 25% 25% 24% 27% 29% 5 34% 34% 34% 31% 27% 27% 29% 28% 28% 34% 35% 37% 29% 19% 18% 17% 19% 28% 6 34% 37% 37% 35% 31% 32% 25% 20% 19% 21% 29% 24% 23% 22% 23% 24% 22% 27% 7 29% 31% 32% 31% 29% 30% 30% 29% 30% 32% 30% 38% 29% 28% 24% 25% 24% 29% 8 7% 6% 6% 7% 6% 5% 2% 7% 7% 8% 7% 2% 5% 6% 8% 5% 4% 6% 9 24% 24% 23% 22% 20% 22% 20% 21% 18% 20% 18% 24% 18% 18% 16% 13% 14% 20% 10 27% 29% 27% 26% 25% 26% 24% 24% 23% 25% 22% 22% 21% 21% 23% 28% 25% 25% 11 35% 34% 32% 33% 29% 28% 26% 26% 23% 26% 23% 19% 23% 22% 22% 20% 24% 26% 12 22% 24% 22% 22% 21% 19% 17% 16% 16% 15% 14% 14% 14% 15% 16% 16% 17% 18% 13 34% 36% 35% 36% 34% 34% 31% 29% 29% 30% 25% 23% 25% 28% 24% 25% 31% 30% 14 26% 28% 26% 25% 22% 21% 20% 24% 22% 25% 25% 25% 25% 23% 22% 21% 19% 23% 15 63% 65% 61% 54% 47% 47% 38% 35% 29% 29% 29% 34% 27% 28% 25% 27% 30% 39% 16 43% 44% 41% 40% 38% 39% 33% 31% 36% 30% 31% 33% 32% 27% 19% 24% 25% 33% 17 47% 43% 41% 40% 35% 37% 35% 32% 26% 29% 26% 32% 25% 24% 21% 20% 18% 31% 18 24% 24% 24% 25% 23% 24% 26% 26% 26% 27% 28% 28% 25% 22% 21% 24% 25% 25% 19 68% 70% 66% 62% 57% 63% 71% 53% 48% 47% 43% 55% 44% 41% 41% 43% 44% 54% 20 56% 62% 59% 60% 58% 51% 53% 41% 44% 46% 38% 27% 35% 35% 33% 35% 39% 45% 21 72% 75% 73% 72% 69% 71% 75% 62% 59% 59% 58% 55% 55% 53% 48% 51% 52% 62% 22 31% 34% 34% 34% 35% 33% 33% 31% 31% 32% 32% 33% 32% 32% 26% 25% 25% 31% 23 66% 66% 69% 67% 71% 78% 61% 62% 58% 62% 48% 50% 45% 40% 39% 45% 45% 57% 24 35% 35% 29% 31% 17% 13% 12% 8% 9% 7% 7% 10% 7% 6% 9% 9% 8% 15% 25 43% 48% 53% 48% 53% 47% 43% 43% 33% 31% 18% 15% 12% 11% 7% 6% 6% 30% 26 47% 46% 39% 41% 40% 40% 47% 44% 45% 53% 50% 38% 43% 45% 44% 45% 43% 44% 27 92% 68% 64% 59% 48% 56% 50% 57% 55% 57% 45% 43% 41% 39% 33% 35% 37% 52% 28 78% 81% 76% 71% 62% 62% 56% 55% 53% 54% 51% 48% 47% 43% 36% 36% 35% 55% 29 1% 1% 1% 2% 1% 1% 4% 5% 6% 7% 6% 8% 8% 6% 4% 4% 3% 4% 30 47% 50% 48% 49% 49% 50% 56% 48% 52% 53% 49% 44% 45% 44% 38% 41% 44% 47% 31 76% 78% 74% 73% 68% 57% 61% 57% 57% 63% 59% 57% 52% 52% 44% 46% 46% 60% 32 110% 110% 111% 108% 99% 101% 101% 89% 88% 87% 79% 76% 76% 70% 60% 64% 67% 88% 33 68% 69% 73% 74% 67% 73% 53% 52% 51% 56% 51% 46% 47% 42% 34% 36% 38% 55% 34 61% 63% 60% 60% 55% 60% 54% 51% 49% 46% 43% 47% 40% 42% 36% 37% 37% 49% Average 46% 46% 45% 44% 40% 41% 39% 36% 35% 37% 34% 34% 32% 30% 27% 28% 29% 37% 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 Average 1 51% 53% 49% 49% 47% 49% 52% 48% 52% 51% 47% 48% 43% 40% 35% 37% 37% 46% 2 62% 64% 60% 57% 50% 53% 51% 47% 46% 45% 39% 39% 39% 34% 33% 34% 35% 46% 3 13% 13% 14% 14% 13% 14% 13% 12% 11% 12% 13% 17% 14% 13% 12% 13% 13% 13% 4 36% 37% 34% 33% 29% 31% 24% 26% 26% 30% 26% 38% 29% 25% 25% 24% 27% 29% 5 34% 34% 34% 31% 27% 27% 29% 28% 28% 34% 35% 37% 29% 19% 18% 17% 19% 28% 6 34% 37% 37% 35% 31% 32% 25% 20% 19% 21% 29% 24% 23% 22% 23% 24% 22% 27% 7 29% 31% 32% 31% 29% 30% 30% 29% 30% 32% 30% 38% 29% 28% 24% 25% 24% 29% 8 7% 6% 6% 7% 6% 5% 2% 7% 7% 8% 7% 2% 5% 6% 8% 5% 4% 6% 9 24% 24% 23% 22% 20% 22% 20% 21% 18% 20% 18% 24% 18% 18% 16% 13% 14% 20% 10 27% 29% 27% 26% 25% 26% 24% 24% 23% 25% 22% 22% 21% 21% 23% 28% 25% 25% 11 35% 34% 32% 33% 29% 28% 26% 26% 23% 26% 23% 19% 23% 22% 22% 20% 24% 26% 12 22% 24% 22% 22% 21% 19% 17% 16% 16% 15% 14% 14% 14% 15% 16% 16% 17% 18% 13 34% 36% 35% 36% 34% 34% 31% 29% 29% 30% 25% 23% 25% 28% 24% 25% 31% 30% 14 26% 28% 26% 25% 22% 21% 20% 24% 22% 25% 25% 25% 25% 23% 22% 21% 19% 23% 15 63% 65% 61% 54% 47% 47% 38% 35% 29% 29% 29% 34% 27% 28% 25% 27% 30% 39% 16 43% 44% 41% 40% 38% 39% 33% 31% 36% 30% 31% 33% 32% 27% 19% 24% 25% 33% 17 47% 43% 41% 40% 35% 37% 35% 32% 26% 29% 26% 32% 25% 24% 21% 20% 18% 31% 18 24% 24% 24% 25% 23% 24% 26% 26% 26% 27% 28% 28% 25% 22% 21% 24% 25% 25% 19 68% 70% 66% 62% 57% 63% 71% 53% 48% 47% 43% 55% 44% 41% 41% 43% 44% 54% 20 56% 62% 59% 60% 58% 51% 53% 41% 44% 46% 38% 27% 35% 35% 33% 35% 39% 45% 21 72% 75% 73% 72% 69% 71% 75% 62% 59% 59% 58% 55% 55% 53% 48% 51% 52% 62% 22 31% 34% 34% 34% 35% 33% 33% 31% 31% 32% 32% 33% 32% 32% 26% 25% 25% 31% 23 66% 66% 69% 67% 71% 78% 61% 62% 58% 62% 48% 50% 45% 40% 39% 45% 45% 57% 24 35% 35% 29% 31% 17% 13% 12% 8% 9% 7% 7% 10% 7% 6% 9% 9% 8% 15% 25 43% 48% 53% 48% 53% 47% 43% 43% 33% 31% 18% 15% 12% 11% 7% 6% 6% 30% 26 47% 46% 39% 41% 40% 40% 47% 44% 45% 53% 50% 38% 43% 45% 44% 45% 43% 44% 27 92% 68% 64% 59% 48% 56% 50% 57% 55% 57% 45% 43% 41% 39% 33% 35% 37% 52% 28 78% 81% 76% 71% 62% 62% 56% 55% 53% 54% 51% 48% 47% 43% 36% 36% 35% 55% 29 1% 1% 1% 2% 1% 1% 4% 5% 6% 7% 6% 8% 8% 6% 4% 4% 3% 4% 30 47% 50% 48% 49% 49% 50% 56% 48% 52% 53% 49% 44% 45% 44% 38% 41% 44% 47% 31 76% 78% 74% 73% 68% 57% 61% 57% 57% 63% 59% 57% 52% 52% 44% 46% 46% 60% 32 110% 110% 111% 108% 99% 101% 101% 89% 88% 87% 79% 76% 76% 70% 60% 64% 67% 88% 33 68% 69% 73% 74% 67% 73% 53% 52% 51% 56% 51% 46% 47% 42% 34% 36% 38% 55% 34 61% 63% 60% 60% 55% 60% 54% 51% 49% 46% 43% 47% 40% 42% 36% 37% 37% 49% Average 46% 46% 45% 44% 40% 41% 39% 36% 35% 37% 34% 34% 32% 30% 27% 28% 29% 37% View Large Table A6. Rate of profit, circulating capital, Greece 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 Average 1 51% 53% 49% 49% 47% 49% 52% 48% 52% 51% 47% 48% 43% 40% 35% 37% 37% 46% 2 62% 64% 60% 57% 50% 53% 51% 47% 46% 45% 39% 39% 39% 34% 33% 34% 35% 46% 3 13% 13% 14% 14% 13% 14% 13% 12% 11% 12% 13% 17% 14% 13% 12% 13% 13% 13% 4 36% 37% 34% 33% 29% 31% 24% 26% 26% 30% 26% 38% 29% 25% 25% 24% 27% 29% 5 34% 34% 34% 31% 27% 27% 29% 28% 28% 34% 35% 37% 29% 19% 18% 17% 19% 28% 6 34% 37% 37% 35% 31% 32% 25% 20% 19% 21% 29% 24% 23% 22% 23% 24% 22% 27% 7 29% 31% 32% 31% 29% 30% 30% 29% 30% 32% 30% 38% 29% 28% 24% 25% 24% 29% 8 7% 6% 6% 7% 6% 5% 2% 7% 7% 8% 7% 2% 5% 6% 8% 5% 4% 6% 9 24% 24% 23% 22% 20% 22% 20% 21% 18% 20% 18% 24% 18% 18% 16% 13% 14% 20% 10 27% 29% 27% 26% 25% 26% 24% 24% 23% 25% 22% 22% 21% 21% 23% 28% 25% 25% 11 35% 34% 32% 33% 29% 28% 26% 26% 23% 26% 23% 19% 23% 22% 22% 20% 24% 26% 12 22% 24% 22% 22% 21% 19% 17% 16% 16% 15% 14% 14% 14% 15% 16% 16% 17% 18% 13 34% 36% 35% 36% 34% 34% 31% 29% 29% 30% 25% 23% 25% 28% 24% 25% 31% 30% 14 26% 28% 26% 25% 22% 21% 20% 24% 22% 25% 25% 25% 25% 23% 22% 21% 19% 23% 15 63% 65% 61% 54% 47% 47% 38% 35% 29% 29% 29% 34% 27% 28% 25% 27% 30% 39% 16 43% 44% 41% 40% 38% 39% 33% 31% 36% 30% 31% 33% 32% 27% 19% 24% 25% 33% 17 47% 43% 41% 40% 35% 37% 35% 32% 26% 29% 26% 32% 25% 24% 21% 20% 18% 31% 18 24% 24% 24% 25% 23% 24% 26% 26% 26% 27% 28% 28% 25% 22% 21% 24% 25% 25% 19 68% 70% 66% 62% 57% 63% 71% 53% 48% 47% 43% 55% 44% 41% 41% 43% 44% 54% 20 56% 62% 59% 60% 58% 51% 53% 41% 44% 46% 38% 27% 35% 35% 33% 35% 39% 45% 21 72% 75% 73% 72% 69% 71% 75% 62% 59% 59% 58% 55% 55% 53% 48% 51% 52% 62% 22 31% 34% 34% 34% 35% 33% 33% 31% 31% 32% 32% 33% 32% 32% 26% 25% 25% 31% 23 66% 66% 69% 67% 71% 78% 61% 62% 58% 62% 48% 50% 45% 40% 39% 45% 45% 57% 24 35% 35% 29% 31% 17% 13% 12% 8% 9% 7% 7% 10% 7% 6% 9% 9% 8% 15% 25 43% 48% 53% 48% 53% 47% 43% 43% 33% 31% 18% 15% 12% 11% 7% 6% 6% 30% 26 47% 46% 39% 41% 40% 40% 47% 44% 45% 53% 50% 38% 43% 45% 44% 45% 43% 44% 27 92% 68% 64% 59% 48% 56% 50% 57% 55% 57% 45% 43% 41% 39% 33% 35% 37% 52% 28 78% 81% 76% 71% 62% 62% 56% 55% 53% 54% 51% 48% 47% 43% 36% 36% 35% 55% 29 1% 1% 1% 2% 1% 1% 4% 5% 6% 7% 6% 8% 8% 6% 4% 4% 3% 4% 30 47% 50% 48% 49% 49% 50% 56% 48% 52% 53% 49% 44% 45% 44% 38% 41% 44% 47% 31 76% 78% 74% 73% 68% 57% 61% 57% 57% 63% 59% 57% 52% 52% 44% 46% 46% 60% 32 110% 110% 111% 108% 99% 101% 101% 89% 88% 87% 79% 76% 76% 70% 60% 64% 67% 88% 33 68% 69% 73% 74% 67% 73% 53% 52% 51% 56% 51% 46% 47% 42% 34% 36% 38% 55% 34 61% 63% 60% 60% 55% 60% 54% 51% 49% 46% 43% 47% 40% 42% 36% 37% 37% 49% Average 46% 46% 45% 44% 40% 41% 39% 36% 35% 37% 34% 34% 32% 30% 27% 28% 29% 37% 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 Average 1 51% 53% 49% 49% 47% 49% 52% 48% 52% 51% 47% 48% 43% 40% 35% 37% 37% 46% 2 62% 64% 60% 57% 50% 53% 51% 47% 46% 45% 39% 39% 39% 34% 33% 34% 35% 46% 3 13% 13% 14% 14% 13% 14% 13% 12% 11% 12% 13% 17% 14% 13% 12% 13% 13% 13% 4 36% 37% 34% 33% 29% 31% 24% 26% 26% 30% 26% 38% 29% 25% 25% 24% 27% 29% 5 34% 34% 34% 31% 27% 27% 29% 28% 28% 34% 35% 37% 29% 19% 18% 17% 19% 28% 6 34% 37% 37% 35% 31% 32% 25% 20% 19% 21% 29% 24% 23% 22% 23% 24% 22% 27% 7 29% 31% 32% 31% 29% 30% 30% 29% 30% 32% 30% 38% 29% 28% 24% 25% 24% 29% 8 7% 6% 6% 7% 6% 5% 2% 7% 7% 8% 7% 2% 5% 6% 8% 5% 4% 6% 9 24% 24% 23% 22% 20% 22% 20% 21% 18% 20% 18% 24% 18% 18% 16% 13% 14% 20% 10 27% 29% 27% 26% 25% 26% 24% 24% 23% 25% 22% 22% 21% 21% 23% 28% 25% 25% 11 35% 34% 32% 33% 29% 28% 26% 26% 23% 26% 23% 19% 23% 22% 22% 20% 24% 26% 12 22% 24% 22% 22% 21% 19% 17% 16% 16% 15% 14% 14% 14% 15% 16% 16% 17% 18% 13 34% 36% 35% 36% 34% 34% 31% 29% 29% 30% 25% 23% 25% 28% 24% 25% 31% 30% 14 26% 28% 26% 25% 22% 21% 20% 24% 22% 25% 25% 25% 25% 23% 22% 21% 19% 23% 15 63% 65% 61% 54% 47% 47% 38% 35% 29% 29% 29% 34% 27% 28% 25% 27% 30% 39% 16 43% 44% 41% 40% 38% 39% 33% 31% 36% 30% 31% 33% 32% 27% 19% 24% 25% 33% 17 47% 43% 41% 40% 35% 37% 35% 32% 26% 29% 26% 32% 25% 24% 21% 20% 18% 31% 18 24% 24% 24% 25% 23% 24% 26% 26% 26% 27% 28% 28% 25% 22% 21% 24% 25% 25% 19 68% 70% 66% 62% 57% 63% 71% 53% 48% 47% 43% 55% 44% 41% 41% 43% 44% 54% 20 56% 62% 59% 60% 58% 51% 53% 41% 44% 46% 38% 27% 35% 35% 33% 35% 39% 45% 21 72% 75% 73% 72% 69% 71% 75% 62% 59% 59% 58% 55% 55% 53% 48% 51% 52% 62% 22 31% 34% 34% 34% 35% 33% 33% 31% 31% 32% 32% 33% 32% 32% 26% 25% 25% 31% 23 66% 66% 69% 67% 71% 78% 61% 62% 58% 62% 48% 50% 45% 40% 39% 45% 45% 57% 24 35% 35% 29% 31% 17% 13% 12% 8% 9% 7% 7% 10% 7% 6% 9% 9% 8% 15% 25 43% 48% 53% 48% 53% 47% 43% 43% 33% 31% 18% 15% 12% 11% 7% 6% 6% 30% 26 47% 46% 39% 41% 40% 40% 47% 44% 45% 53% 50% 38% 43% 45% 44% 45% 43% 44% 27 92% 68% 64% 59% 48% 56% 50% 57% 55% 57% 45% 43% 41% 39% 33% 35% 37% 52% 28 78% 81% 76% 71% 62% 62% 56% 55% 53% 54% 51% 48% 47% 43% 36% 36% 35% 55% 29 1% 1% 1% 2% 1% 1% 4% 5% 6% 7% 6% 8% 8% 6% 4% 4% 3% 4% 30 47% 50% 48% 49% 49% 50% 56% 48% 52% 53% 49% 44% 45% 44% 38% 41% 44% 47% 31 76% 78% 74% 73% 68% 57% 61% 57% 57% 63% 59% 57% 52% 52% 44% 46% 46% 60% 32 110% 110% 111% 108% 99% 101% 101% 89% 88% 87% 79% 76% 76% 70% 60% 64% 67% 88% 33 68% 69% 73% 74% 67% 73% 53% 52% 51% 56% 51% 46% 47% 42% 34% 36% 38% 55% 34 61% 63% 60% 60% 55% 60% 54% 51% 49% 46% 43% 47% 40% 42% 36% 37% 37% 49% Average 46% 46% 45% 44% 40% 41% 39% 36% 35% 37% 34% 34% 32% 30% 27% 28% 29% 37% View Large Table A7. Rate of profit on fixed capital, Germany 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 Average 1 16% 15% 6% 6% 6% 6% 7% 11% 9% 10% 21% 26% 26% 49% 112% 67% 73% 33% 2 24% 26% 10% 9% 8% 8% 8% 9% 9% 11% 20% 19% 18% 2% 3% 2% 2% 9% 3 21% 21% 8% 9% 9% 8% 10% 11% 11% 13% 26% 28% 28% 77% 109% 64% 70% 36% 4 37% 36% 13% 14% 13% 12% 13% 14% 13% 16% 32% 31% 34% 110% 170% 96% 104% 51% 5 38% 36% 13% 15% 12%