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Why do states shift from opposition to torture to its employment in the face of widespread abhorrence and claims that it generates unreliable information? The expected value of acting upon unreliable information depends on the state’s appraisal of the type of error it might be committing. States may value avoiding Type I errors, which result from acting upon incorrect intelligence, differently than avoiding Type II errors, which result from failing to act on an undetected threat. Interrogations yield a mix of truth and lies; operations employing this information will avoid making Type II errors but will also make Type I errors. A state’s preference over error type changes with circumstances (as we show, occurs in Turkey and the United States), leading states to adopt coercive interrogation techniques despite secular abhorrence of torture. Our results suggest anti-torture advocacy might be more effective targeting preferences over error types than reinforcing anti-torture moral imperatives.
Foreign Policy Analysis – Oxford University Press
Published: May 5, 2016
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