The Principal Principle Does Not Imply the Principle of Indifference, Because Conditioning on Biconditionals is Counterintuitive

The Principal Principle Does Not Imply the Principle of Indifference, Because Conditioning on... Abstract In his ([2010]), Roger White argued for a principle of indifference. Hart and Titelbaum ([2015]) showed that White’s argument relied on an intuition about conditioning on biconditionals which, while widely shared, is incorrect. In their ([2017]), Hawthorne, Landes,Wallmann, and Williamson argue for a principle of indifference. Remarkably, their argument relies on the same faulty intuition. We explain their intuition, explain why it’s faulty, and show how it generates their principle of indifference. © The Author 2018. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of British Society for the Philosophy of Science. All rights reserved. For Permissions, please email: journals.permissions@oup.com http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science Oxford University Press

The Principal Principle Does Not Imply the Principle of Indifference, Because Conditioning on Biconditionals is Counterintuitive

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Publisher
Oxford University Press
Copyright
© The Author 2018. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of British Society for the Philosophy of Science. All rights reserved. For Permissions, please email: journals.permissions@oup.com
ISSN
0007-0882
eISSN
1464-3537
D.O.I.
10.1093/bjps/axy011
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

Abstract In his ([2010]), Roger White argued for a principle of indifference. Hart and Titelbaum ([2015]) showed that White’s argument relied on an intuition about conditioning on biconditionals which, while widely shared, is incorrect. In their ([2017]), Hawthorne, Landes,Wallmann, and Williamson argue for a principle of indifference. Remarkably, their argument relies on the same faulty intuition. We explain their intuition, explain why it’s faulty, and show how it generates their principle of indifference. © The Author 2018. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of British Society for the Philosophy of Science. All rights reserved. For Permissions, please email: journals.permissions@oup.com

Journal

The British Journal for the Philosophy of ScienceOxford University Press

Published: Jan 16, 2018

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