Structural inequality, natural resources and mobilization in southern Tanzania

Structural inequality, natural resources and mobilization in southern Tanzania Abstract Following large offshore discoveries, Tanzania is set to become a major natural gas producer. Widespread political pledges first fueled popular expectations of local development in the southern regions close to the discoveries. Still, in 2012 and 2013, before any gas was produced, riots erupted amid claims of broken promises. Conflict theories to a large extent fail to explain these riots. Spatial inequality is a recognized conflict driver, yet southern Tanzania remained peaceful for five decades despite grave regional marginalization. Furthermore, standard explanations of natural resource conflicts are all linked to large revenues flows, and no such flows were present at the time of the conflict. This article investigates when and how spatial inequalities and natural resources spark conflict. Based on semi-structured interviews and new survey data, it finds that natural resource mismanagement and subsequent leadership framing increased the salience of a regional identity and exacerbated felt group grievances in southern Tanzania. A feeling of injustice was particularly salient in motivating riot participants. Following a number of large natural gas discoveries, Tanzania is set to become a major petroleum producer within the coming decades. Recoverable resources of at least 57 trillion cubic feet can pave the way for the largest investments in the country’s history, and even modest forecasts indicate annual revenues far exceeding total current government inflows.1 While these future inflows have created hopes of a brighter future for most of the population in a country currently among the world’s poorest, expectations of development are particularly high in the two regions that are home to the discoveries: Mtwara and Lindi. With a history of lagging economic development and general marginalization, political promises of change fuelled hopes among the locals. ‘Mtwara will be like Europe’, President Kikwete declared in 2010. However, ‘You have broken your promises’, was the general claim during several protests and riots in 2012 and 2013. The riots followed a government decision to pipe the gas from a smaller onshore discovery in Mtwara to Dar es Salaam. The locals found this hard to reconcile with the story of local development based on industries fuelled by the same gas. Inequality between geographically advantaged and disadvantaged regions is recognized as a major conflict driver in Sub-Saharan Africa and beyond.2 Such structural asymmetries are assumed to generate group grievances, which in turn fuels mobilization. However, the ‘Wakusini’ (‘southerners’) inhabiting the marginalized Mtwara and Lindi regions in Tanzania remained peaceful for at least fifty years before riots erupted. Clearly, structural inequality was not enough to spark conflict. Furthermore, a link between natural resource abundance, particularly oil, and conflict is also well documented.3 Yet such conflicts are most often related to large revenue streams, with resource wealth funding rebel groups, weakening the state apparatus, or accruing to particular groups of the population but not others.4 At the time of the Mtwara conflict, no revenues had started flowing from the future gas developments. As such, existing conflict theories to a large extent fall short of explaining the riots. The case, therefore, offers a good opportunity to look into the causal mechanisms linking structural background patterns and conflict, and to address the question when and how regional inequalities and natural resources lead to conflict. To do so, I will take an in-depth look at the mobilization process and argue that the mere presence of structural inequalities and/or natural resources does not necessarily produce group grievances. For this to happen, people first have to identify with the group and be aware of group related structural disadvantages, and next, consider these disadvantages unjust. Determining what factors trigger and shape such perceptions and judgements is vital in order to give precise policy recommendations. Based on 35 semi-structured interviews conducted in 2014 and 2015, and an 800-respondent survey from 2015, I find that for the case of southern Tanzania, the natural gas mismanagement exacerbated group grievances and politicized the southern regional identity. While the long-lasting marginalization is resented among the ‘Wakusini’, the natural gas mismanagement is considered unjust. This sentiment was not only caused by frustrated expectations linked to broken promises, but also by a feeling of being robbed of something that rightfully belonged to them. The feeling of unjust treatment, reinforced by extensive elite mobilization, in turn had the power to make a historically peaceful population stand up to confront the government. This article contributes in several ways to existing knowledge on inequality, natural resources and conflict. First, while other natural resource related conflicts in Sub-Saharan African countries such as Nigeria, Angola, Sudan, Chad and Equatorial Guinea are thoroughly analyzed by academic work, the Mtwara riots have so far not been examined. Second, I investigate how group grievances are triggered and emphasize that this process is not necessarily induced by objective marginalization or revenue flows, but rather by changes in expectations and judgements. Importantly, my analysis highlights how natural resource mismanagement can facilitate elite framing and help exacerbate group grievances among already marginalized groups. While based on data from Tanzania, this finding serves as a warning signal to other emerging petroleum producing countries where the resources are also discovered in areas with marginalized groups, such as Kenya, Uganda, Mozambique, and Ghana. This article also speaks to the resource nationalism literature and to the inequality and natural resource literature. It supports emerging voices calling for more focus on the sub-national effects of resource nationalism, as opposed to the more common state-centric view. Furthermore, it contrasts with cross-country studies of conflict risk, which largely analyze the association between objectively measured structural patterns and conflict outbreak, thus circumnavigating the point that objective economic facts and ‘on the ground’ subjective perceptions of these facts are often very different.5 I begin the article with a description of the historic marginalization of Mtwara and Lindi, how the government first managed the natural gas discoveries and how the locals responded. Following this I present my data, before discussing the salience of a regional identity. I then highlight how a perception of injustice is a recurring motivating factor among riot participants. Next, I discuss how opposition party leaders in particular played a role in strengthening such perceptions. Before concluding, I look into the harsh government response to the riots, and finally emphasize how natural resource mismanagement can increase grievances among historically marginalized groups A history of marginalization, and sudden natural riches Southern Tanzania, comprising the Mtwara and Lindi regions, has been marginalized and underdeveloped compared to the rest of Tanzania at least since independence.6 While neglect by, and isolation from, the more prosperous north has been the norm since the late 1970s, the regions still bear scars from two post-colonial incidents in which the southerners had to bear a particularly heavy burden. President Nyerere’s support of the Front for the Liberation of Mozambique (FRELIMO) during the Mozambique civil war in the late 1960s and early 1970s proved costly to the population close to the border, which experienced loss of civilian lives and the destruction of infrastructure by the Portuguese counterinsurgency.7 During the same period, Nyerere pushed forward his socialist ‘Ujamaa’ or ‘villagization’ project, in which he aimed to move the country’s huge rural population into government constructed villages. Partly to protect locals from the ongoing war, the resettlement occurred on a larger scale in the south than in the rest of the country.8 The project is infamous for destroying social structures and moving people far away from existing infrastructure. The lack of infrastructure has persisted. It was not until 2015 that the road to Dar es Salaam was completed and the final parts paved. Before the inauguration of the Mkapa Bridge in 2003, the regions were effectively cut off from the rest of Tanzania during the rainy season. The success of the bridge aside, former President Benjamin Mkapa, originally from Mtwara himself, never succeeded with his grand ambitions of boosting trade by improving infrastructure to Mozambique, Zambia and Malawi, the so-called Mtwara Development Corridor. The ‘Ujamaa’ project also proved detrimental to the regions’ main source of income and employment: cashew nut production. As people left their farms, production dropped drastically.9 While crop production is now back at historic levels, the industry exports raw nuts, is poorly regulated and lacks transparency in marketing and pricing, resulting in low profits for the farmers. This situation, along with promises of government subsidies that never materialized and the lack of affordable pesticides, fertilizers and tools, created a great deal of frustration and added to the feeling of neglect.10 The economic marginalization of the southern regions is evident in data from different sources. A World Bank Report from 2008 concludes that while Tanzania as a whole experienced growth in the period from the mid-1990s to 2005, close to stagnant transfers from central to local governments (in percent of GDP) led to an increase in inequality between regions and a substantially greater poverty reduction in Dar es Salaam than in the rest of the country. Figure 1 shows the share of the population in southern Tanzania, Dar es Salaam and Tanzania in total living under the poverty line defined by the World Bank. Figure 1 View largeDownload slide Percent of population under World Bank poverty line Robert J Utz, Sustaining and sharing economic growth in Tanzania (World Bank Publications, 2008), p. 43 Figure 1 View largeDownload slide Percent of population under World Bank poverty line Robert J Utz, Sustaining and sharing economic growth in Tanzania (World Bank Publications, 2008), p. 43 The Demographic and Health Surveys contain data for a longer time period, and confirm the relative economic deprivation. Data on asset ownership from 1991 to 2012 in Figure 2 show that Mtwara and Lindi have persistently lagged behind both Dar es Salaam and the country average, although with a slight relative improvement from 2010 to 2012.11 Figure 2 View largeDownload slide Asset score Mtwara/Lindi vs. Dar es Salaam and Tanzania total Source: Demographic and Health Surveys. Figure 2 View largeDownload slide Asset score Mtwara/Lindi vs. Dar es Salaam and Tanzania total Source: Demographic and Health Surveys. From 2010 and onwards, huge natural gas discoveries brought the impoverished southern regions to the centre of the petroleum world’s attention. Most of the estimated 57 trillion cubic feet of recoverable natural gas reserves are located in deep-sea offshore blocks outside Mtwara and Lindi, and are planned to be processed in a Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) plant onshore in Lindi (see Map 1).12 While the large offshore fields remain in the planning phase, a smaller onshore gas field in Mnazi Bay, Mtwara, has started production.13 A decision to pipe this gas to Dar es Salaam was first made official in July 2012, before a full commission of the pipeline project in November 2012.14 The pipeline decision came after a period of extensive government promises of investments in local gas-fired industries and subsequent development of the southern regions. The government officially debated a 300 megawatt power plant and then a fertilizer plant, both meant to be situated locally.15 The decision on the pipeline was made official with no corresponding information to the local communities on the rationale for the change in plans, and on how local development would be supported once the gas was taken to Dar es Salaam (Figure 3). Map 1 View largeDownload slide Pipeline, planned LNG site and gas blocks (discoveries have been made in all) Source: GPS coordinates from survey data. Map 1 View largeDownload slide Pipeline, planned LNG site and gas blocks (discoveries have been made in all) Source: GPS coordinates from survey data. Figure 3 View largeDownload slide Responses to the question: ‘Think about the condition of people living in this region [State if Mtwara or Lindi Region]. Are their economic conditions worse, same as or better than for people in other regions in this country?’ Figure 3 View largeDownload slide Responses to the question: ‘Think about the condition of people living in this region [State if Mtwara or Lindi Region]. Are their economic conditions worse, same as or better than for people in other regions in this country?’ In a region never previously marked by any kind of political uprisings, up to 4000 people attended a protest march in Mtwara Town on the 27 December 2012.16 Riots continued on 26 and 27 January. Several government offices and houses were set on fire, and nine civilians allegedly shot by the police.17 In May 2013, after the Energy and Mineral Budget Announcement, a general strike was followed by yet another two days of riots, more loss of civilian lives and property violations.18 The police and army’s brutal force and severe human rights violations eventually ended the uprising.19 According to the conflict literature, such grave regional inequalities as demonstrated above are strongly associated with mobilization.20 Shared grievances, as a result of regional inequalities, are assumed to politicize group identities and lead to protests or violent conflict.21 Cases of conflict rooted in regional inequality are also rife.22 Yet, marginalization alone did not spark conflict in southern Tanzania. On the other hand, a link between natural resources and conflict is also well documented. Empirical studies have provided relatively robust evidence that the presence of oil and gas, particularly onshore, increases conflict risk.23 Natural resource wealth is assumed to drive mobilization through mechanisms such as greed (participants’ incentives to enrich themselves), feasibility (financing to organize a rebel group), limited state capacity to fight rebels, and popular grievances.24 There are many examples of these causal mechanisms in play in sub-Saharan Africa, with countries such as Angola, Nigeria, Sudan, Chad and Equatorial Guinea plagued by conflict.25 Large revenue streams are central in driving these causal mechanisms. However, in Tanzania, production had not started and revenues had not yet accrued from the gas discoveries. As such, existing conflict theories offer limited clues as to why the riots materialized when they did. In the following sections, I argue that the natural resource mismanagement increased the salience of a regional identity and exacerbated group grievances, and this in turn fuelled mobilization. Listening to local voices No representative data on the socio-economic situation or the attitudes linked to the natural gas discoveries in Mtwara and Lindi existed before my study. Hence, to gather data on the process leading up to mobilization, I conducted two rounds of fieldwork in southern Tanzania including 35 semi-structured interviews (15 in May 2014 and 20 in June 2015) and an 800-respondent survey (June 2015). The interviews provide insights into personal attitudes, emotions and motivations linked to the gas issues and the riots as well as the process leading up to the mobilization, and are the primary source of granular information on causal mechanisms. The survey has the advantage of providing representative data on the population under study. Interviews were conducted in Mtwara Town and Mikindani (Mtwara Mikindani District), Msanga Mkuu (Mtwara Rural District) and Lindi Town (Lindi Municipality District), with 10 women and 25 men aged 18–58. The interviewees include a Christian religious leader, a highly ranked government party official, a journalist, 6 participants in the riots, students and both unemployed and employed people. I applied maximum variation sampling, where interviewees were selected to represent variation in factors identified by the literature to affect conflict. These include age, gender, urban/rural location, education and employment/unemployment.26 Finally, I was especially interested in the views of those who participated in the riots. This skewed the sample to include more men than women, since the majority of the participants were men. While 35 interviews were needed to reach diversity on all the mentioned factors, saturation was reached well before the 35 were finalized, with people regardless of background and demography giving very similar accounts. The online appendix provides more information on the interviews. The interviews from 2014 provided several insights that helped in the design of the survey, such as which districts to cover as well as particular views and expectations that I wished to test on a representative sample. The survey covered 804 respondents from 6 of the 13 districts in the regions. Mtwara Mikindani, Mtwara Rural, Lindi Rural and Lindi Municipality were the districts most affected by the current and planned gas developments and were chosen due to this. Tandahimba and Newala were less affected, although several people from these districts were bussed to Mtwara to take part in the protests and riots. In order to cover these groups as well, while at the same time capturing sentiments of people only minimally affected by the new resources, the two districts are included.27 The exclusion of the remaining 7 districts is due both to their limited relevance and the project’s financial constraints. The survey was stratified according to district, urban, rural and mixed areas, and gender, but after that the selection of wards, villages, and respondents was fully randomized. One hundred and thirty-four villages were drawn. We conducted six surveys in each village, selected households using random walking patterns and drew respondents within each household who were then surveyed upon consent. Map 2 shows the selected districts, sampled villages as well as interview sites. The online appendix also provides further information on the survey. Map 2 View largeDownload slide Selected districts, sampled survey points and selected interview sites Source: GPS coordinates from survey data. Map 2 View largeDownload slide Selected districts, sampled survey points and selected interview sites Source: GPS coordinates from survey data. I designed both the survey and the interviews to let people speak as freely as possible and express their priorities and attitudes using their own words. Several of the survey questions were open ended (with no reading of response categories), and the interviews, in addition to containing mostly open-ended questions, also allowed the interviewee to speak freely at the end by asking ‘is there anything you want to add to what we have already talked about’. Most of the interviewees used this opportunity to both reiterate what they saw as most important and to add new insights. While the interview sample might be biased, particularly due to the fact that all interviewees lived relatively close to the natural gas developments but also since it is not representative on other important variables, the survey data can to some extent be used to test whether individual responses are in line with the view of the larger population. Several questions were replicated in the survey and the interviews, and responses are compared in the analyses. Both in the interviews and in the survey, people were encouraged to talk about highly sensitive political issues, which may have biased the responses. That said, most interviewees proved very eager to share their views and to make their voice heard. Finally, both the survey and the interviews to some extent encouraged people to talk about the past, introducing a recall bias in these parts of the material. The salience of a regional identity According to the political psychology literature, protest behaviour is closely linked to politicized group identities. The more a person identifies with a group, the more likely it is that he or she will participate in collective action with the group.28 Which group identities prevail in Mtwara and Lindi? And have the natural gas discoveries led to marked changes in these identities? Let me start with available group categories, of which there are several. First, despite Nyerere’s extensive policies to fight tribalism resulting in a strong national identity, ethnic identity is not totally absent.29 The largest group in Mtwara and Lindi, the Makondes, is said to be ethnically self-conscious and to fiercely defend their culture.30 Second, the historic marginalization paved the way for a distinct regional identity, with both people from the region and people from other parts of the country identifying Mtwarans and Lindians as ‘Wakusini’, the Swahili word for ‘southerners’.31 Finally, religious tensions between the slight Christian over Muslim majority became increasingly frequent in Tanzania.32 In coastal Mtwara and Lindi, the majority are Muslim.33 This mix of identities is evident in the interview responses. When asked how they prefer to be identified by other people, while some stated ‘Wakusini’ only, most interviewees mentioned two or more identities. The most frequently mentioned identities were Tanzanian and ‘Wakusini’, alone, together or in combination with the other identity groups (Muslim, the respondent’s tribe). The relative importance and political relevance of the regional identity become more evident when people were asked to assess the economic and political situation. Even when given an open question on whether the Tanzanian government treated all the people the same, several interviewees highlighted the relative disadvantage of the southern regions compared to other regions. No interviewee mentioned their ethnic or religious group. On the direct question on the economic situation of people in Mtwara and Lindi compared to other regions, all interviewees emphasized their marginalization: ‘Mtwara region has no rights and is not treated the same as other regions’.34 ‘When you compare, the leaders continue to despise the south. Regions like Lindi and Mtwara mostly they continue to neglect these regions in comparison to other regions. That’s the reason why we’re not developing.35 These other regions that people compared their situation with were always ‘the north’. The north seems to encompass all other regions than Mtwara and Lindi. When specifying, some mentioned other northern regions, some said all other regions than Mtwara and Lindi, and some talked about Dar es Salaam. In the minds of the Wakusini, the north is ‘where there is development’.36 As such, it was not a comparison to the elites in Dar es Salaam alone, but a broader categorization of all Tanzanians outside their own regions. These perceptions were likely to have been influenced by the experiences of numerous southerners working in low-skilled jobs in Dar es Salaam, as well as other sources such as the media, relatives and traders. The interviews were conducted in areas close to the natural gas discoveries, and all responses reflect a high awareness of the marginalization of the south. In contrast, the survey included less affected areas and offers two important nuances to the interview responses. First, people geographically farther away from the gas discoveries spoke more positively about the relative economic situation of the region. When asked to assess the economic condition of people in their region (Mtwara or Lindi)—if it is worse, same as or better than for people in other regions in the country—20 percent in Newala and 21 percent in Tandahimba answered ‘better’ or ‘much better’. Only 9 percent held this view in the remaining, coastal districts. Furthermore, discontent was higher among those who had prior knowledge of the gas discoveries. For this group, 54 percent held the view that the economic situation was ‘worse’ or ‘much worse’ in Mtwara/Lindi. For those with no prior knowledge, the figure is 38 percent. These are all indications that the natural gas discoveries affected the way people viewed regional inequalities. Second, the survey also reveals a difference in perceptions between Mtwara and Lindi. A larger share of people in Lindi than Mtwara regarded the regional economic condition as worse or much worse compared to other regions (see Figure 4). On the other hand, the survey data reveal that Mtwara and Lindi were on par in terms of objective economic conditions, with Lindi actually better off on some parameters.37 This highlights how subjective views can differ from objective facts and resonates with cross-country studies, which generally find large discrepancies between objective and perceived group inequalities.38 Figure 4 View largeDownload slide Responses to the question: ‘I will now read out several issues. For each one, please tell me if it justifies a demonstration or a protest march, or not’ Figure 4 View largeDownload slide Responses to the question: ‘I will now read out several issues. For each one, please tell me if it justifies a demonstration or a protest march, or not’ In summary, the political relevance of a regional identity was evident through the frequent comparisons made between Mtwara and Lindi and other regions/the north. The perception of regional inequality was also stronger among those who lived closer to the gas discoveries, and among those who had heard about the gas. Still, a salient regional identity and perceptions of regional inequality cannot fully explain the conflict outbreak. People rioted in Mtwara, not in Lindi, and more importantly, the regional group identification and perception of marginalization compared to other regions existed before the natural gas discoveries. The ‘Wakusini’ historically were regarded as backward, something that was highlighted by the interviewees.39 On the other hand, while the group identity was not triggered by the natural gas discoveries or management, its pre-existence was important to support the elite narratives and mobilization, as I elaborate in a later section. A strong perception of injustice A perception and awareness of a regional identity and regional inequalities do not necessarily generate grievances. It is well documented that inequality acceptance varies greatly among both individuals and groups, and depends, among other things, on existing norms and ideologies.40 Hence, for frustrations to arise, people will have to evaluate the inequalities and consider them unfair.41 This constitutes the next step on the causal pathway from objective conditions to group grievances. In essence, what made people go from accepting relative deprivation compared to the rest of the country, to becoming frustrated enough to stand up against the government? A first insight is linked to Robert Gurr’s theory of relative deprivation, and before him, James Davies’ J-Curve theory: when people get less than they expect, frustrations will arise and grievances develop.42 In the initial euphoria following the first discoveries, government promises of local development were plentiful. A particular emphasis was put on the development of local industries, which would bring benefits to the whole southern population. However, with little pre-warning the decision to pipe the gas to Dar es Salaam was made official. Nearly all of my 35 interviewees strongly emphasized how frustrated expectations, or more directly, broken promises of local development were what infuriated them. The frustration was particularly linked to speeches made by then President Kikwete when he visited the region as part of the 2010 election campaign: The reason was the lies that the president told, because the president promised, he spoke here on Mashujaa Day (..) If he had built the industries just like he had promised then these problems would have been avoided. There would have been no one who died.43 The survey responses reflect this feeling of dashed expectations. When asked how satisfied they were with the living conditions for the people in the region compared to what they expected before they had heard of the pipeline, 57 percent in Mtwara and 70 percent in Lindi reported that they were dissatisfied or very dissatisfied. Moving on to a more direct measure of unfair treatment, the survey included the question: ‘How often, if ever, are people living in this region treated unfairly by the government’. Forty-two percent held the view that this never happens, while 43 percent thought it happens sometimes, often or always.44 As expected, once more the share of people answering sometimes, often or always was higher in the coastal districts closer to the gas developments than in the districts further inland, and among those who had heard about the gas for a long time. However, in contrast to what I found in the previous section, the share holding the view that the region is sometimes/often/always treated unfairly was higher in Mtwara than in Lindi.45 While frustrated expectations are likely to be linked to a perception of unfair treatment, the interviews provide further insights into what fuels a feeling of unfairness and injustice. Generally, it seems that a notion of injustice is strongly linked to a perception of being robbed of something that belongs to them. Two contrasting interviews highlight this. First, a participant in the riots with high political awareness and strong views on the marginalization of Mtwara, both in general and after the natural resource discoveries, answered the following to a question of how many times injustice has been done to the people of the south: ‘I see this as the first time because there has never been discovered anything before here in Mtwara that has been stolen, that was robbed from us’.46 Implicitly, the years of marginalization and lack of development, while resented, was not considered an injustice. On the other hand, another informant, extremely poor even compared to southern standards, displayed an equally high awareness of the marginalization of the south: ‘In short the living conditions here in Mtwara, life is hard. We’re not all right… It’s different from other regions… To be honest I don’t think we have any political influence whatsoever’.47 Still, on the direct question on how often injustice has been done to the people of Mtwara, she answered: ‘That has never happened’. Once more, the marginalization was not seen as an injustice, and she had seemingly no basis to judge the natural gas management as unfair, as she was clear that she knew nothing about the gas issues—she was not even sure if there have been any discoveries. In general, each time respondents stated that an injustice existed, it was linked to a feeling of other, often richer, people taking what was not rightfully theirs. None of the informants highlighted the lack of development as an injustice, while several highlighted the management of the gas discoveries as one. This feeling of injustice was also strongly linked to land rights, with several emphasizing how injustice was done when the government ‘grabbed’ land and did not pay a proper price for it. Those who participated in the riots, furthermore, linked this feeling of injustice directly to their motivation to participate: ‘[I participated] To defend the interest of Mtwara’.48 Most of them perceived that their rights had been violated, and that they had to stand up for them: ‘I participated because I’m someone from Mtwara and the resources being grabbed belong to the people of Mtwara I cannot accept to be robbed of my property’.49 This link between frustrated expectations as well as injustice linked to land rights, and demonstrations and protest, is also evident in the survey data, where almost 70 percent of the respondents stated that broken promises of local development justifies such civil unrest, followed by sale of land rights and displacement. Lack of electricity, on the other hand, received a far lower score. The above accounts are fully in line with Robin Williams’ distinction between a ‘real grievance’, as opposed to mere deprivation and dissatisfaction.50 While the former ‘rests upon the claim that injustice has been inflicted upon undeserving victims’ and ‘are normative protests, claiming violations of rights or rules’, the latter might be accepted as ‘just the way things are’.51 In summary, while a group identity and perception of regional inequality preceded the gas discoveries, the feeling of injustice was new and was claimed to be the main motivating factor for the participants in the protests and riots. On the other hand, motivations linked to personal economic gain, or a ‘greed’ mechanism, were totally absent in the riot participants’ accounts. They uniformly linked their motivation to the rights of the group and the development of the region, never to individual gain: ‘That’s why I was supporting them because I being a south person I also value the development of this place’.52 It is important to note that in retrospect, most interviewees said that they would not have become so angry if they had only been given information and education on the rationale for the pipeline decision at the same time as it was taken. To them, this decision was tantamount to no local benefits and development, and at least a part of their anger was linked to a feeling of not being consulted or informed. Leadership mobilization Making people aware of injustices often requires leadership intervention.53 In particular, the social movements literature emphasizes how people may live silently with severe inequality unless elites actively highlight the injustices and pin the blame on a specific actor, very often the government.54 Such leadership intervention took place in Mtwara. Several public meetings were held throughout the last months of 2012, one of the largest allegedly attended by more than 10,000 people.55 The meetings were organized by political party leaders from altogether nine opposition parties, of which the biggest were Chama Cha Demokrasia Na Maendeleo (Chadema), Civic United Front (CUF) and Chama cha Mageuzi na Ujenzi wa Taifa (NCCR–Mageuzi).56 In addition, both Christian and Muslim religious leaders participated, as did some local representatives of the incumbent party Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM). The main message at these meeting was very clear: the gas should not leave Mtwara.57 The government had broken its promises of local development, and the locals were encouraged to take to the streets to show that they did not accept it. In addition to the meetings, people were mobilized via extensive text messages and flyers.58 Despite this relatively massive mobilization, many of my informants, including most of those who participated in the riots, claimed that there were no leaders, and that it was only the people themselves that decided to take to the streets. ‘[T]here was no leader, we were one’.59 Rather than indicating that no mobilization took place, which is well documented, this is likely to be a sign of how widespread the sentiments became, and how the message travelled by word of mouth to those who did not take part in the meetings. This resonates with the riot literature, which has long proposed that ‘no riot ever occurs without rumours to incite, accompany, and intensify the violence’.60 Equally important, as discussed below, it is also likely to be an indication of how well the message from the leaders resonated with the population. In terms of blaming, it was clearly the government that became the culprit. The government took the decision on the pipeline and is responsible for the natural gas management specifically and the lack of development in general. Hence, blaming the government for the injustice appears to have been relatively straightforward.61 It is clear that the opposition party leaders had their own agenda linked to the overall political landscape in Tanzania, with the dominance of the incumbent party and the struggle to get into government in a country were elections are far from free and fair. Still, some local incumbent party leaders openly supported the campaign on the grounds that the south should no longer be exploited or marginalized.62 It is hard to say whether there would have been any protests and riots if the elite-driven framing and mobilization had not taken place. The way it all unfolded, with the first protests starting immediately after the December 27th public meeting, and the second round of riots following more meetings and text messages, this part seems to have played a crucial role (Figure 5). Figure 5 View largeDownload slide Gas discoveries, political decisions and mobilization timeline Figure 5 View largeDownload slide Gas discoveries, political decisions and mobilization timeline The government response Historically, scholars have engaged in debates concerning the relative importance of grievances and motivational factors versus opportunity and feasibility factors in inducing conflict.63 However, recent work tends to regard both motivation and opportunity as necessary conditions for conflict to materialize.64 The importance of opportunity structures is clearly demonstrated by the case of Mtwara. According to many of my informants, before the first round of protests, the political leaders first went to the Regional Commissioner and asked him to join the meetings to discuss their claims. Allegedly, he refused to listen to their message. With no conventional political channel to handle their interests, the leaders then saw no other options to protesting. Several sources also emphasized that the initial protests were approved and supported by other local government officials, of which some also attended the public meetings.65 In terms of resources, protests and riots require little beyond motivated participants, and feasibility is thus very much governed by the expected government response to a mobilization. At the time of the first protests, no one expected brutal government repression, and in this sense opportunity was unrestricted. Correspondingly, the crackdown by the police and the army came as a surprise to most of the protesters, according to my informants. This same brutal response and human rights violations, ranging from killings and torture to rape, in the end effectively put a stop to further protests.66 In addition, a total ban on public meetings was only lifted during the election campaign in 2015, and the local radio, by far the most frequently used source of information, was until 2016 not allowed to broadcast any gas related information.67 While the killings and the abuse served to increase local grievances, now visible in the annual Memorial Day in the name of the victims, opportunity to stand up against the injustices is very restricted. My first visit to the region coincided with the first year anniversary of the May 2013 riots, and the fear of new riots and efforts to contain them were visible in army presence with tanks and armed personnel at roadblocks, closure of all shops and business and a curfew starting at 9:00 pm. Hence, the opportunity to protest is now restricted by the expected high cost and low reward of participating: Since that time things have come and gone for the people of Mtwara. The people here are looking at the president so that they can see what he’s going to do. If he wants to take it, then let him take it, what can we do? Get beaten again and killed? We’re just silent, we don’t have the power.68 The authoritarian style of President Magufuli, elected in 2015 and his banning of street protests, among other measures, is unlikely to change this.69 While the locals joined the protests and riots to fight for their rights after decades-long marginalization, the government perspective is likely to have been influenced by other historical events and trends. The Arusha Declaration of 1967 famously coupled resources and nation.70 However, despite its claim that ‘all citizens together possess all the natural resources of the country’, the legacy of Tanzania’s mining industry tells a different story.71 In 2008, Tanzania ranked third among the world’s largest gold producers. Still, annual royalties amounted to less than USD 30 million.72 This has created strong sentiments among Tanzanians that the gold resources have been completely mismanaged and that all revenues have left the country.73 At the same time, resource nationalism, with its focus on greater national control over natural resource extraction and narratives of fair distribution of benefits to all citizens, is a general trend in sub-Saharan Africa and beyond.74 In Tanzania, the Arusha Declaration coupled with the failure to secure national income from the mining industry is likely to further strengthen the focus on resource nationalism among national leaders.75 The first government reactions to the riots mirrored precisely such sentiments. Rather than addressing people’s questions about how they would benefit from the gas discoveries, in a televised address to Parliament, President Kikwete denounced the protesters and warned that the natural resources were the property of all Tanzanians, regardless of where they were found.76 The Minister for Minerals and Energy, Professor Sospeter Muhongo, agreed and labelled those rioting naïve and non-patriotic.77 From many government officials’ perspective, the protests are likely to have been regarded as totally unjustified. This may be part of the explanation for the harsh response. These conflicting narratives—the government’s focus on ‘resources belonging to the whole nation’ and the locals’ claims of injustices and unfair distribution—underline the challenges of resource nationalism in countries with weak peripheries and marginalized groups and no legacy of providing basic public goods to these peripheries. Such challenges, in turn, resonate with recent objections to the use of the state as a unit of analysis in the resource nationalism literature. John Childs uses the case of Tanzania to argue that such a state-centric focus on resource ownership and distributional justice fails to factor in ‘competing claims and identities (..) at the sub-national scale’ and that any struggles over resources are always ‘territorialized within national space’.78 Resource nationalism has been demonstrated to exacerbate resource curse effects as weak state apparatuses struggle to handle negative consequences of large petroleum revenues.79 Large petroleum revenues have induced conflict via a range of different causal mechanisms, including but far from limited to ethnic or regional grievances, in Angola, Nigeria and Sudan, for instance.80 The case of Tanzania, where no revenues were yet present, emphasizes the strength of identity-based claims. For the government of Tanzania, this is a warning signal that the demands of the southern population should be taken seriously in order to avoid escalation of the conflict. Finally, the government response to the riots must also be seen in light of the overall political development in Tanzania and a fear of growing opposition party support. Since the first multiparty general election in 1995, CCM has remained in power, but faces increasing competition for votes. In southern Tanzania, CUF is gaining strength; it won 6 of the 16 parliamentary seats in Mtwara and Lindi in 2015, compared to 2 seats in 2010.81 The ruling CCM party’s unwillingness to cede control is reflected in the decision to nullify the 2015 elections in Zanzibar where, according to most observers, CUF were the real winners.82 Petroleum resources in areas with marginalized groups So far, I have argued that the natural gas mismanagement politicized a regional identity and generated group grievances. The mostly qualitative data reported in this paper support the conjecture that grievances and a newly acute sense of injustice and indignation stimulated the mass mobilizations that gripped southern Tanzania during 2012 and 2013. Yet, it remains to be established whether the existing regional inequalities helped fuel the grievances, or whether the natural gas mismanagement drove the grievances irrespective of the historical marginalization. In other words, was the natural gas mismanagement an intervening or an independent variable? This is very hard to conclusively test without much more extensive data, but the literature and the interviews offer some indications. In a rare but much cited study of the relationship between natural resources, grievances, leadership framing and conflict, Edward Aspinall looked at the separatist conflict in the Aceh province in Indonesia.83 He concluded that natural resources can be used as a mobilization tool by elites, but only if a relevant collective identity is already in place. This concurs with realistic group conflict theory, for which empirical studies find that an emerging threat from competition over resources increases in-group solidarity, but only when this in-group solidarity is above a certain threshold before the threat arises.84 Earlier empirical studies thus point to the importance of a pre-existing identity, without linking this to inequality. Looking then to the framing literature, more clues to the importance of historic marginalization emerge. This literature finds that the effectiveness of collective action frames in creating mobilization varies from case to case, and that one important success factor is the degree to which the frame resonates with the population. This resonance is in turn driven by the credibility of the frame and its relative salience: how close to the reality and the available evidence is the frame, and how relevant is its scope for the population to be mobilized.85 In the case of Mtwara, the frame was clearly very close and very relevant. Hence, from existing theory and empirical evidence, one should expect that the historical marginalization helped support the narrative of the mobilizer and hence played a part in inducing conflict. Such a line of argument overlaps with the accounts of the interviewees. The previous neglect by the government and the recent mismanagement was so intertwined in the accounts that it is hard to conclude that the historic inequalities played no part. In general, it seems that the various variables reinforced the same overall story: first they gave us nothing, then they promised us change, and then they went back on their word and instead took what rightfully belongs to us: ‘It has taken 50 years to build the road, and still isn’t finished. Now they are building the pipeline in 18 months’.86 Natural resources or more specifically natural resource mismanagement seems to have acted as an intervening variable, not an independent variable in the case of southern Tanzania. This account of natural resource mismanagement fuelling group grievances among a historically marginalized population provides an important lesson to several emerging petroleum producers in sub-Saharan Africa. While Tanzania has a peaceful history and no pronounced ethnic tensions, Kenya has discovered oil onshore in a remote area marked by pre-existing low-intensity ethnic conflict and populated by a historically marginalized ethnic group: the Turkana. In 2012, the former Kenyan president, Mwai Kibaki, announced the discovery of 250 million barrels of oil and described this as the beginning of the journey to make Kenya a major international economic player.87 Initial euphoria among the locals subsided after increasing incidents of exclusion of local communities in oil-related decision-making, land grabbing by outsiders, corruption, and emerging inter-ethnic conflicts over discovered oil-field territories ignited fears that future revenues would only benefit central elites. Scholars now warn that there is a ‘high likelihood that oil will exacerbate inter-ethnic conflicts in an already volatile region and even result in full-blown violent conflicts between the already marginalized Turkana and the government’.88 Just across the border from Tanzania, Mozambique has made enormous natural gas discoveries in its marginalized northern region. After two decades of relative calm, rebel groups threaten that ‘peace is over’ and demand that the gas dividends should benefit the entire population.89 Uganda’s oil discoveries overlap with the territory of the marginalized Kingdom of Bunyoro, and claims of unjust revenue distribution have already surfaced there.90 Ghana’s large Jubilee discovery is outside the coast of the underdeveloped western region. Yet, compared to the other countries above, Ghana may be better equipped to counter identity-based claims, as well as other resource curse effects, due to its strong institutional framework and relatively stable political system.91 Conclusion A link between regional inequalities and conflict is well documented, as is an association between large petroleum resources and conflict. On the other hand, when and how such objective conditions trigger mobilization is less studied. Popular grievances stemming from regional marginalization or unfair natural resource revenue distribution is often mentioned as the conflict mechanism, yet structural background patterns do not automatically translate into group grievances. In the case of southern Tanzania, regional inequalities were clearly not enough to trigger conflict and actually show a decline after the first gas discoveries.92 Furthermore, at the time of the riots, gas production had not yet started, making standard natural resource conflict explanations linked to large revenue flows less relevant. In this article I have argued that for group grievances to develop, people will first have to identify with a common group identity, next, be aware of disadvantages on behalf of the group, and most importantly, consider these disadvantages unjust. Natural resource mismanagement and subsequent elite mobilization seemingly triggered all these sentiments in Tanzania. While the salience of a regional or ‘southern’ identity apparently increased following the natural gas mismanagement, this same identity has long historic roots and cannot in itself explain the conflict. Rather, what fuelled the mobilization was a pronounced feeling of injustice. Such a feeling of injustice was in turn closely linked to perceptions of being robbed of something that belongs to the group and to have been deceived by politicians breaking their promises of local development. While Mtwara and Lindi’s decades-long marginalization and underdevelopment were accepted with resignation and, thus, not framed as a tangible ‘injustice’, the mismanagement of the natural gas discovery ‘felt’ like an injustice. This was powerfully symbolized by the new resource being literally piped from its source in the southern periphery to the wealthier north without ‘payment’. In the words of many of the interviewees: ‘we were robbed’. This is what in the end transitioned many people from accepting their fate to mobilizing to try and improve it. While some of this perception of injustice is likely to be a direct result of the broken government promises, the leadership framing presumably served to carry the message to a larger share of the population. The long-lasting regional inequalities and the pre-existing group identity made the narrative of the mobilizers resonate well with, and be credible to, the population, factors demonstrated to positively affect the success of framing campaigns. The harsh government response to the riots, visibly influenced by both the Arusha Declaration and resource nationalism and their overlapping narratives of ‘natural resources belonging to the whole nation’, did nothing to address the root causes of the riots. A population repeatedly left out of this concept of a nation simply did not believe that resources that are piped out will somehow trickle back. For emerging petroleum producers, particularly those with discoveries in regions with marginalized groups, this is an important lesson. It underlines the importance of realistic information as opposed to lofty promises, as well as proper inclusion of the local groups in natural resource related decision-making. In addition to this policy perspective, these findings have several implications for the existing literature. First, the resource nationalism literature should to a larger extent take into account sub-national effects when analyzing the benefits and risks linked to increased national control over resource wealth. Second, extant empirical studies of inequality and natural resources largely analyze the link between structural background patterns and conflict risk. Hence they elide the question of whether these cleavages are politically relevant or not. To avoid this, future studies should aim to measure perceptions and grievances more directly. Third, the mobilization around a regional identity in Tanzania, coupled with the multiple identities actually present, shows that large-N studies should make an effort to establish which group identity is relevant before embarking on their analyses. Most current studies start with an assumption that it is the ethnic identity that is salient for all the countries included in the analysis, without testing this bold conjecture. Such an overall approach would totally miss the perception of regional inequality in Mtwara and Lindi. In the next decades, the majority of the world’s oil and gas supplies are projected to come from developing countries.93 This will add to the already discovered resources in sub-Saharan Africa. For these resources to foster peace and development rather than unrest and political violence, it is paramount that the rights, attitudes and opinions of the groups living close to them are properly taken into account. The fact that sub-national identity claims emerged in Tanzania, arguably one of the sub-Saharan African countries with the strongest national identity, emphasizes the power in natural resource induced group grievances. Footnotes 1. International Monetary Fund, ‘United Republic of Tanzania: Selected issues’ (International Monetary Fund, Washington, DC, 2014); Tanzanian Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative, ‘Reconciliation report for the period 1 July 2011 to 30 June 2012’ (Tanzanian Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative, Nairobi, 2014). 2. Robert H. Bates, When things fell apart. State failure in late-century Africa (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2008); Halvard Buhaug et al., ‘It’s the local economy, stupid! Geographic wealth dispersion and conflict outbreak location’, Journal of Conflict Resolution 55, 5 (2011), pp. 814–40; Christa Deiwiks, Lars-Erik Cederman, and Kristian Skrede Gleditsch, ‘Inequality and conflict in federations’, Journal of Peace Research 49, 2 (2012), pp. 289–304; Gudrun Østby, ‘Inequalities, the political environment and civil conflict: Evidence from 55 developing countries,’ in Frances Stewart (ed.), Horizontal inequalities and conflict: Understanding group violence in multiethnic societies (Palgrave Macmillian Basingstoke, UK, 2008), pp. 136–59; Frances Stewart, Horizontal inequalities and conflict: Understanding group violence in multiethnic societies (Palgrave Macmillan Basingstoke, UK, 2008). 3. Vally Koubi et al., ‘Do natural resources matter for interstate and intrastate armed conflict?’, Journal of Peace Research 51, 2 (2014), pp. 227–43; Michael L. Ross, ‘What have we learned about the resource curse?’, Annual Review of Political Science 18 (2015), pp. 239–59. 4. Koubi et al., ‘Do natural resources matter’. 5. Arnim Langer and Kristien Smedts, ‘Seeing is not believing: Perceptions of horizontal inequalities in Africa,’ (Centre for Research on Peace and Development, Leuven, 2013). 6. Pekka Seppälä and Bertha Koda, The Making of a Periphery: economic development and cultural encounters in southern Tanzania, vol. 32 (Nordic Africa Institute, Stockholm, 1998); Priya Lal, African Socialism in Post-colonial Tanzania (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2015). 7. Zachariah Mampilly, ‘Accursed by man, not God: The fight for Tanzania’s gas lands’, <http://www.warscapes.com/reportage/accursed-man-not-god-fight-tanzanias-gas-lands> (20 August 2016). 8. By 1971, more than 44 percent of the population in Mtwara lived in an ‘Ujamaa’ village, while the national average was 10–12 percent: Michael Jennings, Surrogates of the State: NGOs, development, and Ujamaa in Tanzania (Kumarian Press, Bloomfield, CT, 2008); See also Lal, African Socialism. 9. Lal, African Socialism. 10. Robert M. Ahearne, ‘Development and progress as historical phenomena in Tanzania: ‘Maendeleo? We had that in the past’, African Studies Review 59, 1 (2016), pp. 77–96. 11. The asset scores are the share of respondents owning a radio, a television, a refrigerator, and for the newest surveys, a mobile and a telephone, in Mtwara and Lindi divided by the same share in Dar es Salaam/the whole of Tanzania. The lower the score, the larger the inequality. 12. Fumbuka Ng’wanakilala, ‘Tanzania makes big onshore natural gas discovery—local newspapers’, <https://www.reuters.com/article/tanzania-gas/tanzania-makes-big-onshore-natural-gas-discovery-local-newspapers-idUSL8N16427G> (25 February 2016). While still relevant, these plans could be altered and substituted by regional export via pipelines following the drop in natural gas prices—ref. Tanzania Ministry of Energy and Minerals, ‘Natural gas utilization master plan 2016–2045’ (Tanzania Minsitry of Energy and Minerals, Dar es Salaam, 2016), pp. 1–55. 13. Discovered in 1982. 14. Africa Confidential, ‘Protests fuel political crisis,’ Africa Confidential, 7 June 2013, p. 6. 15. Ibid. 16. Ibid. 17. The total number of fatalities is disputed—most locals claim that the government figure is far too low. 18. Richard Mgamba, ‘Mtwara people need knowledge and assurance, not just ‘bombs’, IPP Media, 19 May 2013; Samuel Kamndaya Abdallah Bakari, ‘Chaos hits Mtwara after gas project confirmation,’ 22 May 2013, <http://www.thecitizen.co.tz/News/national/1840392-1860180-tx2qedz/index.html> (1 November 2016). 19. Sylivester Domasa, ‘Inside Mtwara natural gas bloody chaos,’ IPPMedia, 10 August 2013.; Interviews Mtwara, 2014/2015. 20. Buhaug et al., ‘It’s the local economy’; Deiwiks, Cederman, and Gleditsch, ‘Inequality and conflict’; Mansoob Murshed and Scott Gates, ‘Spatial–horizontal inequality and the Maoist insurgency in Nepal’, Review of Development Economics 9, 1 (2005), pp. 121–34; Østby, ‘Inequalities, the political environment and civil conflict’; Gudrun Østby, Ragnhild Nordås, and Jan Ketil Rød, ‘Regional inequalities and civil conflict in sub‐Saharan Africa’, International Studies Quarterly 53, 2 (2009), pp. 301–24; Stewart, Horizontal inequalities and conflict. 21. P.G. Klandermans, ‘Identity politics and politicized identities: Identity processes and the dynamics of protest’, Political Psychology 35, 1 (2014), pp. 1–22; Stewart, Horizontal inequalities and conflict; Østby, ‘Inequalities, the political environment and civil conflict’, pp. 136–59. 22. See e.g. Bates, When Things Fell Apart. 23. Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, ‘Greed and grievance in civil war’, Oxford Economic Papers 56, 4 (2004), pp. 563–95; James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin, ‘Ethnicity, insurgency, and civil war’, American Political Science Review 97, 01 (2003), pp. 75–90; Koubi et al., ‘Do natural resources matter’, pp. 227–43; Päivi Lujala, ‘The spoils of nature: Armed civil conflict and rebel access to natural resources’, Journal of Peace Research 47, 1 (2010), pp. 15–28; Ross, ‘What Have We Learned’, pp. 239–59. 24. Victor Asal et al., ‘Political exclusion, oil, and ethnic armed conflict’, Journal of Conflict Resolution (2015), pp. 1343–67; Matthias Basedau and Jan Henryk Pierskalla, ‘How ethnicity conditions the effect of oil and gas on civil conflict: A spatial analysis of Africa from 1990 to 2010’, Political Geography 38 (2014), pp. 1–11; Collier and Hoeffler, ‘Greed and grievance’, pp. 563–95; Paul Collier, Anke Hoeffler, and Dominic Rohner, ‘Beyond greed and grievance: feasibility and civil war’, Oxford Economic Papers 61, 1 (2009), pp. 1–27; Fearon and Laitin, ‘Ethnicity, insurgency, and civil war’, pp. 75–90; Østby, Nordås, and Rød, ‘Regional inequalities and civil conflict’, pp. 301–24. 25. Le Billon, ‘The political ecology of war’; Frynas, ‘Corporate and state responses’; Jędrzej George Frynas, ‘The oil boom in Equatorial Guinea’, African Affairs 103, 413 (2004), pp. 527–46; Luke A. Patey,‘Crude days ahead? Oil and the resource curse in Sudan’, African Affairs 109, 437 (2010), pp. 617–36; Scott Pegg, ‘Chronicle of a death foretold: The collapse of the Chad-Cameroon pipeline project’, African Affairs 108, 431 (2009), pp. 311–20. 26. Collier and Hoeffler, ‘Greed and grievance’; Ibrahim Elbadawi and Nicholas Sambanis, ‘Why are there so many civil wars in Africa? Understanding and preventing violent conflict’, Journal of African Economies 9, 3 (2000), pp. 244–69; Donald L Horowitz, The Deadly Ethnic Riot (University of California Press, CA, 2001); Henrik Urdal, ‘A clash of generations? Youth bulges and political violence’, International Studies Quarterly 50, 3 (2006), pp. 607–29. 27. 9 percent of the respondents had not heard about the gas discoveries at all. In the remaining sample with only people who had heard of the gas, 13 percent had not heard of the pipeline. 28. Klandermans, ‘Identity politics and politicized identities’, pp. 8; Bernd Simon et al., ‘Collective identification and social movement participation’, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 74, 3 (1998), p. 646. 29. See e.g. Elliott Green, ‘The political economy of nation formation in modern Tanzania: explaining stability in the face of diversity’, Commonwealth & Comparative Politics 49, 2 (2011), pp. 223–44. 30. Seppälä and Koda, The Making of a Periphery. 31. Ibid. 32. Mampilly, ‘Accursed by man, not God: The fight for Tanzania’s gas lands’. 33. See the online appendix for an overview of Muslim/Christian and ethnic affiliation in the surveyed sample. 34. Food seller, Female, 35. 35. Boda boda driver, male, 20. 36. Farmer, 28, male, riot participant. 37. See the online appendix for detailed statistics. 38. See for example Arnim Langer and Satoru Mikami, ‘The relationship between objective and subjective horizontal inequalities: Evidence from five African countries’ (Center for Research on Peace and Development, Belgium, 2012). Such subjective views also show up in the interviews. The informants from Lindi make comparisons to Mtwara, and how the latter has already benefited from the gas with the establishment of a university college and improved infrastructure. Lindi on the other hand, have not gotten anything yet. 39. See for example, Seppälä and Koda, The Making of a Periphery. 40. Ingvild Almas et al., ‘Fairness and the development of inequality acceptance’, Science 328, 5982 (2010), pp. 1176–8; Robin Murphy Williams, The Wars Within: Peoples and states in conflict (Cornell University Press, NY, 2003). 41. Lars-Erik Cederman, Kristian Skrede Gleditsch, and Halvard Buhaug, Inequality, Grievances, and Civil War (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2013). 42. James C. Davies, ‘Toward a theory of revolution’, American Sociological Review (1962), pp. 5–19; Ted Robert Gurr, Why Men Rebel (Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ, 1970). 43. Fisherman, male, 58. 44. In comparison, only 20 percent think that their religious group was sometimes/often/always treated unfairly. Data from an external source show that 23 percent of the respondents held the same view for their ethnic group (Afrobarometer Surveys round 6 2015 at Afrobarometer homepage <http://afrobarometer.org/data/merged-round-6-data-36-countries-2016> (2 October 2016). Number of respondents was only 127. 45. In other work and based on regression analyses, we find that people who think that the region is treated unfairly were more likely to support and participate in civil unrest than people who do not hold this opinion. Elise Must and Siri Aas Rustad, ‘Expectations, grievances and civil unrest in emerging petrostates. Empirical evidence from Tanzania’, in Elise Must (ed), When and How does Inequality Cause Conflict? Group dynamics, perceptions and natural resources (London School of Economics and Political Science, London, 2016), pp. 130–72. 46. Fisherman, male, 58. Participant in riots. 47. Farmer, female, 49. 48. Farmer, male, 28. 49. Fisherman, male, 58. Participant in riots. 50. Williams, The Wars Within. 51. Ibid. p. 131. 52. Student, male, 22. Participant in riots. 53. Paul R Brass, Ethnicity and Nationalism: Theory and comparison (Sage Publications, New Delhi; Newbury Park, CA, 1991). 54. Robert D. Benford and David A. Snow, ‘Framing processes and social movements: An overview and assessment’, Annual Review of Sociology (2000), pp. 611–39; William A Gamson, Talking Politics (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1992). 55. Mampilly, ‘Accursed by man, not God: The fight for Tanzania’s gas lands’. 56. Journalist, Mtwara and Student, female, 25. 57. Ibid. 58. Journalist, Mtwara. Both the interviews and media articles leave little doubt that moving the gas was the main mobilization issue. However, the opposition party leaders appear to have been relatively pragmatic and strategic, picking the topic most likely to fuel support. For the population further inland, where cashew nut farming is the main source of income, people were allegedly mobilized based on frustrations linked to missing subsidies and under-pricing. 59. Male, Student, 22, participant in riots. 60. Gordon W.S. Allport and Leo Postman, The Psychology of Rumor (Henry Holt and Company, New York, NY, 1947). pp 193. 61. Blaming the oil industry would have been a less obvious choice. The knowledge of both the companies and their operations is extremely low among the locals. For example, only 1.5 percent had heard of Maurel and Prom, the company who operates the onshore field feeding the pipeline. Those few with knowledge of the oil industry expressed very positive views, and highlighted how the industry brings skills and investments that are currently not available in Tanzania. 62. Journalist, Mtwara. 63. Collier and Hoeffler, ‘Greed and grievance’; Davies, ‘Toward a theory of revolution,’ pp. 5–19; Gurr, Why Men Rebel; Sidney Tarrow, Charles Tilly, and Doug McAdam, Dynamics of Contention (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2001); Charles Tilly, From Mobilization to Revolution (McGraw-Hill, New York, NY, 1978); Elisabeth Jean Wood, Insurgent Collective Action and Civil War in El Salvador (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2003). 64. Corinne Bara, ‘Incentives and opportunities: A complexity-oriented explanation of violent ethnic conflict’, Journal of Peace Research 51, 6 (2014), pp. 696–710. 65. Mampilly, ‘Accursed by man, not God: The fight for Tanzania’s gas lands’, Interviews Mtwara 2014/15. 66. Ibid.; Interviews Mtwara 2014/15. 67. According to the survey responses, nearly 80 percent listen to the local radio regularly. 68. Fisherman, male, 28. 69. BBC, ‘What has Tanzania’s Magufuli done during his year in office?’ <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-37822740> (4 November 2016). 70. John Childs, ‘Geography and resource nationalism: A critical review and reframing’, The Extractive Industries and Society 3, 2 (2016), pp. 539–46. 71. Godfrey Mwakikagile, Nyerere and Africa: End of an era (New Africa Press, Pretoria, 2007), p. 448. 72. Siri Lange and Abel Kinyondo, ‘Resource nationalism and local content in Tanzania: Experiences from mining and consequences for the petroleum sector’, The Extractive Industries and Society (2016), pp. 1095–104; Tanzania Minerals Audit Agency, ‘Annual Report 2014’ (Tanzania Minerals Audit Agency, Ministry of Energy and Minerals, Dar es Salaam, 2015), pp. 1–37. 73. Lange and Kinyondo, ‘Resource nationalism and local content in Tanzania’. 74. Stefan Andreasson, ‘Varieties of resource nationalism in sub-Saharan Africa’s energy and minerals markets’, The Extractive Industries and Society 2, 2 (2015), pp. 310–19. 75. Lange and Kinyondo, ‘Resource nationalism and local content in Tanzania’. 76. Mampilly, ‘Accursed by man, not God: The fight for Tanzania’s gas lands’. 77. Mgamba, ‘Mtwara people need knowledge’. 78. Childs, ‘Geography and resource nationalism’, p. 544; Tom Perreault, ‘Nature and nation: hydrocarbons, governance, and the territorial logics of resource nationalism in Bolivia’, in Anthony Bebbington and Jeffrey Bury (eds), Subterranean Struggles: New Geographies of extractive industries in Latin America (University of Texas Press, Austin, TX, 2013), pp. 67–90, 87. 79. Michael Ross, The Oil Curse: How petroleum wealth shapes the development of nations (Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ, 2012). 80. Frynas, ‘Corporate and state responses’; Le Billon, ‘The political ecology of war’; Patey, ‘Crude days ahead?’. 81. National Election Commission Tanzania, ‘Tanzania Parliamentary Results 2015’ (National Election Commission Tanzania, Dar es Salaam, 2015). 82. Conor Gaffey, ‘Zanzibar: What you need to know about Tanzania’s troubled utopia and its election do-over’ Newsweek, 19 March 2016 <http://www.newsweek.com/zanzibar-elections-tanzania-john-magufuli-437497> (29 October 2016). 83. Edward Aspinall, ‘The construction of grievance natural resources and identity in a separatist conflict’, Journal of Conflict Resolution 51, 6 (2007), pp. 950–72. 84. Marilynn B. Brewer and Donald T. Campbell, Ethnocentrism and Intergroup Attitudes: East African evidence (Sage Publications, New York, NY, 1976); Muzafer Sherif et al., Intergroup Conflict and Cooperation: The Robbers Cave experiment, vol. 10 (University Book Exchange Norman, Oklahoma, OK, 1961). 85. Benford and Snow, ‘Framing processes and social movements’. 86. Journalist. 87. Eliza M. Johannes, Leo C. Zulu, and Ezekiel Kalipeni, ‘Oil discovery in Turkana County, Kenya: a source of conflict or development?’, African Geographical Review 34, 2 (2015), pp. 142–64. 88. Ibid., p. 20. 89. Economist, ‘Gas-fired tension,’ (9 November 2013). 90. R. Vokes, ‘The politics of oil in Uganda,’ African Affairs 111, 443 (2012), pp. 303–14. 91. D. Kopinski, A. Polus, and W. Tycholiz, ‘Resource curse or resource disease? Oil in Ghana’, African Affairs 112, 449 (2013), pp. 583–601. 92. See graph in background section. The slight decline is plausible—the gas activities have brought increased local spending in real estate, hotels, infrastructure, etc. 93. Ross, The Oil Curse. © The Author(s) 2018. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of Royal African Society. All rights reserved http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png African Affairs Oxford University Press

Structural inequality, natural resources and mobilization in southern Tanzania

African Affairs , Volume 117 (466) – Jan 1, 2018

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Oxford University Press
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© The Author(s) 2018. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of Royal African Society. All rights reserved
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0001-9909
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Abstract

Abstract Following large offshore discoveries, Tanzania is set to become a major natural gas producer. Widespread political pledges first fueled popular expectations of local development in the southern regions close to the discoveries. Still, in 2012 and 2013, before any gas was produced, riots erupted amid claims of broken promises. Conflict theories to a large extent fail to explain these riots. Spatial inequality is a recognized conflict driver, yet southern Tanzania remained peaceful for five decades despite grave regional marginalization. Furthermore, standard explanations of natural resource conflicts are all linked to large revenues flows, and no such flows were present at the time of the conflict. This article investigates when and how spatial inequalities and natural resources spark conflict. Based on semi-structured interviews and new survey data, it finds that natural resource mismanagement and subsequent leadership framing increased the salience of a regional identity and exacerbated felt group grievances in southern Tanzania. A feeling of injustice was particularly salient in motivating riot participants. Following a number of large natural gas discoveries, Tanzania is set to become a major petroleum producer within the coming decades. Recoverable resources of at least 57 trillion cubic feet can pave the way for the largest investments in the country’s history, and even modest forecasts indicate annual revenues far exceeding total current government inflows.1 While these future inflows have created hopes of a brighter future for most of the population in a country currently among the world’s poorest, expectations of development are particularly high in the two regions that are home to the discoveries: Mtwara and Lindi. With a history of lagging economic development and general marginalization, political promises of change fuelled hopes among the locals. ‘Mtwara will be like Europe’, President Kikwete declared in 2010. However, ‘You have broken your promises’, was the general claim during several protests and riots in 2012 and 2013. The riots followed a government decision to pipe the gas from a smaller onshore discovery in Mtwara to Dar es Salaam. The locals found this hard to reconcile with the story of local development based on industries fuelled by the same gas. Inequality between geographically advantaged and disadvantaged regions is recognized as a major conflict driver in Sub-Saharan Africa and beyond.2 Such structural asymmetries are assumed to generate group grievances, which in turn fuels mobilization. However, the ‘Wakusini’ (‘southerners’) inhabiting the marginalized Mtwara and Lindi regions in Tanzania remained peaceful for at least fifty years before riots erupted. Clearly, structural inequality was not enough to spark conflict. Furthermore, a link between natural resource abundance, particularly oil, and conflict is also well documented.3 Yet such conflicts are most often related to large revenue streams, with resource wealth funding rebel groups, weakening the state apparatus, or accruing to particular groups of the population but not others.4 At the time of the Mtwara conflict, no revenues had started flowing from the future gas developments. As such, existing conflict theories to a large extent fall short of explaining the riots. The case, therefore, offers a good opportunity to look into the causal mechanisms linking structural background patterns and conflict, and to address the question when and how regional inequalities and natural resources lead to conflict. To do so, I will take an in-depth look at the mobilization process and argue that the mere presence of structural inequalities and/or natural resources does not necessarily produce group grievances. For this to happen, people first have to identify with the group and be aware of group related structural disadvantages, and next, consider these disadvantages unjust. Determining what factors trigger and shape such perceptions and judgements is vital in order to give precise policy recommendations. Based on 35 semi-structured interviews conducted in 2014 and 2015, and an 800-respondent survey from 2015, I find that for the case of southern Tanzania, the natural gas mismanagement exacerbated group grievances and politicized the southern regional identity. While the long-lasting marginalization is resented among the ‘Wakusini’, the natural gas mismanagement is considered unjust. This sentiment was not only caused by frustrated expectations linked to broken promises, but also by a feeling of being robbed of something that rightfully belonged to them. The feeling of unjust treatment, reinforced by extensive elite mobilization, in turn had the power to make a historically peaceful population stand up to confront the government. This article contributes in several ways to existing knowledge on inequality, natural resources and conflict. First, while other natural resource related conflicts in Sub-Saharan African countries such as Nigeria, Angola, Sudan, Chad and Equatorial Guinea are thoroughly analyzed by academic work, the Mtwara riots have so far not been examined. Second, I investigate how group grievances are triggered and emphasize that this process is not necessarily induced by objective marginalization or revenue flows, but rather by changes in expectations and judgements. Importantly, my analysis highlights how natural resource mismanagement can facilitate elite framing and help exacerbate group grievances among already marginalized groups. While based on data from Tanzania, this finding serves as a warning signal to other emerging petroleum producing countries where the resources are also discovered in areas with marginalized groups, such as Kenya, Uganda, Mozambique, and Ghana. This article also speaks to the resource nationalism literature and to the inequality and natural resource literature. It supports emerging voices calling for more focus on the sub-national effects of resource nationalism, as opposed to the more common state-centric view. Furthermore, it contrasts with cross-country studies of conflict risk, which largely analyze the association between objectively measured structural patterns and conflict outbreak, thus circumnavigating the point that objective economic facts and ‘on the ground’ subjective perceptions of these facts are often very different.5 I begin the article with a description of the historic marginalization of Mtwara and Lindi, how the government first managed the natural gas discoveries and how the locals responded. Following this I present my data, before discussing the salience of a regional identity. I then highlight how a perception of injustice is a recurring motivating factor among riot participants. Next, I discuss how opposition party leaders in particular played a role in strengthening such perceptions. Before concluding, I look into the harsh government response to the riots, and finally emphasize how natural resource mismanagement can increase grievances among historically marginalized groups A history of marginalization, and sudden natural riches Southern Tanzania, comprising the Mtwara and Lindi regions, has been marginalized and underdeveloped compared to the rest of Tanzania at least since independence.6 While neglect by, and isolation from, the more prosperous north has been the norm since the late 1970s, the regions still bear scars from two post-colonial incidents in which the southerners had to bear a particularly heavy burden. President Nyerere’s support of the Front for the Liberation of Mozambique (FRELIMO) during the Mozambique civil war in the late 1960s and early 1970s proved costly to the population close to the border, which experienced loss of civilian lives and the destruction of infrastructure by the Portuguese counterinsurgency.7 During the same period, Nyerere pushed forward his socialist ‘Ujamaa’ or ‘villagization’ project, in which he aimed to move the country’s huge rural population into government constructed villages. Partly to protect locals from the ongoing war, the resettlement occurred on a larger scale in the south than in the rest of the country.8 The project is infamous for destroying social structures and moving people far away from existing infrastructure. The lack of infrastructure has persisted. It was not until 2015 that the road to Dar es Salaam was completed and the final parts paved. Before the inauguration of the Mkapa Bridge in 2003, the regions were effectively cut off from the rest of Tanzania during the rainy season. The success of the bridge aside, former President Benjamin Mkapa, originally from Mtwara himself, never succeeded with his grand ambitions of boosting trade by improving infrastructure to Mozambique, Zambia and Malawi, the so-called Mtwara Development Corridor. The ‘Ujamaa’ project also proved detrimental to the regions’ main source of income and employment: cashew nut production. As people left their farms, production dropped drastically.9 While crop production is now back at historic levels, the industry exports raw nuts, is poorly regulated and lacks transparency in marketing and pricing, resulting in low profits for the farmers. This situation, along with promises of government subsidies that never materialized and the lack of affordable pesticides, fertilizers and tools, created a great deal of frustration and added to the feeling of neglect.10 The economic marginalization of the southern regions is evident in data from different sources. A World Bank Report from 2008 concludes that while Tanzania as a whole experienced growth in the period from the mid-1990s to 2005, close to stagnant transfers from central to local governments (in percent of GDP) led to an increase in inequality between regions and a substantially greater poverty reduction in Dar es Salaam than in the rest of the country. Figure 1 shows the share of the population in southern Tanzania, Dar es Salaam and Tanzania in total living under the poverty line defined by the World Bank. Figure 1 View largeDownload slide Percent of population under World Bank poverty line Robert J Utz, Sustaining and sharing economic growth in Tanzania (World Bank Publications, 2008), p. 43 Figure 1 View largeDownload slide Percent of population under World Bank poverty line Robert J Utz, Sustaining and sharing economic growth in Tanzania (World Bank Publications, 2008), p. 43 The Demographic and Health Surveys contain data for a longer time period, and confirm the relative economic deprivation. Data on asset ownership from 1991 to 2012 in Figure 2 show that Mtwara and Lindi have persistently lagged behind both Dar es Salaam and the country average, although with a slight relative improvement from 2010 to 2012.11 Figure 2 View largeDownload slide Asset score Mtwara/Lindi vs. Dar es Salaam and Tanzania total Source: Demographic and Health Surveys. Figure 2 View largeDownload slide Asset score Mtwara/Lindi vs. Dar es Salaam and Tanzania total Source: Demographic and Health Surveys. From 2010 and onwards, huge natural gas discoveries brought the impoverished southern regions to the centre of the petroleum world’s attention. Most of the estimated 57 trillion cubic feet of recoverable natural gas reserves are located in deep-sea offshore blocks outside Mtwara and Lindi, and are planned to be processed in a Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) plant onshore in Lindi (see Map 1).12 While the large offshore fields remain in the planning phase, a smaller onshore gas field in Mnazi Bay, Mtwara, has started production.13 A decision to pipe this gas to Dar es Salaam was first made official in July 2012, before a full commission of the pipeline project in November 2012.14 The pipeline decision came after a period of extensive government promises of investments in local gas-fired industries and subsequent development of the southern regions. The government officially debated a 300 megawatt power plant and then a fertilizer plant, both meant to be situated locally.15 The decision on the pipeline was made official with no corresponding information to the local communities on the rationale for the change in plans, and on how local development would be supported once the gas was taken to Dar es Salaam (Figure 3). Map 1 View largeDownload slide Pipeline, planned LNG site and gas blocks (discoveries have been made in all) Source: GPS coordinates from survey data. Map 1 View largeDownload slide Pipeline, planned LNG site and gas blocks (discoveries have been made in all) Source: GPS coordinates from survey data. Figure 3 View largeDownload slide Responses to the question: ‘Think about the condition of people living in this region [State if Mtwara or Lindi Region]. Are their economic conditions worse, same as or better than for people in other regions in this country?’ Figure 3 View largeDownload slide Responses to the question: ‘Think about the condition of people living in this region [State if Mtwara or Lindi Region]. Are their economic conditions worse, same as or better than for people in other regions in this country?’ In a region never previously marked by any kind of political uprisings, up to 4000 people attended a protest march in Mtwara Town on the 27 December 2012.16 Riots continued on 26 and 27 January. Several government offices and houses were set on fire, and nine civilians allegedly shot by the police.17 In May 2013, after the Energy and Mineral Budget Announcement, a general strike was followed by yet another two days of riots, more loss of civilian lives and property violations.18 The police and army’s brutal force and severe human rights violations eventually ended the uprising.19 According to the conflict literature, such grave regional inequalities as demonstrated above are strongly associated with mobilization.20 Shared grievances, as a result of regional inequalities, are assumed to politicize group identities and lead to protests or violent conflict.21 Cases of conflict rooted in regional inequality are also rife.22 Yet, marginalization alone did not spark conflict in southern Tanzania. On the other hand, a link between natural resources and conflict is also well documented. Empirical studies have provided relatively robust evidence that the presence of oil and gas, particularly onshore, increases conflict risk.23 Natural resource wealth is assumed to drive mobilization through mechanisms such as greed (participants’ incentives to enrich themselves), feasibility (financing to organize a rebel group), limited state capacity to fight rebels, and popular grievances.24 There are many examples of these causal mechanisms in play in sub-Saharan Africa, with countries such as Angola, Nigeria, Sudan, Chad and Equatorial Guinea plagued by conflict.25 Large revenue streams are central in driving these causal mechanisms. However, in Tanzania, production had not started and revenues had not yet accrued from the gas discoveries. As such, existing conflict theories offer limited clues as to why the riots materialized when they did. In the following sections, I argue that the natural resource mismanagement increased the salience of a regional identity and exacerbated group grievances, and this in turn fuelled mobilization. Listening to local voices No representative data on the socio-economic situation or the attitudes linked to the natural gas discoveries in Mtwara and Lindi existed before my study. Hence, to gather data on the process leading up to mobilization, I conducted two rounds of fieldwork in southern Tanzania including 35 semi-structured interviews (15 in May 2014 and 20 in June 2015) and an 800-respondent survey (June 2015). The interviews provide insights into personal attitudes, emotions and motivations linked to the gas issues and the riots as well as the process leading up to the mobilization, and are the primary source of granular information on causal mechanisms. The survey has the advantage of providing representative data on the population under study. Interviews were conducted in Mtwara Town and Mikindani (Mtwara Mikindani District), Msanga Mkuu (Mtwara Rural District) and Lindi Town (Lindi Municipality District), with 10 women and 25 men aged 18–58. The interviewees include a Christian religious leader, a highly ranked government party official, a journalist, 6 participants in the riots, students and both unemployed and employed people. I applied maximum variation sampling, where interviewees were selected to represent variation in factors identified by the literature to affect conflict. These include age, gender, urban/rural location, education and employment/unemployment.26 Finally, I was especially interested in the views of those who participated in the riots. This skewed the sample to include more men than women, since the majority of the participants were men. While 35 interviews were needed to reach diversity on all the mentioned factors, saturation was reached well before the 35 were finalized, with people regardless of background and demography giving very similar accounts. The online appendix provides more information on the interviews. The interviews from 2014 provided several insights that helped in the design of the survey, such as which districts to cover as well as particular views and expectations that I wished to test on a representative sample. The survey covered 804 respondents from 6 of the 13 districts in the regions. Mtwara Mikindani, Mtwara Rural, Lindi Rural and Lindi Municipality were the districts most affected by the current and planned gas developments and were chosen due to this. Tandahimba and Newala were less affected, although several people from these districts were bussed to Mtwara to take part in the protests and riots. In order to cover these groups as well, while at the same time capturing sentiments of people only minimally affected by the new resources, the two districts are included.27 The exclusion of the remaining 7 districts is due both to their limited relevance and the project’s financial constraints. The survey was stratified according to district, urban, rural and mixed areas, and gender, but after that the selection of wards, villages, and respondents was fully randomized. One hundred and thirty-four villages were drawn. We conducted six surveys in each village, selected households using random walking patterns and drew respondents within each household who were then surveyed upon consent. Map 2 shows the selected districts, sampled villages as well as interview sites. The online appendix also provides further information on the survey. Map 2 View largeDownload slide Selected districts, sampled survey points and selected interview sites Source: GPS coordinates from survey data. Map 2 View largeDownload slide Selected districts, sampled survey points and selected interview sites Source: GPS coordinates from survey data. I designed both the survey and the interviews to let people speak as freely as possible and express their priorities and attitudes using their own words. Several of the survey questions were open ended (with no reading of response categories), and the interviews, in addition to containing mostly open-ended questions, also allowed the interviewee to speak freely at the end by asking ‘is there anything you want to add to what we have already talked about’. Most of the interviewees used this opportunity to both reiterate what they saw as most important and to add new insights. While the interview sample might be biased, particularly due to the fact that all interviewees lived relatively close to the natural gas developments but also since it is not representative on other important variables, the survey data can to some extent be used to test whether individual responses are in line with the view of the larger population. Several questions were replicated in the survey and the interviews, and responses are compared in the analyses. Both in the interviews and in the survey, people were encouraged to talk about highly sensitive political issues, which may have biased the responses. That said, most interviewees proved very eager to share their views and to make their voice heard. Finally, both the survey and the interviews to some extent encouraged people to talk about the past, introducing a recall bias in these parts of the material. The salience of a regional identity According to the political psychology literature, protest behaviour is closely linked to politicized group identities. The more a person identifies with a group, the more likely it is that he or she will participate in collective action with the group.28 Which group identities prevail in Mtwara and Lindi? And have the natural gas discoveries led to marked changes in these identities? Let me start with available group categories, of which there are several. First, despite Nyerere’s extensive policies to fight tribalism resulting in a strong national identity, ethnic identity is not totally absent.29 The largest group in Mtwara and Lindi, the Makondes, is said to be ethnically self-conscious and to fiercely defend their culture.30 Second, the historic marginalization paved the way for a distinct regional identity, with both people from the region and people from other parts of the country identifying Mtwarans and Lindians as ‘Wakusini’, the Swahili word for ‘southerners’.31 Finally, religious tensions between the slight Christian over Muslim majority became increasingly frequent in Tanzania.32 In coastal Mtwara and Lindi, the majority are Muslim.33 This mix of identities is evident in the interview responses. When asked how they prefer to be identified by other people, while some stated ‘Wakusini’ only, most interviewees mentioned two or more identities. The most frequently mentioned identities were Tanzanian and ‘Wakusini’, alone, together or in combination with the other identity groups (Muslim, the respondent’s tribe). The relative importance and political relevance of the regional identity become more evident when people were asked to assess the economic and political situation. Even when given an open question on whether the Tanzanian government treated all the people the same, several interviewees highlighted the relative disadvantage of the southern regions compared to other regions. No interviewee mentioned their ethnic or religious group. On the direct question on the economic situation of people in Mtwara and Lindi compared to other regions, all interviewees emphasized their marginalization: ‘Mtwara region has no rights and is not treated the same as other regions’.34 ‘When you compare, the leaders continue to despise the south. Regions like Lindi and Mtwara mostly they continue to neglect these regions in comparison to other regions. That’s the reason why we’re not developing.35 These other regions that people compared their situation with were always ‘the north’. The north seems to encompass all other regions than Mtwara and Lindi. When specifying, some mentioned other northern regions, some said all other regions than Mtwara and Lindi, and some talked about Dar es Salaam. In the minds of the Wakusini, the north is ‘where there is development’.36 As such, it was not a comparison to the elites in Dar es Salaam alone, but a broader categorization of all Tanzanians outside their own regions. These perceptions were likely to have been influenced by the experiences of numerous southerners working in low-skilled jobs in Dar es Salaam, as well as other sources such as the media, relatives and traders. The interviews were conducted in areas close to the natural gas discoveries, and all responses reflect a high awareness of the marginalization of the south. In contrast, the survey included less affected areas and offers two important nuances to the interview responses. First, people geographically farther away from the gas discoveries spoke more positively about the relative economic situation of the region. When asked to assess the economic condition of people in their region (Mtwara or Lindi)—if it is worse, same as or better than for people in other regions in the country—20 percent in Newala and 21 percent in Tandahimba answered ‘better’ or ‘much better’. Only 9 percent held this view in the remaining, coastal districts. Furthermore, discontent was higher among those who had prior knowledge of the gas discoveries. For this group, 54 percent held the view that the economic situation was ‘worse’ or ‘much worse’ in Mtwara/Lindi. For those with no prior knowledge, the figure is 38 percent. These are all indications that the natural gas discoveries affected the way people viewed regional inequalities. Second, the survey also reveals a difference in perceptions between Mtwara and Lindi. A larger share of people in Lindi than Mtwara regarded the regional economic condition as worse or much worse compared to other regions (see Figure 4). On the other hand, the survey data reveal that Mtwara and Lindi were on par in terms of objective economic conditions, with Lindi actually better off on some parameters.37 This highlights how subjective views can differ from objective facts and resonates with cross-country studies, which generally find large discrepancies between objective and perceived group inequalities.38 Figure 4 View largeDownload slide Responses to the question: ‘I will now read out several issues. For each one, please tell me if it justifies a demonstration or a protest march, or not’ Figure 4 View largeDownload slide Responses to the question: ‘I will now read out several issues. For each one, please tell me if it justifies a demonstration or a protest march, or not’ In summary, the political relevance of a regional identity was evident through the frequent comparisons made between Mtwara and Lindi and other regions/the north. The perception of regional inequality was also stronger among those who lived closer to the gas discoveries, and among those who had heard about the gas. Still, a salient regional identity and perceptions of regional inequality cannot fully explain the conflict outbreak. People rioted in Mtwara, not in Lindi, and more importantly, the regional group identification and perception of marginalization compared to other regions existed before the natural gas discoveries. The ‘Wakusini’ historically were regarded as backward, something that was highlighted by the interviewees.39 On the other hand, while the group identity was not triggered by the natural gas discoveries or management, its pre-existence was important to support the elite narratives and mobilization, as I elaborate in a later section. A strong perception of injustice A perception and awareness of a regional identity and regional inequalities do not necessarily generate grievances. It is well documented that inequality acceptance varies greatly among both individuals and groups, and depends, among other things, on existing norms and ideologies.40 Hence, for frustrations to arise, people will have to evaluate the inequalities and consider them unfair.41 This constitutes the next step on the causal pathway from objective conditions to group grievances. In essence, what made people go from accepting relative deprivation compared to the rest of the country, to becoming frustrated enough to stand up against the government? A first insight is linked to Robert Gurr’s theory of relative deprivation, and before him, James Davies’ J-Curve theory: when people get less than they expect, frustrations will arise and grievances develop.42 In the initial euphoria following the first discoveries, government promises of local development were plentiful. A particular emphasis was put on the development of local industries, which would bring benefits to the whole southern population. However, with little pre-warning the decision to pipe the gas to Dar es Salaam was made official. Nearly all of my 35 interviewees strongly emphasized how frustrated expectations, or more directly, broken promises of local development were what infuriated them. The frustration was particularly linked to speeches made by then President Kikwete when he visited the region as part of the 2010 election campaign: The reason was the lies that the president told, because the president promised, he spoke here on Mashujaa Day (..) If he had built the industries just like he had promised then these problems would have been avoided. There would have been no one who died.43 The survey responses reflect this feeling of dashed expectations. When asked how satisfied they were with the living conditions for the people in the region compared to what they expected before they had heard of the pipeline, 57 percent in Mtwara and 70 percent in Lindi reported that they were dissatisfied or very dissatisfied. Moving on to a more direct measure of unfair treatment, the survey included the question: ‘How often, if ever, are people living in this region treated unfairly by the government’. Forty-two percent held the view that this never happens, while 43 percent thought it happens sometimes, often or always.44 As expected, once more the share of people answering sometimes, often or always was higher in the coastal districts closer to the gas developments than in the districts further inland, and among those who had heard about the gas for a long time. However, in contrast to what I found in the previous section, the share holding the view that the region is sometimes/often/always treated unfairly was higher in Mtwara than in Lindi.45 While frustrated expectations are likely to be linked to a perception of unfair treatment, the interviews provide further insights into what fuels a feeling of unfairness and injustice. Generally, it seems that a notion of injustice is strongly linked to a perception of being robbed of something that belongs to them. Two contrasting interviews highlight this. First, a participant in the riots with high political awareness and strong views on the marginalization of Mtwara, both in general and after the natural resource discoveries, answered the following to a question of how many times injustice has been done to the people of the south: ‘I see this as the first time because there has never been discovered anything before here in Mtwara that has been stolen, that was robbed from us’.46 Implicitly, the years of marginalization and lack of development, while resented, was not considered an injustice. On the other hand, another informant, extremely poor even compared to southern standards, displayed an equally high awareness of the marginalization of the south: ‘In short the living conditions here in Mtwara, life is hard. We’re not all right… It’s different from other regions… To be honest I don’t think we have any political influence whatsoever’.47 Still, on the direct question on how often injustice has been done to the people of Mtwara, she answered: ‘That has never happened’. Once more, the marginalization was not seen as an injustice, and she had seemingly no basis to judge the natural gas management as unfair, as she was clear that she knew nothing about the gas issues—she was not even sure if there have been any discoveries. In general, each time respondents stated that an injustice existed, it was linked to a feeling of other, often richer, people taking what was not rightfully theirs. None of the informants highlighted the lack of development as an injustice, while several highlighted the management of the gas discoveries as one. This feeling of injustice was also strongly linked to land rights, with several emphasizing how injustice was done when the government ‘grabbed’ land and did not pay a proper price for it. Those who participated in the riots, furthermore, linked this feeling of injustice directly to their motivation to participate: ‘[I participated] To defend the interest of Mtwara’.48 Most of them perceived that their rights had been violated, and that they had to stand up for them: ‘I participated because I’m someone from Mtwara and the resources being grabbed belong to the people of Mtwara I cannot accept to be robbed of my property’.49 This link between frustrated expectations as well as injustice linked to land rights, and demonstrations and protest, is also evident in the survey data, where almost 70 percent of the respondents stated that broken promises of local development justifies such civil unrest, followed by sale of land rights and displacement. Lack of electricity, on the other hand, received a far lower score. The above accounts are fully in line with Robin Williams’ distinction between a ‘real grievance’, as opposed to mere deprivation and dissatisfaction.50 While the former ‘rests upon the claim that injustice has been inflicted upon undeserving victims’ and ‘are normative protests, claiming violations of rights or rules’, the latter might be accepted as ‘just the way things are’.51 In summary, while a group identity and perception of regional inequality preceded the gas discoveries, the feeling of injustice was new and was claimed to be the main motivating factor for the participants in the protests and riots. On the other hand, motivations linked to personal economic gain, or a ‘greed’ mechanism, were totally absent in the riot participants’ accounts. They uniformly linked their motivation to the rights of the group and the development of the region, never to individual gain: ‘That’s why I was supporting them because I being a south person I also value the development of this place’.52 It is important to note that in retrospect, most interviewees said that they would not have become so angry if they had only been given information and education on the rationale for the pipeline decision at the same time as it was taken. To them, this decision was tantamount to no local benefits and development, and at least a part of their anger was linked to a feeling of not being consulted or informed. Leadership mobilization Making people aware of injustices often requires leadership intervention.53 In particular, the social movements literature emphasizes how people may live silently with severe inequality unless elites actively highlight the injustices and pin the blame on a specific actor, very often the government.54 Such leadership intervention took place in Mtwara. Several public meetings were held throughout the last months of 2012, one of the largest allegedly attended by more than 10,000 people.55 The meetings were organized by political party leaders from altogether nine opposition parties, of which the biggest were Chama Cha Demokrasia Na Maendeleo (Chadema), Civic United Front (CUF) and Chama cha Mageuzi na Ujenzi wa Taifa (NCCR–Mageuzi).56 In addition, both Christian and Muslim religious leaders participated, as did some local representatives of the incumbent party Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM). The main message at these meeting was very clear: the gas should not leave Mtwara.57 The government had broken its promises of local development, and the locals were encouraged to take to the streets to show that they did not accept it. In addition to the meetings, people were mobilized via extensive text messages and flyers.58 Despite this relatively massive mobilization, many of my informants, including most of those who participated in the riots, claimed that there were no leaders, and that it was only the people themselves that decided to take to the streets. ‘[T]here was no leader, we were one’.59 Rather than indicating that no mobilization took place, which is well documented, this is likely to be a sign of how widespread the sentiments became, and how the message travelled by word of mouth to those who did not take part in the meetings. This resonates with the riot literature, which has long proposed that ‘no riot ever occurs without rumours to incite, accompany, and intensify the violence’.60 Equally important, as discussed below, it is also likely to be an indication of how well the message from the leaders resonated with the population. In terms of blaming, it was clearly the government that became the culprit. The government took the decision on the pipeline and is responsible for the natural gas management specifically and the lack of development in general. Hence, blaming the government for the injustice appears to have been relatively straightforward.61 It is clear that the opposition party leaders had their own agenda linked to the overall political landscape in Tanzania, with the dominance of the incumbent party and the struggle to get into government in a country were elections are far from free and fair. Still, some local incumbent party leaders openly supported the campaign on the grounds that the south should no longer be exploited or marginalized.62 It is hard to say whether there would have been any protests and riots if the elite-driven framing and mobilization had not taken place. The way it all unfolded, with the first protests starting immediately after the December 27th public meeting, and the second round of riots following more meetings and text messages, this part seems to have played a crucial role (Figure 5). Figure 5 View largeDownload slide Gas discoveries, political decisions and mobilization timeline Figure 5 View largeDownload slide Gas discoveries, political decisions and mobilization timeline The government response Historically, scholars have engaged in debates concerning the relative importance of grievances and motivational factors versus opportunity and feasibility factors in inducing conflict.63 However, recent work tends to regard both motivation and opportunity as necessary conditions for conflict to materialize.64 The importance of opportunity structures is clearly demonstrated by the case of Mtwara. According to many of my informants, before the first round of protests, the political leaders first went to the Regional Commissioner and asked him to join the meetings to discuss their claims. Allegedly, he refused to listen to their message. With no conventional political channel to handle their interests, the leaders then saw no other options to protesting. Several sources also emphasized that the initial protests were approved and supported by other local government officials, of which some also attended the public meetings.65 In terms of resources, protests and riots require little beyond motivated participants, and feasibility is thus very much governed by the expected government response to a mobilization. At the time of the first protests, no one expected brutal government repression, and in this sense opportunity was unrestricted. Correspondingly, the crackdown by the police and the army came as a surprise to most of the protesters, according to my informants. This same brutal response and human rights violations, ranging from killings and torture to rape, in the end effectively put a stop to further protests.66 In addition, a total ban on public meetings was only lifted during the election campaign in 2015, and the local radio, by far the most frequently used source of information, was until 2016 not allowed to broadcast any gas related information.67 While the killings and the abuse served to increase local grievances, now visible in the annual Memorial Day in the name of the victims, opportunity to stand up against the injustices is very restricted. My first visit to the region coincided with the first year anniversary of the May 2013 riots, and the fear of new riots and efforts to contain them were visible in army presence with tanks and armed personnel at roadblocks, closure of all shops and business and a curfew starting at 9:00 pm. Hence, the opportunity to protest is now restricted by the expected high cost and low reward of participating: Since that time things have come and gone for the people of Mtwara. The people here are looking at the president so that they can see what he’s going to do. If he wants to take it, then let him take it, what can we do? Get beaten again and killed? We’re just silent, we don’t have the power.68 The authoritarian style of President Magufuli, elected in 2015 and his banning of street protests, among other measures, is unlikely to change this.69 While the locals joined the protests and riots to fight for their rights after decades-long marginalization, the government perspective is likely to have been influenced by other historical events and trends. The Arusha Declaration of 1967 famously coupled resources and nation.70 However, despite its claim that ‘all citizens together possess all the natural resources of the country’, the legacy of Tanzania’s mining industry tells a different story.71 In 2008, Tanzania ranked third among the world’s largest gold producers. Still, annual royalties amounted to less than USD 30 million.72 This has created strong sentiments among Tanzanians that the gold resources have been completely mismanaged and that all revenues have left the country.73 At the same time, resource nationalism, with its focus on greater national control over natural resource extraction and narratives of fair distribution of benefits to all citizens, is a general trend in sub-Saharan Africa and beyond.74 In Tanzania, the Arusha Declaration coupled with the failure to secure national income from the mining industry is likely to further strengthen the focus on resource nationalism among national leaders.75 The first government reactions to the riots mirrored precisely such sentiments. Rather than addressing people’s questions about how they would benefit from the gas discoveries, in a televised address to Parliament, President Kikwete denounced the protesters and warned that the natural resources were the property of all Tanzanians, regardless of where they were found.76 The Minister for Minerals and Energy, Professor Sospeter Muhongo, agreed and labelled those rioting naïve and non-patriotic.77 From many government officials’ perspective, the protests are likely to have been regarded as totally unjustified. This may be part of the explanation for the harsh response. These conflicting narratives—the government’s focus on ‘resources belonging to the whole nation’ and the locals’ claims of injustices and unfair distribution—underline the challenges of resource nationalism in countries with weak peripheries and marginalized groups and no legacy of providing basic public goods to these peripheries. Such challenges, in turn, resonate with recent objections to the use of the state as a unit of analysis in the resource nationalism literature. John Childs uses the case of Tanzania to argue that such a state-centric focus on resource ownership and distributional justice fails to factor in ‘competing claims and identities (..) at the sub-national scale’ and that any struggles over resources are always ‘territorialized within national space’.78 Resource nationalism has been demonstrated to exacerbate resource curse effects as weak state apparatuses struggle to handle negative consequences of large petroleum revenues.79 Large petroleum revenues have induced conflict via a range of different causal mechanisms, including but far from limited to ethnic or regional grievances, in Angola, Nigeria and Sudan, for instance.80 The case of Tanzania, where no revenues were yet present, emphasizes the strength of identity-based claims. For the government of Tanzania, this is a warning signal that the demands of the southern population should be taken seriously in order to avoid escalation of the conflict. Finally, the government response to the riots must also be seen in light of the overall political development in Tanzania and a fear of growing opposition party support. Since the first multiparty general election in 1995, CCM has remained in power, but faces increasing competition for votes. In southern Tanzania, CUF is gaining strength; it won 6 of the 16 parliamentary seats in Mtwara and Lindi in 2015, compared to 2 seats in 2010.81 The ruling CCM party’s unwillingness to cede control is reflected in the decision to nullify the 2015 elections in Zanzibar where, according to most observers, CUF were the real winners.82 Petroleum resources in areas with marginalized groups So far, I have argued that the natural gas mismanagement politicized a regional identity and generated group grievances. The mostly qualitative data reported in this paper support the conjecture that grievances and a newly acute sense of injustice and indignation stimulated the mass mobilizations that gripped southern Tanzania during 2012 and 2013. Yet, it remains to be established whether the existing regional inequalities helped fuel the grievances, or whether the natural gas mismanagement drove the grievances irrespective of the historical marginalization. In other words, was the natural gas mismanagement an intervening or an independent variable? This is very hard to conclusively test without much more extensive data, but the literature and the interviews offer some indications. In a rare but much cited study of the relationship between natural resources, grievances, leadership framing and conflict, Edward Aspinall looked at the separatist conflict in the Aceh province in Indonesia.83 He concluded that natural resources can be used as a mobilization tool by elites, but only if a relevant collective identity is already in place. This concurs with realistic group conflict theory, for which empirical studies find that an emerging threat from competition over resources increases in-group solidarity, but only when this in-group solidarity is above a certain threshold before the threat arises.84 Earlier empirical studies thus point to the importance of a pre-existing identity, without linking this to inequality. Looking then to the framing literature, more clues to the importance of historic marginalization emerge. This literature finds that the effectiveness of collective action frames in creating mobilization varies from case to case, and that one important success factor is the degree to which the frame resonates with the population. This resonance is in turn driven by the credibility of the frame and its relative salience: how close to the reality and the available evidence is the frame, and how relevant is its scope for the population to be mobilized.85 In the case of Mtwara, the frame was clearly very close and very relevant. Hence, from existing theory and empirical evidence, one should expect that the historical marginalization helped support the narrative of the mobilizer and hence played a part in inducing conflict. Such a line of argument overlaps with the accounts of the interviewees. The previous neglect by the government and the recent mismanagement was so intertwined in the accounts that it is hard to conclude that the historic inequalities played no part. In general, it seems that the various variables reinforced the same overall story: first they gave us nothing, then they promised us change, and then they went back on their word and instead took what rightfully belongs to us: ‘It has taken 50 years to build the road, and still isn’t finished. Now they are building the pipeline in 18 months’.86 Natural resources or more specifically natural resource mismanagement seems to have acted as an intervening variable, not an independent variable in the case of southern Tanzania. This account of natural resource mismanagement fuelling group grievances among a historically marginalized population provides an important lesson to several emerging petroleum producers in sub-Saharan Africa. While Tanzania has a peaceful history and no pronounced ethnic tensions, Kenya has discovered oil onshore in a remote area marked by pre-existing low-intensity ethnic conflict and populated by a historically marginalized ethnic group: the Turkana. In 2012, the former Kenyan president, Mwai Kibaki, announced the discovery of 250 million barrels of oil and described this as the beginning of the journey to make Kenya a major international economic player.87 Initial euphoria among the locals subsided after increasing incidents of exclusion of local communities in oil-related decision-making, land grabbing by outsiders, corruption, and emerging inter-ethnic conflicts over discovered oil-field territories ignited fears that future revenues would only benefit central elites. Scholars now warn that there is a ‘high likelihood that oil will exacerbate inter-ethnic conflicts in an already volatile region and even result in full-blown violent conflicts between the already marginalized Turkana and the government’.88 Just across the border from Tanzania, Mozambique has made enormous natural gas discoveries in its marginalized northern region. After two decades of relative calm, rebel groups threaten that ‘peace is over’ and demand that the gas dividends should benefit the entire population.89 Uganda’s oil discoveries overlap with the territory of the marginalized Kingdom of Bunyoro, and claims of unjust revenue distribution have already surfaced there.90 Ghana’s large Jubilee discovery is outside the coast of the underdeveloped western region. Yet, compared to the other countries above, Ghana may be better equipped to counter identity-based claims, as well as other resource curse effects, due to its strong institutional framework and relatively stable political system.91 Conclusion A link between regional inequalities and conflict is well documented, as is an association between large petroleum resources and conflict. On the other hand, when and how such objective conditions trigger mobilization is less studied. Popular grievances stemming from regional marginalization or unfair natural resource revenue distribution is often mentioned as the conflict mechanism, yet structural background patterns do not automatically translate into group grievances. In the case of southern Tanzania, regional inequalities were clearly not enough to trigger conflict and actually show a decline after the first gas discoveries.92 Furthermore, at the time of the riots, gas production had not yet started, making standard natural resource conflict explanations linked to large revenue flows less relevant. In this article I have argued that for group grievances to develop, people will first have to identify with a common group identity, next, be aware of disadvantages on behalf of the group, and most importantly, consider these disadvantages unjust. Natural resource mismanagement and subsequent elite mobilization seemingly triggered all these sentiments in Tanzania. While the salience of a regional or ‘southern’ identity apparently increased following the natural gas mismanagement, this same identity has long historic roots and cannot in itself explain the conflict. Rather, what fuelled the mobilization was a pronounced feeling of injustice. Such a feeling of injustice was in turn closely linked to perceptions of being robbed of something that belongs to the group and to have been deceived by politicians breaking their promises of local development. While Mtwara and Lindi’s decades-long marginalization and underdevelopment were accepted with resignation and, thus, not framed as a tangible ‘injustice’, the mismanagement of the natural gas discovery ‘felt’ like an injustice. This was powerfully symbolized by the new resource being literally piped from its source in the southern periphery to the wealthier north without ‘payment’. In the words of many of the interviewees: ‘we were robbed’. This is what in the end transitioned many people from accepting their fate to mobilizing to try and improve it. While some of this perception of injustice is likely to be a direct result of the broken government promises, the leadership framing presumably served to carry the message to a larger share of the population. The long-lasting regional inequalities and the pre-existing group identity made the narrative of the mobilizers resonate well with, and be credible to, the population, factors demonstrated to positively affect the success of framing campaigns. The harsh government response to the riots, visibly influenced by both the Arusha Declaration and resource nationalism and their overlapping narratives of ‘natural resources belonging to the whole nation’, did nothing to address the root causes of the riots. A population repeatedly left out of this concept of a nation simply did not believe that resources that are piped out will somehow trickle back. For emerging petroleum producers, particularly those with discoveries in regions with marginalized groups, this is an important lesson. It underlines the importance of realistic information as opposed to lofty promises, as well as proper inclusion of the local groups in natural resource related decision-making. In addition to this policy perspective, these findings have several implications for the existing literature. First, the resource nationalism literature should to a larger extent take into account sub-national effects when analyzing the benefits and risks linked to increased national control over resource wealth. Second, extant empirical studies of inequality and natural resources largely analyze the link between structural background patterns and conflict risk. Hence they elide the question of whether these cleavages are politically relevant or not. To avoid this, future studies should aim to measure perceptions and grievances more directly. Third, the mobilization around a regional identity in Tanzania, coupled with the multiple identities actually present, shows that large-N studies should make an effort to establish which group identity is relevant before embarking on their analyses. Most current studies start with an assumption that it is the ethnic identity that is salient for all the countries included in the analysis, without testing this bold conjecture. Such an overall approach would totally miss the perception of regional inequality in Mtwara and Lindi. In the next decades, the majority of the world’s oil and gas supplies are projected to come from developing countries.93 This will add to the already discovered resources in sub-Saharan Africa. For these resources to foster peace and development rather than unrest and political violence, it is paramount that the rights, attitudes and opinions of the groups living close to them are properly taken into account. The fact that sub-national identity claims emerged in Tanzania, arguably one of the sub-Saharan African countries with the strongest national identity, emphasizes the power in natural resource induced group grievances. Footnotes 1. International Monetary Fund, ‘United Republic of Tanzania: Selected issues’ (International Monetary Fund, Washington, DC, 2014); Tanzanian Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative, ‘Reconciliation report for the period 1 July 2011 to 30 June 2012’ (Tanzanian Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative, Nairobi, 2014). 2. Robert H. Bates, When things fell apart. State failure in late-century Africa (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2008); Halvard Buhaug et al., ‘It’s the local economy, stupid! Geographic wealth dispersion and conflict outbreak location’, Journal of Conflict Resolution 55, 5 (2011), pp. 814–40; Christa Deiwiks, Lars-Erik Cederman, and Kristian Skrede Gleditsch, ‘Inequality and conflict in federations’, Journal of Peace Research 49, 2 (2012), pp. 289–304; Gudrun Østby, ‘Inequalities, the political environment and civil conflict: Evidence from 55 developing countries,’ in Frances Stewart (ed.), Horizontal inequalities and conflict: Understanding group violence in multiethnic societies (Palgrave Macmillian Basingstoke, UK, 2008), pp. 136–59; Frances Stewart, Horizontal inequalities and conflict: Understanding group violence in multiethnic societies (Palgrave Macmillan Basingstoke, UK, 2008). 3. Vally Koubi et al., ‘Do natural resources matter for interstate and intrastate armed conflict?’, Journal of Peace Research 51, 2 (2014), pp. 227–43; Michael L. Ross, ‘What have we learned about the resource curse?’, Annual Review of Political Science 18 (2015), pp. 239–59. 4. Koubi et al., ‘Do natural resources matter’. 5. Arnim Langer and Kristien Smedts, ‘Seeing is not believing: Perceptions of horizontal inequalities in Africa,’ (Centre for Research on Peace and Development, Leuven, 2013). 6. Pekka Seppälä and Bertha Koda, The Making of a Periphery: economic development and cultural encounters in southern Tanzania, vol. 32 (Nordic Africa Institute, Stockholm, 1998); Priya Lal, African Socialism in Post-colonial Tanzania (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2015). 7. Zachariah Mampilly, ‘Accursed by man, not God: The fight for Tanzania’s gas lands’, <http://www.warscapes.com/reportage/accursed-man-not-god-fight-tanzanias-gas-lands> (20 August 2016). 8. By 1971, more than 44 percent of the population in Mtwara lived in an ‘Ujamaa’ village, while the national average was 10–12 percent: Michael Jennings, Surrogates of the State: NGOs, development, and Ujamaa in Tanzania (Kumarian Press, Bloomfield, CT, 2008); See also Lal, African Socialism. 9. Lal, African Socialism. 10. Robert M. Ahearne, ‘Development and progress as historical phenomena in Tanzania: ‘Maendeleo? We had that in the past’, African Studies Review 59, 1 (2016), pp. 77–96. 11. The asset scores are the share of respondents owning a radio, a television, a refrigerator, and for the newest surveys, a mobile and a telephone, in Mtwara and Lindi divided by the same share in Dar es Salaam/the whole of Tanzania. The lower the score, the larger the inequality. 12. Fumbuka Ng’wanakilala, ‘Tanzania makes big onshore natural gas discovery—local newspapers’, <https://www.reuters.com/article/tanzania-gas/tanzania-makes-big-onshore-natural-gas-discovery-local-newspapers-idUSL8N16427G> (25 February 2016). While still relevant, these plans could be altered and substituted by regional export via pipelines following the drop in natural gas prices—ref. Tanzania Ministry of Energy and Minerals, ‘Natural gas utilization master plan 2016–2045’ (Tanzania Minsitry of Energy and Minerals, Dar es Salaam, 2016), pp. 1–55. 13. Discovered in 1982. 14. Africa Confidential, ‘Protests fuel political crisis,’ Africa Confidential, 7 June 2013, p. 6. 15. Ibid. 16. Ibid. 17. The total number of fatalities is disputed—most locals claim that the government figure is far too low. 18. Richard Mgamba, ‘Mtwara people need knowledge and assurance, not just ‘bombs’, IPP Media, 19 May 2013; Samuel Kamndaya Abdallah Bakari, ‘Chaos hits Mtwara after gas project confirmation,’ 22 May 2013, <http://www.thecitizen.co.tz/News/national/1840392-1860180-tx2qedz/index.html> (1 November 2016). 19. Sylivester Domasa, ‘Inside Mtwara natural gas bloody chaos,’ IPPMedia, 10 August 2013.; Interviews Mtwara, 2014/2015. 20. Buhaug et al., ‘It’s the local economy’; Deiwiks, Cederman, and Gleditsch, ‘Inequality and conflict’; Mansoob Murshed and Scott Gates, ‘Spatial–horizontal inequality and the Maoist insurgency in Nepal’, Review of Development Economics 9, 1 (2005), pp. 121–34; Østby, ‘Inequalities, the political environment and civil conflict’; Gudrun Østby, Ragnhild Nordås, and Jan Ketil Rød, ‘Regional inequalities and civil conflict in sub‐Saharan Africa’, International Studies Quarterly 53, 2 (2009), pp. 301–24; Stewart, Horizontal inequalities and conflict. 21. P.G. Klandermans, ‘Identity politics and politicized identities: Identity processes and the dynamics of protest’, Political Psychology 35, 1 (2014), pp. 1–22; Stewart, Horizontal inequalities and conflict; Østby, ‘Inequalities, the political environment and civil conflict’, pp. 136–59. 22. See e.g. Bates, When Things Fell Apart. 23. Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, ‘Greed and grievance in civil war’, Oxford Economic Papers 56, 4 (2004), pp. 563–95; James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin, ‘Ethnicity, insurgency, and civil war’, American Political Science Review 97, 01 (2003), pp. 75–90; Koubi et al., ‘Do natural resources matter’, pp. 227–43; Päivi Lujala, ‘The spoils of nature: Armed civil conflict and rebel access to natural resources’, Journal of Peace Research 47, 1 (2010), pp. 15–28; Ross, ‘What Have We Learned’, pp. 239–59. 24. Victor Asal et al., ‘Political exclusion, oil, and ethnic armed conflict’, Journal of Conflict Resolution (2015), pp. 1343–67; Matthias Basedau and Jan Henryk Pierskalla, ‘How ethnicity conditions the effect of oil and gas on civil conflict: A spatial analysis of Africa from 1990 to 2010’, Political Geography 38 (2014), pp. 1–11; Collier and Hoeffler, ‘Greed and grievance’, pp. 563–95; Paul Collier, Anke Hoeffler, and Dominic Rohner, ‘Beyond greed and grievance: feasibility and civil war’, Oxford Economic Papers 61, 1 (2009), pp. 1–27; Fearon and Laitin, ‘Ethnicity, insurgency, and civil war’, pp. 75–90; Østby, Nordås, and Rød, ‘Regional inequalities and civil conflict’, pp. 301–24. 25. Le Billon, ‘The political ecology of war’; Frynas, ‘Corporate and state responses’; Jędrzej George Frynas, ‘The oil boom in Equatorial Guinea’, African Affairs 103, 413 (2004), pp. 527–46; Luke A. Patey,‘Crude days ahead? Oil and the resource curse in Sudan’, African Affairs 109, 437 (2010), pp. 617–36; Scott Pegg, ‘Chronicle of a death foretold: The collapse of the Chad-Cameroon pipeline project’, African Affairs 108, 431 (2009), pp. 311–20. 26. Collier and Hoeffler, ‘Greed and grievance’; Ibrahim Elbadawi and Nicholas Sambanis, ‘Why are there so many civil wars in Africa? Understanding and preventing violent conflict’, Journal of African Economies 9, 3 (2000), pp. 244–69; Donald L Horowitz, The Deadly Ethnic Riot (University of California Press, CA, 2001); Henrik Urdal, ‘A clash of generations? Youth bulges and political violence’, International Studies Quarterly 50, 3 (2006), pp. 607–29. 27. 9 percent of the respondents had not heard about the gas discoveries at all. In the remaining sample with only people who had heard of the gas, 13 percent had not heard of the pipeline. 28. Klandermans, ‘Identity politics and politicized identities’, pp. 8; Bernd Simon et al., ‘Collective identification and social movement participation’, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 74, 3 (1998), p. 646. 29. See e.g. Elliott Green, ‘The political economy of nation formation in modern Tanzania: explaining stability in the face of diversity’, Commonwealth & Comparative Politics 49, 2 (2011), pp. 223–44. 30. Seppälä and Koda, The Making of a Periphery. 31. Ibid. 32. Mampilly, ‘Accursed by man, not God: The fight for Tanzania’s gas lands’. 33. See the online appendix for an overview of Muslim/Christian and ethnic affiliation in the surveyed sample. 34. Food seller, Female, 35. 35. Boda boda driver, male, 20. 36. Farmer, 28, male, riot participant. 37. See the online appendix for detailed statistics. 38. See for example Arnim Langer and Satoru Mikami, ‘The relationship between objective and subjective horizontal inequalities: Evidence from five African countries’ (Center for Research on Peace and Development, Belgium, 2012). Such subjective views also show up in the interviews. The informants from Lindi make comparisons to Mtwara, and how the latter has already benefited from the gas with the establishment of a university college and improved infrastructure. Lindi on the other hand, have not gotten anything yet. 39. See for example, Seppälä and Koda, The Making of a Periphery. 40. Ingvild Almas et al., ‘Fairness and the development of inequality acceptance’, Science 328, 5982 (2010), pp. 1176–8; Robin Murphy Williams, The Wars Within: Peoples and states in conflict (Cornell University Press, NY, 2003). 41. Lars-Erik Cederman, Kristian Skrede Gleditsch, and Halvard Buhaug, Inequality, Grievances, and Civil War (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2013). 42. James C. Davies, ‘Toward a theory of revolution’, American Sociological Review (1962), pp. 5–19; Ted Robert Gurr, Why Men Rebel (Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ, 1970). 43. Fisherman, male, 58. 44. In comparison, only 20 percent think that their religious group was sometimes/often/always treated unfairly. Data from an external source show that 23 percent of the respondents held the same view for their ethnic group (Afrobarometer Surveys round 6 2015 at Afrobarometer homepage <http://afrobarometer.org/data/merged-round-6-data-36-countries-2016> (2 October 2016). Number of respondents was only 127. 45. In other work and based on regression analyses, we find that people who think that the region is treated unfairly were more likely to support and participate in civil unrest than people who do not hold this opinion. Elise Must and Siri Aas Rustad, ‘Expectations, grievances and civil unrest in emerging petrostates. Empirical evidence from Tanzania’, in Elise Must (ed), When and How does Inequality Cause Conflict? Group dynamics, perceptions and natural resources (London School of Economics and Political Science, London, 2016), pp. 130–72. 46. Fisherman, male, 58. Participant in riots. 47. Farmer, female, 49. 48. Farmer, male, 28. 49. Fisherman, male, 58. Participant in riots. 50. Williams, The Wars Within. 51. Ibid. p. 131. 52. Student, male, 22. Participant in riots. 53. Paul R Brass, Ethnicity and Nationalism: Theory and comparison (Sage Publications, New Delhi; Newbury Park, CA, 1991). 54. Robert D. Benford and David A. Snow, ‘Framing processes and social movements: An overview and assessment’, Annual Review of Sociology (2000), pp. 611–39; William A Gamson, Talking Politics (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1992). 55. Mampilly, ‘Accursed by man, not God: The fight for Tanzania’s gas lands’. 56. Journalist, Mtwara and Student, female, 25. 57. Ibid. 58. Journalist, Mtwara. Both the interviews and media articles leave little doubt that moving the gas was the main mobilization issue. However, the opposition party leaders appear to have been relatively pragmatic and strategic, picking the topic most likely to fuel support. For the population further inland, where cashew nut farming is the main source of income, people were allegedly mobilized based on frustrations linked to missing subsidies and under-pricing. 59. Male, Student, 22, participant in riots. 60. Gordon W.S. Allport and Leo Postman, The Psychology of Rumor (Henry Holt and Company, New York, NY, 1947). pp 193. 61. Blaming the oil industry would have been a less obvious choice. The knowledge of both the companies and their operations is extremely low among the locals. For example, only 1.5 percent had heard of Maurel and Prom, the company who operates the onshore field feeding the pipeline. Those few with knowledge of the oil industry expressed very positive views, and highlighted how the industry brings skills and investments that are currently not available in Tanzania. 62. Journalist, Mtwara. 63. Collier and Hoeffler, ‘Greed and grievance’; Davies, ‘Toward a theory of revolution,’ pp. 5–19; Gurr, Why Men Rebel; Sidney Tarrow, Charles Tilly, and Doug McAdam, Dynamics of Contention (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2001); Charles Tilly, From Mobilization to Revolution (McGraw-Hill, New York, NY, 1978); Elisabeth Jean Wood, Insurgent Collective Action and Civil War in El Salvador (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2003). 64. Corinne Bara, ‘Incentives and opportunities: A complexity-oriented explanation of violent ethnic conflict’, Journal of Peace Research 51, 6 (2014), pp. 696–710. 65. Mampilly, ‘Accursed by man, not God: The fight for Tanzania’s gas lands’, Interviews Mtwara 2014/15. 66. Ibid.; Interviews Mtwara 2014/15. 67. According to the survey responses, nearly 80 percent listen to the local radio regularly. 68. Fisherman, male, 28. 69. BBC, ‘What has Tanzania’s Magufuli done during his year in office?’ <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-37822740> (4 November 2016). 70. John Childs, ‘Geography and resource nationalism: A critical review and reframing’, The Extractive Industries and Society 3, 2 (2016), pp. 539–46. 71. Godfrey Mwakikagile, Nyerere and Africa: End of an era (New Africa Press, Pretoria, 2007), p. 448. 72. Siri Lange and Abel Kinyondo, ‘Resource nationalism and local content in Tanzania: Experiences from mining and consequences for the petroleum sector’, The Extractive Industries and Society (2016), pp. 1095–104; Tanzania Minerals Audit Agency, ‘Annual Report 2014’ (Tanzania Minerals Audit Agency, Ministry of Energy and Minerals, Dar es Salaam, 2015), pp. 1–37. 73. Lange and Kinyondo, ‘Resource nationalism and local content in Tanzania’. 74. Stefan Andreasson, ‘Varieties of resource nationalism in sub-Saharan Africa’s energy and minerals markets’, The Extractive Industries and Society 2, 2 (2015), pp. 310–19. 75. Lange and Kinyondo, ‘Resource nationalism and local content in Tanzania’. 76. Mampilly, ‘Accursed by man, not God: The fight for Tanzania’s gas lands’. 77. Mgamba, ‘Mtwara people need knowledge’. 78. Childs, ‘Geography and resource nationalism’, p. 544; Tom Perreault, ‘Nature and nation: hydrocarbons, governance, and the territorial logics of resource nationalism in Bolivia’, in Anthony Bebbington and Jeffrey Bury (eds), Subterranean Struggles: New Geographies of extractive industries in Latin America (University of Texas Press, Austin, TX, 2013), pp. 67–90, 87. 79. Michael Ross, The Oil Curse: How petroleum wealth shapes the development of nations (Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ, 2012). 80. Frynas, ‘Corporate and state responses’; Le Billon, ‘The political ecology of war’; Patey, ‘Crude days ahead?’. 81. National Election Commission Tanzania, ‘Tanzania Parliamentary Results 2015’ (National Election Commission Tanzania, Dar es Salaam, 2015). 82. Conor Gaffey, ‘Zanzibar: What you need to know about Tanzania’s troubled utopia and its election do-over’ Newsweek, 19 March 2016 <http://www.newsweek.com/zanzibar-elections-tanzania-john-magufuli-437497> (29 October 2016). 83. Edward Aspinall, ‘The construction of grievance natural resources and identity in a separatist conflict’, Journal of Conflict Resolution 51, 6 (2007), pp. 950–72. 84. Marilynn B. Brewer and Donald T. Campbell, Ethnocentrism and Intergroup Attitudes: East African evidence (Sage Publications, New York, NY, 1976); Muzafer Sherif et al., Intergroup Conflict and Cooperation: The Robbers Cave experiment, vol. 10 (University Book Exchange Norman, Oklahoma, OK, 1961). 85. Benford and Snow, ‘Framing processes and social movements’. 86. Journalist. 87. Eliza M. Johannes, Leo C. Zulu, and Ezekiel Kalipeni, ‘Oil discovery in Turkana County, Kenya: a source of conflict or development?’, African Geographical Review 34, 2 (2015), pp. 142–64. 88. Ibid., p. 20. 89. Economist, ‘Gas-fired tension,’ (9 November 2013). 90. R. Vokes, ‘The politics of oil in Uganda,’ African Affairs 111, 443 (2012), pp. 303–14. 91. D. Kopinski, A. Polus, and W. Tycholiz, ‘Resource curse or resource disease? Oil in Ghana’, African Affairs 112, 449 (2013), pp. 583–601. 92. See graph in background section. The slight decline is plausible—the gas activities have brought increased local spending in real estate, hotels, infrastructure, etc. 93. Ross, The Oil Curse. © The Author(s) 2018. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of Royal African Society. All rights reserved

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African AffairsOxford University Press

Published: Jan 1, 2018

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